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This dissertation consists of three essays related to fund management, and in particular,
mutual funds (MFs) and exchange-traded funds (ETFs).
The first essay studies the decision by an asset manager to launch an exchange-traded
fund (ETF). Fund families focus on both revenue generation and cost reduction when making
launching decisions, with new ETF launches being driven more by investor demand than past
performance. The ETF industry exhibits significant economies of scale and scope, allowing
larger families to benefit from specialization while giving smaller families pressure to expand
their product line. Competitors tend to follow the asset allocation decisions of the three largest
ETF providers, unless when it comes to less liquid or highly concentrated objective markets.
Finally, a time-to-event analysis shows that an ETF survives for longer if launched by fund
families with larger size and higher fees, and whose initiation is not driven by excessive flows
into the family.
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The second essay studies the effects of managerial turnover and competition on U.S. sub-
advised mutual funds (MFs), using changes of subadvisors by 426 funds from January 1995 to
December 2016. Sub-advised MFs make turnover decisions based on return-chasing behavior,
but these changes neither improve subsequent fund returns and risk measures, nor increase
future flows into the fund. Using sub-advisor turnover to change the degree of competition
among sub-advisors does not affect the performance of incumbent sub-advisors. Overall, there
is no evidence that sub-advisor selection decisions by fund families benefit sub-advised MF’s
performance. Outperforming sub-advisors with larger style drift are less likely to be hired, and
the more a sub-advisor deviates from its investment mandate, the more likely it is to be fired.
The third essay uses 2,290 European equity and fixed income ETFs and studies how the
replication method affects the tracking efficiencies of ETFs, especially during market crises.
Throughout the 20-year sample period 2001 to 2020, there is no persistent evidence suggesting
superior tracking performance of synthetic ETFs. I identify 119 benchmarks followed by both
physical and synthetic ETFs simultaneously, and conduct a difference-in-difference analysis
around Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, sovereign debt crisis and COVID-19 outbreak. Synthetic
ETFs face steeper declines in tracking efficiencies following a sudden increase in counterparty
risk, while they are shielded from liquidity shocks. There is a remarkable drop in tracking
performance sensitivity to market distress post the global financial crisis.
II
To my beloved family and friends
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to my supervisors, Prof. Pedro Saffi and Prof. David Chambers, for the
guidance, encouragement and opportunities they provided throughout my PhD journey, as
well as the support both academically and mentally over the pandemic period.
I would also like to thank Prof. Andrei Kirilenko, Dr. Oğuzhan Karakaş, Prof. Elroy
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This thesis consists of three essays in asset management related to mutual funds (MFs) and
exchange-traded funds (ETFs). The first essay sheds light on the industrial organization of
ETFs by examining family decisions to make new ETF offerings. The second essay reflects on
the effects of managerial turnover and competition by studying subadvisor turnover decisions
of sub-advised MFs. The third essay investigates the effect of the replication method on ETF
tracking efficiencies.
The ETF industry has grown enormously since the launch of the SPDR fund by State Street
in 1993. The assets under management (AUM) of US-based ETFs alone surpassed 5 trillion
USD by November 2020 , and ETFs now comprise nearly a third of the trading activities on
the US stock market. Competition and innovation in the ETF marketplace are encouraged by
the regulators. However, the ETF market is highly concentrated, with over 80% of the total
net assets (TNAs) controlled by the “Big Three” asset managers: BlackRock, Vanguard, and
State Street. This raises regulatory concerns over the healthiness of competition in the ETF
marketplace.
The first essay addresses four main questions. First, what are the reasons behind ETF
launches? Second, how do the determinants of ETF launches compare with those for open-
ended MFs? Third, how does the presence of the Big Three shape the ETF industry? Fourth,
can we predict the lifespan of an ETF based on characteristics of the family and the ETF’s
investment objective upon inception? Findings from this essay suggest that the decisions to
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launch ETFs and open-ended MFs differ in important ways. While the active fund families
rely heavily on past performance in making new launches, ETF families pay more attention to
matching investor demand by chasing flows and trading volumes in the market. ETF families
tend to attract market makers for their newly-launched product by leaving greater arbitrage
profits through the unique in-kind creation and redemption mechanism. Families making new
ETF launches are cost-conscious in both limiting the trading cost and reducing the per unit
cost by exploiting the economies of scale. The Big Three tend to lead the asset allocation
decisions of smaller families. However, competitors are less likely to follow the leader into less
liquid or highly concentrated objective markets. Finally, the lifespan of a newly-launched ETF
can be predicted by the family and objective-level characteristics upon inception. A time-to-
event analysis shows that an ETF survives for longer if launched by fund families with larger
size and higher fees, and whose initiation is not driven by excessive flows into the family.
Mutual fund families often delegate or outsource the asset management of a mutual fund to
sub-advisors rather than managing the assets in-house. Given that mutual funds that outsource
management are typically more sophisticated, knowledgeable, and better resourced than the
average mutual fund investor, one might expect fund families to do a better job in picking
outperforming managers. The large number of sub-advisor hiring and firing decisions made
by fund families allows us to test this hypothesis. Between January 1995 and December 2016,
we count 1,239 hiring and 809 firing decisions made by fund families, across 426 sub-advised
mutual funds. Fund families may choose to replace a sub-advisor for “good” reasons, such as
to improve fund returns and to lower risk, or for “bad” ones, such as to increase fund flows
and asset management revenues despite any improvement in performance.
Results from the second essay show that advisors exhibit similar behaviour to retail in-
vestors when selecting a mutual fund (Sirri and Tufano (1998)). Fund families tend to fire
sub-advisors following underperformance and hire them after outperformance. When the fund
itself is outperforming, there are fewer hirings and firings. Furthermore, such changes do not
lead to higher returns, lower volatility, better Sharpe ratios, and higher asset flows. We also
do not find that competition among sub-advisors improve performance. Turnover does not
affect the risk-adjusted returns of incumbent sub-advisors, and their subsequent performance
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is not different from those of recently hired/fired sub-advisors. Finally, the likelihood that a
sub-advisor is fired increases with its degree of style drift (measured by differences of factor
loadings relative to its Morningstar style’s average) and that the likelihood of being hired
following outperformance is reduced by the style drift.
There are two fundamentally different ways that exchange-traded funds (ETFs) can repli-
cate their underlying benchmark indices, namely physical replication and synthetic replication.1
Physical replication involves holding all constituent securities or a representative sample of the
benchmark index. Synthetic replication achieves the benchmark return by entering into a total
return swap or other derivative contract with a counterparty, typically a large investment bank.
The first synthetic ETF was introduced on the French market in 2001. Since then, synthetic
structures have become more popular in Europe than in the US due to different regulations
on fund’s legal structures.2 In this paper, I examine all equity and fixed income ETFs in Eu-
ropean from 01 January 2001 to 31 December 2020 to see if the replication method affects the
tracking error. After the global financial crisis, synthetic ETFs has been widely criticized by
regulators and financial advisors for their complexity, lack of transparency and counterparty
risk. However, there is a resurgence in interest for synthetic ETFs, particularly those providing
exposure to the US equity market due to their tax advantage over their physical peers (Zarate
et al., 2021).3 It is therefore important to known whether fund families offering synthetic ETFs
learn from market failures and improve the risk management of synthetic structures since then.
The third essay addresses the concern by answering the following three questions. First,
do synthetic ETFs posses superior tracking ability compared to physically-replicated ones?
Second, which replication method can better withstand market distress? Third, is there any
1Physical replication can be divided into full replication and sampling, synthetic replication can be based
on either total return swaps or other derivatives, such as futures contracts. A more detailed classification
can be found at: http://www.argos-tsp.com/en/research/argos-finneo/terminological-research/
summary-of-index-replication-methods-used-by-etf-providers.html.
2Most US-registered ETFs are governed by the Investment Company Act 1940 (ICA), which prohibits
transactions between fund and its affiliate as well as other forms of self-dealing. As a result, organizing an ETF
using synthetic structure becomes complicated. On the other hand, the majority of European-listed ETFs are
regulated by UCITS, which allows the use of exchange-traded as well as OTC derivatives to achieve investment
objectives, and therefore synthetic replication becomes more popular in Europe.
3BlackRock, once being a major critic of the synthetic structure, has launched a swap-based S&P 500
UCITS ETF in September 2020. Here is the Financial Times article: https://www.ft.com/content/
6600bd7f-5433-47d3-a2df-04411e6de75b.
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improvement on risk management after the global financial crisis, especially in terms of the
swap counterparty risk of synthetic ETFs? I find no evidence of persistent superior tracking
ability of synthetic ETFs across the sample period, especially after controlling for heterogeneity
across the investment objectives. There are significant cross-sectional variations in tracking
errors. Furthermore, after the global financial crisis, I observe a large reduction in tracking
errors. Synthetic ETFs face steeper declines in tracking efficiencies after a sudden increase in
counterparty risk. But during liquidity shocks, their tracking ability is less affected relative to
the physical ones. I explain the relative tracking performance between physical and synthetic
replication around market crisis by describing the trade-off between counterparty and liquidity
risk that dominates the market. Finally, I find that the tracking performance of both physical
and synthetic ETFs becomes significantly less sensitive to market distress after the global
financial crisis. Specifically, synthetic equity ETFs demonstrate superior tracking ability in
terms of both lower tracking errors and lower sensitivity to market turbulence in the post-
crisis sample period.
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. The next three chapters present my three
essays, followed by a chapter concluding with my main findings and implications. Several
suggestions on future research are also included at the end of the last chapter.
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Chapter 2





This paper studies the decision by an asset manager to launch an exchange-traded fund (ETF).
Fund families focus on both revenue generation and cost reduction when making launching de-
cisions, with new ETF launches being driven more by investor demand than past performance.
The ETF industry exhibits significant economies of scale and scope, allowing larger families to
benefit from specialization while giving smaller families pressure to expand their product line.
Competitors tend to follow the asset allocation decisions of the three largest ETF providers,
unless when it comes to less liquid or highly concentrated objective markets. Finally, a time-
to-event analysis shows that an ETF survives for longer if launched by fund families with larger
size and higher fees, and whose initiation is not driven by excessive flows into the family.
Keywords: Exchange-traded fund (ETF), launching decision, fund family, investor demand, flow,
volume, market concentration
JEL classification: G10, G11, G12
*Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, Address: Trinity College, Cambridge, UK CB2 1TQ, email:
xz359@cam.ac.uk. I thank Pedro Saffi, Marc Lipson, Andrei Kirilenko, David Chambers and all the par-
ticipants at the SFA Annual Meeting (November 2021), World Finance Conference (December 2020), CJBS
Winter Doctoral Conference (December 2020), CERF seminar and CERF cavalcade (May 2020) for insights
and comments. I gratefully acknowledge full financial support from Cambridge Endowment for Research in
Finance (CERF). All remaining errors are my own.
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2.1 Introduction
The exchange-traded fund (ETF) industry has grown enormously since the launch of the
SPDR fund by State Street in 1993. The assets under management (AUM) of US-based ETFs
alone surpassed 5 trillion USD by November 2020 , and ETFs now comprise nearly a third
of the trading activities on the US stock market.1 Figure 2.1 shows that new ETF launches
number from several dozen to hundreds in each year over the past decade, and the aggregate
AUM of the ETF industry has grown exponentially. Competition and innovation in the ETF
marketplace are encouraged by the regulators. For instance, in September 2019 the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted a new rule to facilitate ETF market entrants by
effectively watering down the ‘exemptive relief’ requirements.2
One distinguishing feature of ETFs relative to open-ended mutual funds (MFs) is the ex-
treme market concentration, which raises regulatory concerns that it may stifle competition.3
Figure 2.2 shows that over 80% of the total net assets (TNAs) in ETFs are managed by one
of the “Big Three” asset managers: BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street. With its expo-
nential growth and popularity among financial advisors, the ETF industry has undoubtedly
been placed under the spotlight by investors and regulators alike. However, academic research
on the industrial organization of ETFs is limited. The decision of fund families to launch new
ETFs has not been academically studied before.4
This paper therefore fills in this gap by addressing four main questions. First, what are the
reasons behind ETF launches? Second, how do the determinants of ETF launches compare
1According to a survey by the Financial Planning Association and the Journal of Financial Plan-
ning in April 2019 with 392 respondents, ETFs are the most popular investment vehicle and the
share of financial advisors recommending them to their clients increased from 44 percent in 2008 to
88 percent in 2019. Source link: https://www.financialplanningassociation.org/business-success/
ResearchandPracticeInstitute/Documents/2019-Trends_%20in_Investing_Report.pdf
2The rule aims to streamline the conditions around exemptive relief, which has been costly and time-
consuming to new ETF providers. The press release and fact sheet are available on the SEC website: https:
//www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2019-190
3Barron’s reported in April, 2019 the concern from the SEC in an online article: https://www.
barrons.com/articles/etfs-are-dominated-by-blackrock-vanguard-and-state-street-the-sec-is
-concerned-51554512133?mod=hp_DAY_2.
4Sherrill and Stark (2018) studied the determinants on ETF liquidation. Ben-David et al. (2021) focused
on the product differentiation perspective in the innovation of specialized ETFs. To my best knowledge, there
is no academic paper which systematically studies the launching decisions of ETFs.
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with those for open-ended MFs? Third, how does the presence of the Big Three shape the ETF
industry? Fourth, can we predict the lifespan of an ETF based on characteristics of the family
and the ETF’s investment objective upon inception? The main findings of this paper suggest
that the decisions to launch ETFs and open-ended MFs differ in important ways. While the
active fund families rely heavily on past performance in making new launches, ETF families
pay more attention to matching investor demand by chasing flows and trading volumes in the
market. ETF families tend to attract market makers for their newly-launched product by leav-
ing greater arbitrage profits through the unique in-kind creation and redemption mechanism.
Families making new ETF launches are cost-conscious in both limiting the trading cost and
reducing the per unit cost by exploiting the economies of scale. The Big Three tend to lead
the asset allocation decisions of smaller families. However, competitors are less likely to follow
the leader into less liquid or highly concentrated objective markets. Finally, the lifespan of a
newly-launched ETF can be predicted by the family and objective-level characteristics upon
inception. A time-to-event analysis shows that an ETF survives for longer if launched by fund
families with larger size and higher fees, and whose initiation is not driven by excessive flows
into the family.
It is not surprising to find that fund families make launching decisions according to investor
demand, however the difference in the effect of investor demand on fund offerings between
ETFs and open-ended MFs is more subtle. Actively managed MF managers may limit the
size of funds and thus the value to the fund family, as the ability to implement market-beating
investment strategies decreases with fund size (Berk and Green, 2004; Pástor et al., 2015).
Conversely, ETFs are mostly passive vehicles, with their value to the fund family being driven
more directly by the volume of investors. Khorana and Servaes (1999) study the determinants
of MF starts. They find that launch decisions of the opend-ended MFs are related to three
broad sets of factors: the ability to generate additional fee income, economies of scale, and
follow-the-leader strategy. In this paper, I examine the intuitive question of whether common
characteristics shared between ETFs and open-ended MFs affect their launches in the same
way. Furthermore, structural differences between ETFs and open-ended MFs indicate the po-
tential existence of additional factors in determining ETF inceptions that are not present in
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the MF literature. Unlike the open-ended funds, ETFs are traded on stock exchanges and
enjoy intra-day liquidity. I examine stock exchange characteristics that are unique to ETFs to
study the effect of market liquidity on ETF launching decisions. Given the extensive debate on
active versus passive management (Levy and Lieberman, 2016; Garleanu and Pedersen, 2019),
this paper explores whether family decision to launch new ETFs in a particular investment
objective is correlated with characteristics of the MF equivalent.
I first show that ETF launching decisions are affected by families’ desire to generate in-
cremental profits, but through different channels relative to open-ended MFs. Prior literature
documents the predominant role played by past performance at both the family-level and the
investment objective-level in determining the initiation and termination of open-ended MFs
(Khorana and Servaes, 1999; Brown and Goetzmann, 1995; Lunde et al., 1999). Superior
abnormal returns attract investor flows (Ippolito, 1992; Sirri and Tufano, 1998) and hence
facilitate growth of the family, justifying the emphasis on past performance by MF families.5
However, the majority of ETFs are still passive index trackers with no explicit goal of gener-
ating alpha.6 This rationalizes ETF families’ focus on flows, total AUM, and aggregate fees to
gain a competitive edge. I find empirical evidence suggesting that ETF families are more in-
clined to profit from flow and volume. There is no significant correlation though between ETF
launches and past performance, either at the family-level or the investment objective-level. In-
stead, I find a positive and significant relationship between the likelihood of ETF launches and
the prior-12-month dollar volume in the fund family and in the ETF’s investment objective.
Similar pattern has been found on the prior-12-month net flow into the investment objective.
This contrasts with the findings for open-ended MFs, where the effect of flows becomes trivial
after controlling for past performance (Khorana and Servaes, 1999).
New ETF launches can be compared to the initial public offerings (IPOs). Loughran and
Ritter (2002) show that issuers do not get upset about leaving significant amount of money on
the table during IPOs and argue that it may serve as a form of indirect compensation to the
5Furthermore, an increasing proportion of mutual funds are adopting an incentive fee structure that rewards
the abnormal returns directly (Elton et al., 2003). It may also help explain the heavy reliance of MF initiations
on past performance, which are absent on the ETF sample.
6Despite the recent emergence of actively managed ETFs into the marketplace, they still represent less than
10% of the overall AUM.
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underwriters. Inspired by the IPO literature, I argue that fund families are willing to leave
arbitrage opportunities through the in-kind creation and redemption process when launching
new ETFs as they expect to attract more participation from the market makers, i.e. the au-
thorized participants (APs). The in-kind creation and redemption mechanism is an important
structural difference that distinguishes ETFs from open-ended MFs (Antoniewicz and Hein-
richs, 2014). It takes place on a daily basis and ensures the value of the ETF shares are kept
close to the value of the underlying basket of securities (Ben-David et al., 2018). In this paper,
I find empirical evidence suggesting that families are more likely to launch in objective markets
with more arbitrage opportunities, measured by higher tracking errors, to the market makers.
Like open-ended MFs, fees charged by ETFs consist of a fixed percentage of its total net
asset (TNA). Therefore, to maximize their fee income, families desire both a larger asset base
and a higher percentage fee. To ensure a substantial asset base for the ETF offering, the poten-
tial size of the market is an important consideration for family launching decisions. Moreover,
since investors may switch between the active and passive alternatives with the same invest-
ment objective (Garleanu and Pedersen, 2019), the aggregate TNA of the actively managed
open-ended MFs in the given objective may serve as a proxy for the customer base and hence
the growth potential of the objective market. I find that new ETFs are more likely to be
launched in objectives with larger TNAs and in those experiencing larger inflows, supporting
the argument that families care about the growth potential of the objective market. Addition-
ally, ETFs are more likely to be launched in objectives where the aggregate TNA of the MF
equivalent is larger. Families with higher expense ratios are also more likely to launch new
ETFs. However, at the objective level, the impact of fees is less clear. On the one hand, fee
competition among ETFs is widely reported.7 Issuers may compete for cost-conscious investors
by launching ETFs in objectives with lower expense ratios. On the other hand, as competi-
tion increases, fund families start to compete through an alternative channel, using specialized
ETFs that track niche markets and can charge higher fees (Ben-David et al., 2021).
In addition to revenue growth, profit maximization can also be achieved via cost reduc-
7The following Bloomberg article in March 2019 is an example. https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/
articles/2019-03-22/etf-fee-wars-are-no-laughing-matter.
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tion. Fund families face both fixed costs and variable costs in running an ETF. While fixed
costs include expenditure on R&D, marketing expenses and regulatory charges, variable costs
mainly stem from transaction costs triggered by portfolio turnover. In the realm of passive
ETFs, reconstitution of the benchmark index is the main driver of portfolio turnover. From the
variable costs’ perspective, we expect that fund families are more likely to launch in objectives
that are cheaper to operate. Consistently, I find that new ETFs are more likely to be launched
in objectives with lower portfolio turnover.
Another way to achieve cost reduction is by exploiting economies of scale and scope to
effectively share the fixed costs of running an ETF. Empirical evidence suggests that ETFs are
more likely to be launched by larger families and families who have launched in the prior year.
Notably, I find supporting evidence to the argument that equity ETFs benefit from special-
ization that outweighs the potential cost of cannibalization. Under a panel logistic regression
framework, I find that families are more likely to launch in an objective if it represents a greater
proportion of the family’s TNA. This contradicts the results for equity MFs by Khorana and
Servaes (1999) but is consistent with Evans (2010).8 Meanwhile, in the ETF industry, the
benefits of scope are valued as much as scale. Many retail brokerages, pension plans, and
online platforms are reducing the number of fund providers they offer to their clients. There-
fore, asset managers offering the full spectrum of products will gain a competitive edge. To
understand the choice by families to launch an ETF in a new objective versus one in which
the family already offers a product, I estimate a multinomial logit regression to examine each
decision relative to no launching. I find that smaller families dominate the decision to launch
in objectives where the family has no prior investment. These families face more pressure to
grow and expand to achieve a larger scope needed to compete in the ETF industry.
To address my third research question, I investigate how the presence of the Big Three
affects competition among new market entrants. Figure 2 shows the market share of the ETF
industry controlled by the Big Three from 1996 to 2018, along with the number of new ETF
8Khorana and Servaes (1999) find empirical evidence on specialization in bond MFs but not in equity MFs.
In a later study on equity MFs, Evans (2010) find that families with a large percentage of assets invested in a
given investment objective are more likely to launch an additional fund in that investment objective, consistent
with a desire to specialize.
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launches by families within and outside the Big Three. Though the graph indicates that the
number of new entrants from non-Big Three families has increased dramatically through years,
regulators are still concerned about whether the extreme market concentration in the ETF in-
dustry reduces competition. The Big Three enjoying better brand recognition and a wider
customer base, attract more flows and provide higher liquidity. These competitive advan-
tages allow them to develop more effectively and become the first-movers in most investment
objectives. By following asset allocation decisions of the Big Three, other families can save
substantially on research costs and customer development. On the other hand, with the scale
and scope economies favoring the Big Three and switching costs being substantial within less
liquid investment objectives, the first mover advantage is more likely to persist. Therefore,
additional barriers are imposed on the new market entrants into such objectives. I find that
non-Big Three families tend to make new ETF launches in objectives where the Big Three has
launched in the prior year, which is consistent with the findings for open-ended MFs (Khorana
and Servaes, 1999). However, to the extent that the market for an investment objective is less
liquid or dominated by the Big Three, the follow-the-leader behaviour among non-Big Three
families is diminished. As a robustness check, I test if the family and objective-level charac-
teristics affect launching decisions of the Big Three differently relative to the non-Big Three.
Empirical pattern suggests that the impact of most characteristics is in the same direction for
both the Big Three and non-Big Three, though the economic significance may vary.
Finally, with respect to the fourth research question, I conduct a time-to-event analysis to
study the survival time of ETF offerings. There are significant costs in launching an ETF.
It typically takes between $750,000 and $1.25 million to get through the exemptive relief,
the prospectus and all the contracts, besides costs associated with research, marketing and
maintenance. Therefore, a fund needs to grow rapidly and attract sufficient inflows to remain
profitable in the long run. I find that the lifespan of an ETF offering can be predicted from
family and objective-level characteristics upon inception. ETFs launched by larger families
and families charging higher fees are more likely to survive for longer. In the presence of
substantial scale economies, it is easier for larger families to attract flows and save on the per
unit cost. Besides, families charging higher fees can maintain a higher profit margin. However,
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I find that ETFs launched following large inflows into the fund family are more likely to fail
at an earlier age. One possible explanation is that excessive inflows into the fund family may
evoke managerial hubris as proposed in the corporate takeover literature (Roll, 1986). At the
objective-level, ETFs launched in objectives with higher expense ratios are more likely to fail
earlier. This is consistent with the notion that most ETFs are passive vehicles tracking broad-
market indices and the ETF industry is extremely competitive on fees. Moreover, it is also
related to findings by Ben-David et al. (2021) that expensive specialized ETFs perform poorly
post-launching. Finally, previous literature on MFs documents that launching a new fund into
“hot” or “trendy” objectives may lead to future underperformance (Greene and Stark, 2016).
Similarly, I find that ETFs who are launched due to large trading activities in the objective
market are more likely to fail at a younger age.
This paper carries out a systematic study over the determinants on ETF initiations, con-
tributing to the literature from several perspectives. First, I build upon the literature concern-
ing the industrial organization of the open-ended funds to show how the decision to launch an
ETF is affected by fund characteristics in distinct ways relative to open-ended MFs. Second,
I provide evidence on how market conditions, including liquidity and market concentration,
affect the competition and growth of the ETF industry. Prior literature has documented the
effect of market quality on ETF flows (Clifford et al., 2014). In this paper, I discuss a more
direct channel of the industry expansion, namely the emergence of new market entrants.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lists the major hypotheses. Section
3 describes the data and shows some summary statistics. Section 4 explains the research design
and elaborates the empirical results from the analysis. Section 5 contains the robustness check.
And Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Hypotheses
Our purpose is to examine the determinants of ETF launches by fund families and how
they compare to open-ended MFs. For both ETFs and open-ended MFs, the launching decision
is rational only if the expected benefits outweigh the associated costs. Families benefit from
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additional fee income, which consists of a percentage of the total AUM. Therefore, expanding
the asset base and charging a higher percentage fee are of the best interest to both types
of funds. However, the channels through which families generate profits can be different.
While active funds rely on superior past performance to advertise managerial skills and attract
investments, most ETFs are passively managed tracking their benchmark index. I hence expect
no significant correlation between ETF launching decisions and the abnormal returns on either
the family level or the investment objective level. Instead, I posit that family decisions to
launch new ETFs are more likely to be driven by investor demand. The growth potential of
an objective market may be signalled by prior flows and trading volume. Moreover, families
who have attracted large inflows may enjoy the “halo effect” and flows are more likely to spill
over to the newly launched product. This leads to the first major hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 The likelihood of an ETF launch is positively related to prior net flows and
trading volumes in the family and the investment objective.
While the above arguments speak from the demand side of an ETF, the launch of a fund
also depends on supply-side characteristics. ETF shares are created and redeemed through
in-kind transactions between the ETF providers and the authorized participants (APs) on the
primary market. As market makers, the APs are essential for the distribution and marketing
of the ETF products. They make profits through the bid-ask spread, smart management of
their securities inventory, and through arbitrage activities. In an efficient market, when price
discrepancies between the ETF shares and the underlying basket emerge, the APs may buy
whichever is cheaper on the secondary market in exchange for the other with the ETF provider
on the primary market. In this way, the APs are able to earn arbitrage profits and effectively
drive the two prices to convergence. Higher tracking error in a given objective market leaves
more room for arbitrage activities by the APs. Therefore, in the same spirit as the IPO
firms leave money on the table as indirect compensation to the underwriters (Loughran and
Ritter, 2002), I posit that fund families deliberately leave arbitrage opportunities to attract
participation of the APs. This leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 The likelihood of new ETF launches in a given investment objective is positively
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related to the average tracking error of all funds in the objective.
Similar to the market for open-ended MFs, there exist substantial scale and scope economies
in the ETF market. I hence posit that larger families, families offering a wider range of
products, and families who have launched in the prior year are more likely to launch a new
ETF. Smaller families facing the curse to “grow-or-die” are more likely to expand their product
line to withstand competitions in the earlier stage of their lives, while more established families
may benefit from specialization and the associated economies of scale. This leads to the next
major hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 The decision to launch a new ETF in an objective with no prior investment
within the family is dominated by smaller-sized families or families with smaller scope. The
likelihood of launching a new ETF in an existing objective is positively related to the percentage
of family asset invested in the corresponding investment objective.
The ETF industry is highly concentrated, with over 80% of the aggregate AUM controlled
by the Big Three. The presence of significant scale and scope economies favours the Big Three
and allows them to become the first innovators. However, to the extent that non-Big Three
families could replicate the innovation without incurring significant costs and benefit from the
overall growth of the market, it is rational for them to follow the leader and take the second
mover advantage (Reinganum, 1985). Hence, similar to the behaviour of MF families, I posit
that an ETF launched in a given objective by the Big Three during the previous year would
increase the likelihood of non-Big Three families to launch in the same objective. However, the
profitability of the second mover is related to factors such as brand loyalty and switching cost
in the market. For individual investors, moving from one fund to another triggers capital gain
tax. Institutional investors often suffer from inertia. For illiquid asset, the spread could also
bring in substantial trading cost. Therefore, I take a closer look at the impact of the Big Three
on the competition of other families. Though the follow-the-leader strategy found in the MF
literature still exists in the ETF sample, I posit that non-Big Three families would hesitate
in entering investment objectives dominated by the Big Three. Also, in objectives with less
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liquidity and thus higher switching cost, the first-mover advantage of the Big Three are more
likely to sustain, which poses additional barrier on new market entrants. Here follows the next
major hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4 The likelihood of non-Big Three families to launch new ETFs in an objective
where the Big Three has launched in the previous year is negatively related to the market share
of the objective controlled by the Big Three and the average spread of the objective.
Given the inevitable costs to launch an ETF, the fund needs to attract sufficient inflows
and grow rapidly to remain profitable. I argue that family and objective characteristics upon
inception have significant predicting power on the lifespan of ETF offerings. At the family
level, size can be an important determinant. It is generally harder for smaller families to
attract flows due to the disadvantage on brand recognition and customer base, etc. Also, fam-
ilies charging higher fees are able to maintain a higher profit margin. However, families that
experienced excessive inflows in the prior year may be affected by hubris beliefs as proposed
in the corporate takeover literature (Roll, 1986). At the objective level, the ETF industry
is extremely competitive on expense ratios due to the passive nature. Hence, ETF products
launched in lower-fee objectives possess a competitive advantage on this end. Moreover, pre-
vious literature on MFs documented that launching a new fund into hot or trendy objectives
may lead to future underperformance (Greene and Stark, 2016). In a similar vein, I argue that
ETFs who are launched due to large trading activities in the objective market are more likely
to fail in a younger age. Here comes the last major hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5 ETFs launched by larger and higher-fee families, and whose initiations are not
driven by capital flows into the families are more likely to survive for longer. ETFs launched
in lower-fee objectives and whose launching decision is not affected by large trading activities
in the objective market are more likely to live a longer life.
In Table A2.1, I summarize all the ex-ante predictions on how various family and objective-
level characteristics may affect the likelihood of new ETF launches. The hypotheses are divided
into three broad categories, namely profit maximization, scale and scope economies and the
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impact of the Big Three. Predictions are posed in either the whole sample or two different
subsamples of the existing families and the non-Big Three families where appropriate.
2.3 Data and Sample Descriptions
In this study, I mainly focus on 1,859 US equity ETFs from January 1996 to December
2018, taken from Morningstar Direct Database. Both surviving and delisted funds are in-
cluded in the sample to avoid survivorship bias.9 During the sample period, I observe 1,756
ETF launches across 155 fund families and 74 Morningstar Institutional Categories. I obtain
monthly observations on the gross and net returns, as well as the total net assets (TNAs).
Fund flows are then calculated as the change in TNAs net of any return effect, i.e.
Net F lowi,t = TNAi,t − TNAi,t−1 ∗ (1 +Ri,t), (2.1)
where TNAi,t denotes the total net assets in fund i at the end of month t, and Ri,t is the gross
return of fund i during month t. I also obtain daily observations on the prices, trading volumes
and bid-ask spreads. For the daily variables, monthly averages are computed to fit into the
fund-month panel. Taking the dollar volume for instance:





Daily Trading Pricei,t ∗Daily V olumei,t, (2.2)
where T denotes the number of trading days within month t. Finally, expense ratios and
portfolio turnovers are reported annually on Morningstar. The annual report net expense
ratio represents the percentage of fund TNA used to pay for operating expenses, management
fees, administrative fees, and all other asset-based costs incurred. The portfolio turnover is
9I begin with 3,305 exchange-traded products (ETPs) whose primary share class is listed in U.S. exchanges,
then I exclude 359 exchange-traded notes (ETNs) and exchange-traded commodities (ETCs) from the original
sample. Morningstar uses “ETF” as an umbrella term to refer to a range of different ETPs, including ETFs,
ETNs and ETCs. Unlike ETFs, ETNs and ETCs are more accurately described as debt securities that are less







the numerator denotes the total amount of either purchase or sale by fund i during year t
whichever is less. Family and objective-level measures are obtained by aggregating all ETFs
within the family or objective into one portfolio and taking the equally-weighted average. The
value-weighted averages are also computed and included in the robustness checks.
To examine characteristics of the MF equivalent, I further obtain monthly observations
on returns, TNAs and expense ratios for 9,386 US equity MFs during the same period. Fi-
nally, monthly returns on the benchmark indices are collected from Morningstar. Benchmark-
adjusted abnormal returns of the funds are then calculated as the difference between the real-
ized returns and the predicted returns with beta estimates derived from the following regression
using a prior 36-month rolling window:
Ri,t − rf = αi + βi,t(RBMKi,t − rf ) + εi,t, (2.4)
where (RBMKi,t − rf ) denotes the excess return of the primary benchmark over the risk-free
rate for fund i during month t. For fund observations whose primary benchmark is missing,
the default benchmark is obtained by taking the most commonly used (sorted by the aggregate
TNA of funds following the index) primary benchmark for ETFs in each Morningstar Institu-
tional Category, as shown in Table A2.2.
Table 2.1 reports the descriptive statistics of the fund-month observations on major fund
characteristics, including net flow, dollar volume, tracking error, expense ratio, portfolio turnover,
TNA, family TNA, bid-ask spread and benchmark-adjusted return. In panel A, summary
statistics are reported for all funds in the sample.10 Panel B compares between ETFs from
the Big Three versus non-Big Three families. Panel C compares between active versus passive
ETFs. The “MeanDiff” column in Panel B and C reports the difference in the sample means,
together with the statistical significance from a two-sided t-test. Out of the 1,859 US equity
10Notice that the minimum expense ratio is negative, this is due to security lending activities by the ETFs.
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ETFs, 505 ETFs are launched by the three biggest families, while 1,354 ETFs are launched by
152 non-Big Three families. The line plot in Figure 2.2 shows that the Big Three controlled
over 80% of the total AUM in each year over the past decade. Panel B indicates that funds
launched by the Big Three are generally larger in size and attract more flows and trading
volumes, hence they enjoy better liquidity with lower bid-ask spread. They also charge lower
fees and track their benchmarks more closely. Out of the whole sample, 151 US equity ETFs
are actively managed, representing around 8% in numbers and less than 0.5% in terms of the
AUM by the end of the sample period.11 Panel C shows that the size of passive ETFs are
on average larger than the active ETFs, and they are more likely to be launched by larger
families, charging lower fees. Passive ETFs tend to attract more flows and trading volumes
and hence provide better liquidity with lower bid-ask spread. There are generally less portfolio
re-balancing in passive ETFs and hence lead to lower portfolio turnovers and higher tracking
errors.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 General Factors Affecting ETF Launching Decisions
In this section, I investigate the overall determinants of an ETF launch and test Hypothesis
1 and 2 from both the demand side and the supply side of a fund. On the demand side, I explore
the differential effect of investor demand and past performance on the launching decisions of
ETFs versus opend-ended MFs. On the supply side, I examine whether the launching families
care about participation from the market makers, i.e. the APs. In order to do so, I use the
11By December 2018, the total AUM of all actively-managed US equity ETFs is 9.74 billion USD, as apposed
to 2.61 trillion USD managed by passive ETFs.
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= β0 + β1Objective F lowj,t−1 + β2Family F lowi,t−1
+β3Objective Dollar V olumej,t−1 + β4Family Dollar V olumei,t−1
+β5Objective Tracking Errorj,t−1 +
∑n
k=1 βkXij,t + γt + εij,t,
(2.5)
where pij,t denotes the probability of family i launching a new ETF in objective j during month
t. The matrix Xij,t includes control variables on both the family level and the investment ob-
jective level. In order to make clear contrast between active and passive investments, all the
actively managed ETFs and indexed MFs are excluded from this regression.
Table 2.2 presents the coefficient estimates together with the marginal effects of the panel
logistic regression using all family observations. In Model (1), I include in explanatory variables
only the measures on flows, volumes, returns and tracking errors as discussed in Hypothesis 1
and 2. As a flow measure, I include the prior 12-month average flow rank as in (Evans, 2010).
A fractional rank between zero and one is assigned to each family or investment objective
in each month according to the net flow. By using the flow rank instead of the percentage
flow, the regression is immune from the distortion by the outliers and the undesired market
turbulence through time. As a measure of liquidity, I include the prior-12-month average rank
of the dollar trading volumes, which is constructed in the same manner as the flow ranks. To
measure the arbitrage potential in an objective market, I include the mean tracking error of
all ETFs within the same investment objective, calculated as the standard deviation of the
prior-12-month excess returns over their primary benchmarks. The default objective bench-
mark (as listed in Table A2.2) is assigned when the primary benchmark is missing. As for
the performance measure, I use the prior-12-month average benchmark-adjusted returns of the
family and investment objective. Unlike the actively managed funds, for whom the Carhart
four-factor alpha (Carhart, 1997) may be a better indicator of the absolute performance. In
the realm of passive ETFs, it makes better sense to compare the performance of a fund with
the stated benchmark index.
In Model (2), I also include the expense ratio of the family/objective in the prior year as
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a proxy for the percentage fee charged. Portfolio turnover of the family/objective in the prior
year is included to account for cost reduction considerations. Finally, to explore the scale
economies as well as to control for the well-documented relationship between flow and fund
size, I include the logarithm of lagged family and objective size. In Model (3), I explore the
effect of economies of scope on ETF launches. Family size is replaced by the number of ob-
jectives covered in the family.12 In Model (4), I consider several objective level characteristics
of open-ended MFs, given the documented competition on investor flows between active and
passive funds (Levy and Lieberman, 2016; Garleanu and Pedersen, 2019). I substitute the
objective flow, size, expense ratio and performance measures with the corresponding measures
for the open-ended MF equivalent. More detailed definitions on the variables can be found in
the appendix Table A2.3.
I make the assumption that the ETF launching decisions are independent across different
families, though decisions made by the same family are more likely to be correlated. Therefore,
the standard errors are clustered by fund family. Calendar year fixed effects are included. In
the columns “Marginal Effect”, I report the annualized percentage change in the probability
of an ETF launch when each explanatory variable is increased by one standard deviation and
all other variables are set equal to the mean of zero. For indicator variables, this represents
the percentage change in probability when the indicator variable increases from zero to one.
Hypotheses on both the demand side and the supply side are confirmed by the regression
results. On the demand side, coefficients on the objective flow are positive and significant in
all models, even after controlling for performance and objective size. A one standard devia-
tion increase in the rank of the objective flow increases the likelihood of a new ETF launch
by 2.97%–4.93% across the three model specifications. In the meantime, coefficients on the
performance measures, i.e. the benchmark-adjusted returns of the family and the investment
objective, rarely show any significance. This suggests that families pay relatively little atten-
tion to prior performance in making ETF launching decisions, instead they rely more on the
prior flows to gauge the growth potential of an objective market. This finding is in direct
12The two measures of size and scope are highly colinear with a pairwise correlation of ρ = 0.81, as a result
the two variables shall not be included in the same model.
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contrast to that of open-ended MFs (Khorana and Servaes, 1999). Next, I explore liquidity
features that are unique to ETFs as they are traded on the stock exchanges. In all four models,
the objective dollar volume appears to be a significant determinant on the ETF launching deci-
sions both statistically and economically. Dollar volume on the family level also appears to be
positively correlated with the family decision to launch a new ETF. The economic significance
is particularly evident in Model (2), where a one standard deviation increase in the objective
and family dollar volume leads to a 8.57% and 11.99% increase in the annualized probability
of new ETF launches, respectively. These results suggest that families and objectives who
are able to attract more investor attention and hence enjoy higher liquidity are more likely to
witness new entrants of ETFs.
On the supply side, the positive and significant relation between the objective tracking
error and the likelihood of launching a new ETF is persistent across all four model specifica-
tions. The probability of a family launching a new ETF in a certain objective increases by
1.87%-5.18% annually with a one standard deviation increase in the average tracking error of
the investment objective. This empirical result confirms our conjecture that fund families may
make indirect compensation to the APs to attract market makers by launching new ETFs in
objectives with more arbitrage opportunities.
Model (2) and (3) show that the average family expense ratio has a positive and significant
impact on the ETF launching decision of fund families. A one standard deviation increase in
the family expense ratio increases the annualized probability of a new ETF launch by 5.46%-
7.83%. The average expense ratio of the investment objective also affects the likelihood of
ETF launching decisions positively though not as significant. The above shows that families
are indeed concerned with the ability to generate additional fee income when making ETF
launching decisions, which is consistent with the open-ended MF literature (Khorana and Ser-
vaes, 1999).
Next, I investigate whether families care about cost reductions on top of revenue growth.
Cost reduction can be achieved by a fund family through both cost-sharing on the fixed ex-
penditures and savings on the variable trading costs. Cost-sharing can be realized through
21
economies of scale and scope, which I discuss in more details in the next section. Meanwhile,
the activeness of a fund can be measure by the portfolio turnover, a lower portfolio turnover
indicates less trading activities and hence lower transaction cost. Coefficients from Model (2)-
(4) confirm a negative and significant relationship between the likelihood of new ETF launches
and the average portfolio turnover on both the family level and the investment objective level.
The annualized probability of new ETF launches decreases by 2.83%-5.99% with a one stan-
dard deviation increase in objective portfolio turnover, and 1.77%-6.17% with a one standard
deviation increase in family portfolio turnover across the three model specifications.
In addition to factors pertaining to the ETF market, I also investigate whether family deci-
sions to launch new ETFs are affected by characteristics of the corresponding objective in the
open-ended MF market. Families may pay attention to prior flows into the MF objective as it
signals the investor sentiments towards the asset class. ETFs generally charge lower fees than
open-ended MFs, while the average expense ratios of ETFs and open-ended MFs within the
same investment objectives are positively correlated, with a pairwise correlation of ρ = 0.58.
Given the competition on investor flows between the active and passive world, the size of the
MF objective measures the potential size of the capital pool. Coefficient estimates in Model (4)
show that objective-level flow, expense ratio and size measures of open-ended MFs all appear
to have positive and significant impact on the likelihood of new ETF launches. Comparing
with the results in Model (2), I find that these objective-level measures of open-ended MFs
affect ETF launching decisions in the same direction as measures of the corresponding ETF
objectives, though with smaller economic magnitude. Poor risk-adjusted performance of the
active funds may make the investors doubt if the active management add value and hence
drive investors to the passive alternatives. As a measure of the objective level performance of
the open-edned MFs, I compute the Carhart four-factor alpha using a prior 36-month rolling
window and take the prior 12-month average of all funds within the same investment objective.
However, the empirical evidence does not support this intuition, no statistical significance is
shown from the regression coefficient.
Overall, the results in Table 2.2 confirm both Hypothesis 1 and 2. On the demand side,
investor demand is regarded more seriously by ETF providers than past performance. Families
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pay more attention to flows and trading volumes in making ETF launching decisions. On the
supply side, families are willing to launch in objectives with more arbitrage opportunities to
attract more participation from the market makers.
2.4.2 Economies of Scale and Scope
I find strong support to the economies of scale and scope argument which is persistent
across all model specifications in both the full sample and the subsample of existing families.
There are significant cost complementarities across ETF products in different objectives within
a family. Families are able to effectively reduce the per unit cost through cost sharing on
research, operation, marketing and distribution, etc. Also, families who have gone through
the launching process in the previous period could save on the fixed costs associated with
product development. In the whole sample, Model (2) and (3) from Table 2.2 show that a
one standard deviation increase in the family size and the number of objectives covered in
the family increases the annualized probability of new ETF launches by 15.49% and 5.90%
respectively.
Recognizing that the decision to launch an ETF by a new family might differ from that
of an existing family, in Table 2.3 I look at the subsample of only the existing families. The
positive and significant impact of family size and scope on ETF launching decisions persists.
In addition, an ETF launched in the prior year by a family increases the probability of a new
ETF launch by 9.65%-16.35% across the two model specifications, showing that families benefit
from prior launching experience. In Model (1) of Table 2.3, the binary variable indicating
a new objective without prior family investment demonstrates the strongest impact on the
ETF launching decision, which is consistent with the idea of expanding the breadth of fund
offerings to exploit the economies of scope. The probability of family making new launches in
an objective increases by 25.60% annually if the new fund offering broadens the product line
of the family. Next, I explore families’ desire to benefit from specialization when launching a
new ETF within their existing investment objectives. To approach this problem, I first look
at the objective distribution within existing families. Figure 2.3 presents the number of ETF
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offerings in each objective against the percentage family asset invested for each of the Big
Three providers.13 The positive relation between the number of funds launched into a given
investment objective and the percentage family TNA invested indicates the desire by families
to specialize in objectives of their expertise and capitalize on the economies of scale. Model
(2) in Table 2.3 confirms that families are more likely to launch an additional fund into an
investment objective when the objective already represents a large percentage of the family
assets. This pattern is consistent with the findings by Evans (2010) but inconsistent with the
findings by Khorana and Servaes (1999) for equity MFs.
The presence of significant scale and scope economies may benefit the larger families, and
at the same time impose pressure on new market entrants to expand quickly and gain a
competitive edge. I study how families balance between the need to expand the breadth of
their offerings and the desire to benefit from specialization and the associated economies of
scale. Under a multinomial logistic regression framework, I examine the determinants of family
decisions to launch an ETF in a new objective versus existing objective in the family, both
relative to the decision of no launching. The dependent variable takes a value of one if in a
given month the family launches an ETF in a new objective with no prior investment within the
family. It takes a value of two if the family launches in an existing objective and zero otherwise.
All explanatory variables are standardized to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of
one. Calendar year fixed effects are included, and the standard errors are clustered by fund
family. Under each model specification in Table 2.4, the first column presents the coefficient
estimates corresponding to the determinants of launching in a new objective. The second
column presents the results corresponding to the determinants of launching in an existing
objective within the family. The third column presents the p-value of a difference test between
the coefficients in the first two columns, which sheds light on how the family and objective-level
characteristics affect the decisions to launch in new and existing objectives differently.
Column (1) and (3) in Table 2.4 suggest that the decision by existing families to launch in
13For the labels of the investment objectives to be visible to readers, only the top ten objectives according
to the percentage family asset invested are reported in the graphs. Notice that there is a particular investment
objective according to Morningstar classifications, namely S&P 500 Tracking, which represents a substantial
(if not the largest) proportion of family TNA in all three largest index providers. Yet only one fund is needed
to track a single index in each family, hence the S&P 500 Tracking objective is removed from the figures.
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a new objective without previous family investment is dominated by smaller-sized families and
families with smaller scope, while the statistical significance on all other explanatory variables
largely disappeared.14 Column (2) and (4) in Table 2.4 suggest that factors affecting the
decision of existing families to launch in existing objectives within the family largely conform
with those of the full sample. A one standard deviation increase in the family size is associated
with a 8.72% decrease in the annualized probability of family launching in a new objective,
versus a 16.11% increase in the annualized probability of family launching in existing objectives,
both relative to no launching.15 The p-values from the difference tests show that families who
possess larger scale and scope, who enjoy higher average dollar volume and who are able
to charge higher expense ratios are more likely to launch in existing objectives. The family
decision to launch within an objective is more sensitive to the size of the objective, flows into
existing fund offerings in the same objective and average dollar volume of ETFs within the
same objective if the family already have ETF offerings in that objective than if it represents
a new objective without previous family investment. Overall, the results from Table 2.3 and
2.4 are consistent with the notion in Hypothesis 3 that families with smaller scope face the
pressure to expand the breadth of offerings to withstand market competition which favours the
larger families, while more established families benefit from specialization and the associated
economies of scale.
2.4.3 Role of the Big Three in the ETF Market
In this section, I examine the impact of the Big Three on competition within the ETF
market and test Hypothesis 4 on the behaviour of non-Big Three families. In Table 2.5, I
repeat the panel logistic regression of Table 2.2 in the subsample of non-Big Three families.
14Family size and the number of objectives in the family are included separately in two different model
specifications due to the collinearity concern mentioned before (pairwise correlation of the two variables is
ρ = 0.81).
15The marginal effect of family size is calculated by setting all other explanatory variables at the mean (the







∗ 12 ∗ 100% = −8.72%
.
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All the family and objective-level characteristics specified in Table 2.2 are included as controls.
The main variable of interest is the binary variable indicating the Big Three launched in a
certain objective during the prior year. The positive and significant coefficients under both
model specifications in Table 2.5 show that families tend to follow the leader in picking asset
classes for their new launches. An ETF launched by the Big Three in the prior year increases
the probability that non-Big Three families launch a new ETF in the same objective by 4.83%
and 3.96% annually according to the two model specifications. The statistical pattern on most
control variables persists though the economic significance is dampened.
To the extent that product innovation in the ETF industry could be imitated without
incurring significant costs and the follower could benefit from the overall growth of the market,
it is rational for the non-Big Three families to follow the leader and take the second mover
advantage (Reinganum, 1985). However, the profitability of the second mover is related to
factors such as brand loyalty and switching cost in the market. To examine whether families are
concerned with such frictions when pursuing follow-the-leader strategy, I interact the indicator
variable for Big Three launched in the pior year with the Big Three market share and bid-ask
spread in the given objective. The negative and significant coefficient on the interaction term
in Model (1) shows that non-Big Three families are less likely to launch an ETF into objectives
where the market is dominated by the Big Three, even if the Big Three launched in the prior
year. This is consistent with the notion that the presence of significant scale economies favours
the Big Three. It is easier for the Big Three to develop brand recognition and customer
loyalty especially in markets where they possess the monopoly power. Hence the first mover
advantage of the Big Three is more likely to sustain in such objectives. Result in Model (2)
shows that non-Big Three families are less likely to launch in an investment objective where
the bid-ask spread is high, even if the Big Three launched in the prior year. Higher bid-ask
spread signals less liquidity in the investment objective and hence higher switching cost for
the existing customers, which makes the second movers harder to compete. Overall, empirical
evidence from Table 2.5 supports the conjecture in Hypothesis 4.
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2.4.4 Lifespan of the ETF Offerings
In this last section of analysis, I use a time-to-event analysis to examine the survival time
of ETF offerings. More specifically, I am interested in whether family and objective-level
characteristics upon inception could predict the lifespan of the newly-launched ETFs. The
lifetime of ETFs is measured in months and right-censored. In our full sample, the lifetime
of ETFs has a distribution of mean 43 and median 30, which is equivalent to an average life
of 3.6 years and median life of 2.5 years. In Table 2.6, I apply a fully parametric Accelerated
Failure Time model with Weibull distribution to allow for a nonlinear hazard function, noticing
that the hazard rate of ETF offerings may be higher in the earlier stage and decreases at later
times. As before, all explanatory variables are standardized to have a mean of zero and
standard deviation of one.
In Model (1) of Table 2.6, I look at the family-level characteristics. Results show that a one
standard deviation increase in the logarithm of the family size and family expense ratio extends
the lifespan of an ETF offering by 35.53% and 709.30% respectively.16 In the meantime, a one
standard deviation increase in the flow rank of the family shortens the survival time of the
ETF offering by 95.16%. Similarly, on the objective level, a one standard deviation increase in
the dollar volume and expense ratio shortens the survival time of the ETF offering by 65.87%
and 68.21% respectively in Model (2). Both the statistical and economic significance of the
aforementioned characteristics persist in Model (3), where both the family and objective-level
characteristics are included simultaneously.
Overall, results in Table 2.6 confirms Hypothesis 5. ETFs launched by larger and higher-
fee families, and whose initiations are not driven by capital flows into the families are more
likely to survive for longer. ETFs launched in lower-fee objectives and whose asset allocation
decision is not affected by large trading activities on the market are more likely to live a longer
life.
16The marginal effect of family size on the survival time in Model (1) is calculated as e0.304 − 1 = 35.53%.
All other coefficients are interpreted in the same way.
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2.5 Robustness Check
In unreported results, I check different measures of performance. The benchmark-adjusted
returns are replaced by the excess returns and the value-added measure proposed by Berk and
Green (2004).17 None of the performance measures shows any persistent statistical significance
towards the probability of new ETF launches. Also, I examine both the equally-weighted
average and the asset-weighted average on returns, expense ratios and portfolio turnovers, etc.
The statistical patterns are largely unaffected by the weighting method. For the sake of brevity,
only the equally-weighted measure is reported in the tables.
In order to focus on the comparison between active and passive investment decisions, all
actively managed ETFs and indexed MFs are excluded from the analysis in Table 2.2. However,
given that there are 152 actively managed ETFs in the sample, contributing to around 10% of
the total AUM, it is also worth checking whether the determinants on active ETF launches are
significantly different from those passive ETFs. In Table 2.7, I perform a multinomial logistic
regression to compare the launching decisions of active versus passive ETFs, both relative to
no launching. The dependent variable takes a value of one if an active ETF is launched by a
family in the given objective during a given month. It takes a value of two if a passive ETF is
launched, and zero otherwise. Calendar year fixed effects are included, and the standard errors
are clustered by fund family. The p-values from the difference tests suggest little difference
between the two model specifications on major characteristics, except that active ETFs are
more likely to be launched in smaller objectives.
Recognizing the triopoly structure of the ETF market, I examine whether the factors
affecting ETF launching decisions are different when it comes to the Big Three. In Table 2.8, I
interact the Big Three dummy with all major characteristics on the family and objective-level.
Coefficients on the interaction terms are in general positive and insignificant, suggesting that
determinants on the Big Three launching decisions are similar to the whole sample.
Funds whose listing date is at least 12 months after the inception date are classified as
incubated, following Evans (2010). In the full sample, there exist 124 such cases with complete
17Formula for the value-added: V alue Added = TNA ∗ (rGROSS − rBMK).
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data, representing less than 10% of the total number of funds. Evans (2010) argue that MF
families apply the incubation strategy to increase performance and attract flows. Intuitively,
incubation should be less of a concern for ETFs. Investors would not rely on the track record of
a passive provider as much as an active one, as long as they believe the fund would closely track
the claimed index.18 However as a robustness check, I examine whether certain characteristics
affect family decisions to incubate when making new ETF launches. Under a multinomial
logistic regression framework, I examine the determinants of family decisions to launch an
incubated ETF versus a non-incubated ETF, both relative to the decision of no launching.
The dependent variable takes a value of one if a family launches an incubated fund in the
given objective during a given month. It takes a value of two if the family launches a non-
incubated fund and zero otherwise. As before, calendar year fixed effects are included, and the
standard errors are clustered by fund family. Results from this multinomial logistic regression
are shown in Table 2.9, with the first column showing determinants of an incubated fund,
second column showing determinants of a non-incubated fund, and the last column showing
the p-value of the difference test on the coefficients in the first two columns. Results suggest
there are hardly any differences between the incubated and non-incubated launches. Hence,
the main findings are robust to family decisions on incubation.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I investigate the factors that determine family decisions to launch new ETFs
and compare with the determinants on the launching decisions of open-ended MFs. ETF
launching decisions by 155 families across 74 investment objectives over a 23-year period from
January 1996 to December 2018 are examined. The empirical patterns are persistent and ro-
bust to different model specifications and subsample tests, which lend strong support to the
following conclusions.
18Todd Rosenbluth, head of ETF and mutual fund research at CFRA, said that ”People believe they
understand what they are getting with an ETF that is index based and transparent. Investors are
responding quickly to new products and not treating them like a mutual fund or a fine wine need-
ing to age well”. The Financial Times article could be found here: https://www.ft.com/content/
a611821b-df9b-46d3-acca-fcce6d64f601
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Families are concerned with profit maximization in their launching decisions. They care
about both revenue generation and cost reduction. Revenue growth is achieved through sev-
eral channels. First, families attract flows and expand their asset base by matching investor
demands, that is to launch in objectives enjoying higher flows and trading volumes. Second,
families attract market makers (APs) by launching in objectives with higher tracking error and
hence more arbitrage profits. Third, families charge higher percentage fees and extract more
value from the fee income. In contrast to open-ended MFs, I find no significant impact of past
performance on family launching decisions of ETFs. Cost reduction is achieved through two
major channels. First, families applying passive strategies with lower portfolio turnover could
save on trading costs. Second, families could effectively reduce the per unit cost by exploiting
the economies of scale and scope, which are both significant in the ETF industry.
This leads to the second consideration of fund families in making ETF launching decisions.
On the one hand, the presence of significant scale economies makes the specialization strategy
attractive. On the other hand, the presence of significant scope economies forces new market
entrants to expand quickly in order to gain a competitive edge. As a trade-off, smaller families
facing the pressure to expand the breadths of their offerings are more likely to launch in a new
objective without previous family investment, while larger families are more likely to specialize
in objectives of their expertise and benefit from the associated economies of scale.
Similar to open-ended MFs, ETF families also tend to follow the leader, they are more
likely to make new ETF launches in objectives where the Big Three has launched in the prior
year. However, after a closer look at the market condition of the given objectives, I find that
the willingness of Non-Big Three families to follow the leader is reduced significantly when the
objective market is less liquid with higher switching cost or when the investment objective is
dominated by the Big Three.
Finally, family and objective characteristics upon inception have significant predicting
power on the lifespan of ETF offerings. ETFs launched by larger and higher-fee families;
whose inception is not driven by excessive flows into the family are more likely to survive
for longer. Also, ETFs launched in lower-fee objectives and whose launching decision is not
affected by large trading activities in the objective market are more likely to live a longer life.
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In summary, this paper helps regulators, asset managers and other market participants
understand what determines the launches of ETFs and how the determinants compare to
open-ended MFs.
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Figure 2.1. Aggregate AUM growth of US equity ETFs and the number of launches versus
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Figure 2.2. Time series of the Big Three market share and the number of launches within and
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Figure 2.3. Distribution of the number of ETF offerings against the percentage family TNA
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This table contains descriptive statistics of the fund-month observations on major fund char-
acteristics. Expense Ratio and Portfolio Turnover are annualized. Dollar Volume and Bid-ask
Spread are computed as the monthly average of daily measures and winsorized at the 1% and 99%
level. Net Flow is calculated monthly as the percentage change in TNA net of any return effect.
Benchmark-Adjusted Return is calculated by regressing the monthly net returns on the primary
benchmark returns through a prior 36-month rolling window. Default benchmark of the investment
objective (Table A2.2) is used when the primary benchmark is missing. In panel A, summary
statistics are reported for all ETFs in the sample. Panel B compares the above characteristics
between sub-samples of the Big Three versus non-Big Three families. Panel C compares between
the active versus passive sub-samples. The“MeanDiff” column reports the difference in the sam-
ple means, together with the statistical significance from a two-sided t-test. The asterisks denote
statistical significance as follows: *** significant at 0.1%, ** significant at 1%, and * significant at 5%.
Panel A: Funds from All Families
Variables Obs. Median Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Net Flow ($ millions) 122,421 -0.005 13.681 329.659 -27,705 22,707
Dollar Volume ($ thousands) 41,730 12.592 15.741 11.891 0.677 65.543
Tracking Error (%) 123,998 1.564 2.147 2.096 0.000 25.618
Expense Ratio (%) 122,736 0.480 0.477 0.249 -0.140 5.070
Portfolio Turnover (%) 124,224 22.000 36.002 40.684 0.000 228.000
Fund TNA ($ millions) 126,695 107 1,495 7,472 0.477 306,671
Family TNA ($ millions) 285,288 24,186 123,532 213,839 0.558 1,117,694
Bid-Ask Spread (%) 61,190 0.079 0.133 0.179 0.010 1.261
Benchmark-Adjusted Return (%) 114,310 0.039 0.007 2.956 -187.829 35.933
Panel B: Comparision Between the Big Three and the Non-Big Three
Variables
Non-Big Three Big Three
MeanDiff
Obs. Mean1 Obs. Mean2
Net Flow ($ millions) 66,838 4.880 55,583 24.265 -19.385***
Dollar Volume ($ thousands) 29,182 13.803 12,548 20.248 -6.444***
Tracking Error (%) 67,716 2.405 56,282 1.838 0.567***
Expense Ratio (%) 67,116 0.569 55,620 0.366 0.203***
Portfolio Turnover (%) 67,296 49.867 56,928 19.612 30.255***
Fund TNA ($ millions) 69,921 407 56,774 2,834 -2.4e+03***
Family TNA ($ millions) 150,627 21,000 134,661 240,000 -2.2e+05***
Bid-Ask Spread (%) 38,880 0.138 22,310 0.124 0.014***
Benchmark-Adjusted Return (%) 61,933 -0.038 52,377 0.061 -0.099***




Obs. Mean1 Obs. Mean2
Net Flow ($ millions) 118,089 14.117 4,332 1.796 12.321**
Dollar Volume ($ thousands) 38,870 15.780 2,860 15.213 0.567**
Tracking Error (%) 119,645 2.166 4,353 1.636 0.530***
Expense Ratio (%) 118,320 0.466 4,416 0.760 -0.293***
Portfolio Turnover (%) 119,844 34.608 4,380 74.166 -39.559***
Fund TNA ($ millions) 122,202 1,547 4,493 69 1477.858***
Family TNA ($ millions) 269,924 130,000 15,364 95,000 3.0e+04***
Bid-Ask Spread (%) 57,791 0.131 3,399 0.169 -0.038***
Benchmark-Adjusted Return (%) 110,297 0.009 4,013 -0.037 0.046
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Table 2.2
Panel Logistic Regressions on the likelihood of new ETF Launches
This table presents the results from panel logistic regression models on the likelihood of new ETF
launches. The dependent variable is an indicator variable taking a value of one if a family launches
in a given investment objective during a given month, and zero otherwise. Various family and ob-
jective characteristics of ETFs are included as explanatory variables across Model (1) to (3). In
Model (4), objective characteristics are substituted by the MF counterparty. The models assume
independence of ETF launching decisions across families, but not within families. Calendar year
fixed effects are included, and the standard errors are clustered by fund family. All the explana-
tory variables are standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The
marginal effect is reported in the column“ME”, which is calculated as the annualized percentage
change in the probability of a new ETF launch when each explanatory variable is increased by
one standard deviation and all other variables are set equal to the mean. For indicator variables,
this represents the percentage change in probability when the indicator variable increases from zero
to one. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Variables
All Families
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Coefficients ME Coefficients ME Coefficients ME Coefficients ME
Objective Flow 0.319*** 2.972 0.129*** 4.934 0.129*** 4.226
(0.046) (0.036) (0.035)
Family Flow 0.061 0.499 -0.022 -0.784 0.006 0.185 -0.023 -0.240
(0.073) (0.085) (0.090) (0.088)
Objective Dollar Volume 0.098*** 0.816 0.215*** 8.569 0.212*** 7.229 0.122*** 1.368
(0.035) (0.037) (0.037) (0.035)
Family Dollar Volume 0.120 1.010 0.288*** 11.889 0.144** 4.752 0.263*** 3.166
(0.098) (0.077) (0.072) (0.075)
Objective Tracking Error 0.212*** 1.870 0.135*** 5.179 0.140*** 4.611 0.251*** 3.003
(0.040) (0.041) (0.042) (0.046)
Objective Benchmark-Adjusted Return 0.062 0.507 0.046 1.692 0.048 1.513
(0.054) (0.054) (0.056)
Family Benchmark-Adjusted Return 0.027 0.217 -0.052 -1.826 0.002 0.062
(0.070) (0.071) (0.070)
Objective Expense Ratio 0.129* 4.934 0.123* 4.018
(0.067) (0.067)
Family Expense Ratio 0.198** 7.827 0.164** 5.464 0.189** 2.191
(0.092) (0.083) (0.096)
Objective Portfolio Turnover -0.181*** -5.989 -0.177*** -5.018 -0.311*** -2.827
(0.068) (0.067) (0.058)
Family Portfolio Turnover -0.187** -6.171 -0.208*** -5.814 -0.183** -1.767
(0.072) (0.077) (0.073)
Objective Size 0.693*** 34.898 0.665*** 28.387
(0.101) (0.105)
Family Size 0.362*** 15.489 0.276*** 3.344
(0.110) (0.100)
Number of Objectives in Family 0.176** 5.898
(0.074)
MF Objective Flow 0.079* 0.867
(0.043)
MF Objective Expense Ratio 0.208*** 2.435
(0.060)
MF Objective Size 0.456*** 6.065
(0.044)
MF Objective Alpha FF4F 0.003 0.032
(0.063)
Constant -5.006*** -3.444*** -3.609*** -4.716***
(0.189) (0.275) (0.345) (0.187)
Observations 68,518 67,195 68,228 67,258
Number of Family-Objectives 767 760 767 758
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Wald χ2 8.43E+04 1.36E+08 9.98E+07 4.93E+05
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Table 2.3
Economies of Scale and Scope, Benefit of Specialization
This table presents the results from panel logistic regression models on the likelihood of new ETF
launches in the subsample of existing families. The dependent variable is an indicator variable taking
a value of one if an existing family launches in a given investment objective during a given month,
and zero otherwise. In Model (1), No Prior Family Investment in Objective is a dummy variable
indicating a new objective within the family. In Model (2), only observations within existing families
and existing objectives are considered. All the explanatory variables are standardized to have a
mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The marginal effect is reported in the column“ME”,
which is calculated as the annualized percentage change in the probability of a new ETF launch
when each explanatory variable is increased by one standard deviation and all other variables are
set equal to the mean. For indicator variables, this represents the percentage change in probability
when the indicator variable increases from zero to one. The models assume independence of ETF
launching decisions across families, but not within families. Calendar year fixed effects are included,
and the standard errors are clustered by fund family. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Variables
Model (1) Model (2)
Existing Families Existing Family-Objectives
Coefficients ME Coefficients ME
No Prior Family Investment in Objective 1.108*** 25.601
(0.192)
Percentage Family Asset in Objective 0.189*** 2.358
(0.048)
Family Launched in Prior Year 0.562*** 9.650 0.900*** 16.349
(0.184) (0.339)
Objective Size 0.702*** 12.986 1.112*** 22.731
(0.126) (0.091)
Family Size 0.367*** 5.692 0.863*** 15.362
(0.130) (0.115)
Objective Flow 0.091** 1.228 0.143*** 1.743
(0.036) (0.038)
Objective Dollar Volume 0.217*** 3.118 0.349*** 4.725
(0.047) (0.042)
Family Dollar Volume 0.200*** 2.849 0.323*** 4.314
(0.077) (0.097)
Objective Tracking Error 0.145*** 2.009 0.144*** 1.756
(0.055) (0.056)
Objective Expense Ratio 0.183** 2.585 0.201** 2.523
(0.072) (0.082)
Family Expense Ratio 0.115 1.570 0.429** 6.053
(0.113) (0.190)
Objective Portfolio Turnover -0.058 -0.727 -0.218** -2.229
(0.062) (0.107)





Number of Family-Objectives 704 669
Year FE YES YES
Wald χ2 2.540E+07 2.090E+07
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Table 2.4
Multinomial Logit Regression on the Choice of Objectives
This table presents the results from multinomial logistic regression models on the decision to launch
in a new objective versus an existing objective within the family, both relative to no launching.
The dependent variable takes a value of one if, in a given month, the family launches a new ETF
in a new objective with no prior investment within the family. It takes a value of two if the family
launches a new ETF in an existing objective of the family in that given month and takes a value of
zero otherwise. The column “Difference p-value” presents the p-value of a difference test between
the coefficients across two model specifications. The models assume independence of ETF launching
decisions across families, but not within families. Calendar year fixed effects are included, and the
standard errors are clustered by fund family. All the explanatory variables are standardized to have a
mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Pseudo R2 is computed as one minus the log-likelihood
ratio at convergence over the log-likelihood ratio at zero. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Variables
Existing Families Launch in
New Existing Difference New Existing Difference
Objective Objective p-value Objective Objective p-value
(1) (2) (1) - (2) (3) (4) (3) - (4)
Family Size -0.827*** 1.112*** 0.000
(0.158) (0.110)
Number of Objectives in Family -1.040*** 0.599*** 0.000
(0.115) (0.078)
Objective Size -0.094 1.318*** 0.000 -0.162* 1.320*** 0.000
(0.091) (0.093) (0.092) (0.093)
Objective Dollar Volume -0.040 0.385*** 0.000 -0.064 0.387*** 0.000
(0.054) (0.048) (0.050) (0.047)
Family Dollar Volume -0.118 0.359*** 0.001 0.109 0.014 0.411
(0.124) (0.092) (0.089) (0.079)
Objective Tracking Error -0.101 0.158*** 0.014 -0.085 0.162*** 0.034
(0.087) (0.047) (0.088) (0.052)
Objective Flow 0.104* 0.121*** 0.801 0.083 0.120*** 0.576
(0.061) (0.037) (0.061) (0.035)
Objective Expense Ratio 0.120 0.263*** 0.226 0.098 0.267*** 0.173
(0.095) (0.082) (0.097) (0.083)
Family Expense Ratio 0.040 0.420** 0.026 -0.025 0.299** 0.026
(0.074) (0.172) (0.075) (0.146)
Objective Portfolio Turnover -0.052 -0.172 0.403 -0.044 -0.181 0.328
(0.054) (0.126) (0.052) (0.125)
Family Portfolio Turnover -0.223* -0.142** 0.512 -0.149 -0.174** 0.803
(0.114) (0.065) (0.098) (0.069)
Family Launched in Prior Year 0.388* 0.967*** 0.067 0.521*** 1.157*** 0.085
(0.204) (0.333) (0.175) (0.373)
Constant -4.331*** -4.997*** -4.135*** -5.770***
(1.029) (0.397) (0.508) (0.458)
Observations 67,540 68,427
Year FE YES YES
Pseudo R2 0.094 0.099
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Table 2.5
Impact of the Big Three on Competition
This table presents the results from panel logistic regression models on the likelihood of new ETF
launches in the subsample of non-Big Three families. The dependent variable is an indicator
variable taking a value of one if a family launches in a given investment objective during a given
month, and zero otherwise. Bigthree Launched in Prior Year is a dummy variable taking a value
of one if an ETF was launched by the Big Three in a given objective in the prior year, and
zero otherwise. Interaction terms are expressed with “#” between the two explanatory variables.
The models assume independence of ETF launching decisions across families, but not within
families. Calendar year fixed effects are included, and the standard errors are clustered by fund
family. All the explanatory variables are standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard de-
viation of one. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Variables
Non-Big Three
Model (1) Model (2)
Bigthree Launched in Prior Year 0.993*** 0.942***
(0.210) (0.270)
Bigthree Launched in Prior Year # Bigthree Objective Market Share -0.736***
(0.139)
Bigthree Launched in Prior Year # Objective Bid-Ask Spread -1.025***
(0.274)
Objective Flow 0.116** 0.120
(0.053) (0.076)
Objective Dollar Volume 0.131** 0.272***
(0.054) (0.073)
Family Dollar Volume 0.229*** 0.312***
(0.079) (0.101)
Objective Tracking Error 0.094 -0.301
(0.057) (0.198)
Objective Expense Ratio 0.085 0.136
(0.083) (0.187)
Family Expense Ratio 0.048 -0.014
(0.097) (0.143)
Objective Portfolio Turnover -0.049 0.076
(0.043) (0.069)
Family Portfolio Turnover -0.108 -0.072
(0.070) (0.097)
Objective Size 0.550*** 0.637***
(0.095) (0.126)
Family Size 0.237** 0.199
(0.119) (0.132)





Number of Family-Objectives 625 598
Year FE YES YES
Wald χ2 7295.2 279.6
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Table 2.6
Time-to-Event Analysis on the Lifespan of ETF Offerings
This table reports the results from a time-to-event analysis on the lifespan of the ETF offerings.
The dependent variable is the life of an ETF offering, measured in months and right-censored. The
specification is an Accelerated Failure Time model with Weibull distribution. All the explanatory
variables are standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. ***, ** and *
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Variables
Life of ETF
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Family Flow -3.033*** -2.611***
(0.375) (0.424)
Family Dollar Volume -1.185*** -0.622
(0.413) (0.431)
Family Expense Ratio 2.091*** 1.934***
(0.359) (0.410)
Family Portfolio Turnover 0.087 0.264
(0.260) (0.280)
Family Size 0.304*** 0.293***
(0.038) (0.039)
Family Launched in Prior Year -0.257 -0.136
(0.204) (0.203)
Family Benchmark-Adjusted Return 0.008* 0.007*
(0.004) (0.004)
Objective Flow 0.520** 0.301
(0.245) (0.239)
Objective Dollar Volume -1.075*** -0.452**
(0.217) (0.222)
Objective Expense Ratio -1.146** -1.624***
(0.525) (0.515)
Objective Portfolio Turnover -1.352*** -0.674*
(0.281) (0.345)
Objective Size -0.135*** -0.035
(0.040) (0.042)
Objective Tracking Error 0.076* 0.072*
(0.042) (0.041)
Objective Benchmark-Adjusted Return -0.010 -0.007
(0.006) (0.006)
Constant -0.848 9.876*** 0.564
(0.908) (0.931) (1.317)
Observations 1,239 1,468 1,056
Wald χ2 249.3 63.6 217.0
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Table 2.7
Multinomial Logistic Regressions on the Launches of Active versus Passive ETFs
This table presents the results from a multinomial logistic regression model on the decision to launch
an active versus passive ETF, both relative to no launching. The dependent variable takes a value
of one if a family launches an active ETF in a given investment objective during a given month. It
takes a value of two if the family launches a passive ETF and takes a value of zero otherwise. All
the explanatory variables are standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.
The column “Difference p-value” presents the p-value of a difference test between the coefficients
across two model specifications. The models assume independence of ETF launching decisions
across families, but not within families. Calendar year fixed effects are included, and the standard
errors are clustered by fund family. Pseudo R2 is computed as one minus the log-likelihood ratio at
convergence over the log-likelihood ratio at zero. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Variables
Active Passive Diffefence p-value
(1) (2) (1) - (2)
Objective Size 0.144 0.688*** 0.010
(0.237) (0.115)
Family Size 0.193 0.378*** 0.619
(0.335) (0.119)
Objective Benchmark-Adjusted Return 0.390 0.037 0.311
(0.331) (0.055)
Family Benchmark-Adjusted Return 0.193 -0.041 0.290
(0.215) (0.063)
Objective Flow 0.107 0.124*** 0.910
(0.137) (0.036)
Family Flow 0.111 -0.014 0.619
(0.214) (0.081)
Objective Dollar Volume 0.451*** 0.216*** 0.106
(0.143) (0.043)
Family Dollar Volume -0.009 0.343*** 0.114
(0.200) (0.093)
Objective Tracking Error -0.476 0.126*** 0.099
(0.375) (0.037)
Objective Expense Ratio -0.140 0.195*** 0.302
(0.326) (0.063)
Family Expense Ratio 0.494*** 0.098 0.105
(0.167) (0.134)
Objective Portfolio Turnover 0.043 -0.138* 0.312
(0.153) (0.074)










Robustness Check on Determinants of Big Three Launching Decisions
This table presents the results from panel logistic regression models on the likelihood of new ETF
launches in the subsample of existing families. The dependent variable is an indicator variable taking
a value of one if an existing family launches in a given investment objective during a given month,
and zero otherwise. All explanatory variables in Table 2.2 are included as control variables. The
reported coefficients are estimated on the interaction terms of each explanatory variable with the Big
Three dummy. The models assume independence of ETF launching decisions across families, but not
within families. Calendar year fixed effects are included, and the standard errors are clustered by
fund family. All the explanatory variables are standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard de-
viation of one. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Variables
Model (1) Model (2)
Existing Existing
(Interaction with the Bigthree Dummy) Families Family-Objectives
Percentage Family Asset in Objective 0.449**
(0.191)
Objective Flow 0.015 -0.109*
(0.049) (0.064)
Family Flow -0.167 -0.169
(0.115) (0.171)
Objective Dollar Volume 0.244*** 0.126
(0.045) (0.088)
Family Dollar Volume -0.002 -0.056
(0.168) (0.179)
Objective Tracking Error 0.090 0.097
(0.123) (0.151)
Objective Expense Ratio 0.170* 0.140
(0.093) (0.135)
Family Expense Ratio 0.749*** 0.933***
(0.184) (0.319)
Objective Portfolio Turnover -0.129 -0.143**
(0.100) (0.072)
Family Portfolio Turnover 0.865 2.306**
(0.742) (0.983)
Objective Size 0.465*** 0.200
(0.181) (0.199)





Controls Included YES YES
Year FE YES YES
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Table 2.9
Multinomial Logistic Regression on Determinants to Incubate
This table presents the results from multinomial logistic regression models on the decision to launch
an incubated ETF versus a non-incubated ETF, both relative to no launching. The dependent
variable takes a value of one if, in a given month, the family launches an incubated ETF. It
takes a value of two if the family launches a non-incubated ETF and zero otherwise. The column
“Difference p-value” presents the p-value of a difference test between the coefficients across two model
specifications. The models assume independence of ETF launching decisions across families, but not
within families. Calendar year fixed effects are included, and the standard errors are clustered by
fund family. All the explanatory variables are standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard
deviation of one. Pseudo R2 is computed as one minus the log-likelihood ratio at convergence over
the log-likelihood ratio at zero. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels, respectively.
Variables
Incubated Non-Incubated Diffefence p-value
(1) (2) (1) - (2)
Objective Flow 0.026 0.138*** 0.378
(0.115) (0.035)
Family Flow 0.223 0.007 0.425
(0.289) (0.077)
Objective Dollar Volume 0.161 0.236*** 0.714
(0.195) (0.044)
Family Dollar Volume 0.523 0.212*** 0.479
(0.433) (0.071)
Objective Tracking Error -0.019 0.113** 0.325
(0.121) (0.055)
Objective Expense Ratio 0.211* 0.170** 0.758
(0.112) (0.070)
Family Expense Ratio 0.395* 0.116 0.148
(0.206) (0.102)
Objective Portfolio Turnover -0.554*** -0.074 0.011
(0.192) (0.056)
Family Portfolio Turnover 0.242 -0.202** 0.050
(0.227) (0.086)
Objective Size 0.725*** 0.615*** 0.508
(0.097) (0.138)
Family Size 0.475 0.234** 0.616
(0.485) (0.115)
Family Launched in Prior Year 1.542*** 0.523*** 0.073
(0.521) (0.196)
Objective Benchmark-Adjusted Return 0.092 0.026 0.376
(0.075) (0.028)











This table outlines the ex-ante expectations regarding the effect of each explanatory variable on the
likelihood of new ETF launches. The hypotheses are divided into three broad categories, namely
profit maximization, scale and scope economies and the impact of the Big Three. Predictions are
posed in either the whole sample or two different subsamples of the existing families and the non-Big
Three families where appropriate. Interaction terms are expressed with a “#” between the two
different explanatory variables.
Variables
Likelihood of new ETF Launches
All Existing Non-Big Three
Families Families Families
Panel A: Profit Maximization
Revenue Generation
Flow Objective (ETF&MF) Positive
Flow Family Positive
Dollar Volume Objective Positive
Dollar Volume Family Positive
Tracking Error Objective Positive
Expense Ratio Objective (ETF&MF) Positive




Portfolio Turnover Objective Negative
Portfolio Turnover Family Negative
Panel B: Scale and Scope Economies
Size Objective (ETF&MF) Positive
Size Family Positive
Scope Family Positive
Prior Launch in Family Positive
Benefit of Specialization
Percentage Family Asset in Objective Positive
Panel C: Impact of the Big Three
Prior Launch in Big Three Positive
Market Share # Prior Launch in Big Three Negative































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The More Things Change, The More
They Stay The Same: Why Do Mutual
Funds Change Sub-advisors?
Julia Arnold David Chambers Pedro A.C. Saffi Xinrui Zheng
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Abstract
We study the effects of managerial turnover and competition on U.S. sub-advised mutual funds (MFs),
using changes of sub-advisors by 426 funds from January 1995 to December 2016. Sub-advised MFs
exhibit return-chasing behaviour when making turnover decisions, but these changes neither improve
subsequent fund returns and risk measures, nor increase future flows into the fund. Using sub-advisor
turnover to change the degree of competition among sub-advisors does not affect the performance of
incumbent sub-advisors. Overall, there is no evidence that sub-advisor selection decisions by fund
families benefit sub-advised MF’s performance. Outperforming sub-advisors with larger style drift
are less likely to be hired, and the more a sub-advisor deviates from its investment mandate, the more
likely it is to be fired.
Keywords: Mutual Funds, sub-advisors, managerial turnover, return-chasing, competition.
JEL classification:
* All errors are ours.
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3.1 Introduction
Mutual fund families often delegate or outsource the asset management of a mutual fund to
sub-advisors rather than managing the assets in-house. Prior empirical analysis of mutual funds
has established an absence of persistence in generating abnormal returns and a convex flow-
performance relationship, suggesting that investors chase the best-performing funds.1 Given
that mutual funds that outsource management are typically more sophisticated, knowledgeable,
and better resourced than the average mutual fund investor, one might expect fund families
to do a better job in picking outperforming managers. The large number of sub-advisor hiring
and firing decisions made by fund families allows us to test this hypothesis. Between January
1995 and December 2016, we count 1,239 hiring and 809 firing decisions made by fund families,
across 426 sub-advised mutual funds. Fund families may choose to replace a sub-advisor for
“good” reasons, such as to improve fund returns and to lower risk, or for “bad” ones, such as to
increase fund flows and asset management revenues despite any improvement in performance.
This paper makes three main contributions. First, we analyse what drives the large number
of hiring and firing events and their resulting impact on mutual fund and sub-advisor returns.
Second, we study competition among sub-advisors by exploiting the fact that the existence of
sub-advised (or outsourced) funds with two or more sub-advisors effectively introduces compe-
tition into the management of these funds. The presence of more than one sub-advisor leads to
a split of management fees among sub-advisors, which in turn encourages greater monitoring
between them and appears to benefit performance (Moreno et al. (2018)). Exploiting the fact
that 32% of the outsourced funds in our sample are managed by two or more sub-advisors, we
examine if the performance of the incumbent sub-advisors varies when either one of them is
fired or a new sub-advisor is hired and if this performance is different from that of the recently
hired/fired sub-advisors. Finally, we study how actively the fund family monitors its sub-
advisors beyond looking at performance and whether deviating from the investment mandate
affects a subadvisor’s chances of being hired or fired. Despite not being able to outsource asset
1See, for example, Grinblatt and Titman (1992), Brown and Goetzmann (1995),Elton et al. (1996), Carhart
(1997), Daniel et al. (1997), Sirri and Tufano (1998), and Berk and Green (2004).
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management to improve returns, advisors may be able to act as monitors simply to ensure that
sub-advisors follow the mandates they are given.
Our results show that advisors exhibit similar behaviour to retail investors when selecting a
mutual fund (Sirri and Tufano (1998)). Fund families tend to fire sub-advisors following under-
performance and hire them after outperformance. When the fund itself is outperforming, there
are fewer hirings and firings. Furthermore, such changes do not lead to higher returns, lower
volatility, better Sharpe ratios, and higher asset flows. We also do not find that competition
among sub-advisors improve performance. Turnover does not affect the risk-adjusted returns
of incumbent sub-advisors, and their subsequent performance is not different from those of re-
cently hired/fired sub-advisors. Finally, the likelihood that a sub-advisor is fired increases with
its degree of style drift (measured by differences of factor loadings relative to its Morningstar
style’s average) and that the likelihood of being hired following outperformance is reduced by
the style drift.
We focus on all sub-advised U.S. domestic equity funds available on Morningstar between
1995 and 2016. We collect EDGAR data on funds and their sub-advisors, such as the date sub-
advisors’ are hired or fired, the identity of fund families, among others. On average, 7.8% of
domestic equity funds are sub-advised, but the proportion has been increasing over time and in
2016 it reached 11.2% of the total. Unlike previous work, we collect sub-advisors’ return data
from Morningstar and the Informa PSN Separately Managed Accounts database, which allows
us to extend the literature by studying performance at the sub-advisor level instead of only
at the fund level. We match the sub-advisor name and investment style reported on EDGAR
with the mutual fund in Morningstar which has the same portfolio manager and investment
style to estimate the pre-hiring performance of a sub-advisor. In total, we study 426 funds
that have more than 382 unique sub-advisors.
Funds experiencing persistently poor performance face the threat of fund outflows and lower
management fees.2 If a fund family has the ability to identify future performance based on
past performance, we would expect that the decision to hire or fire a sub-advisor is related to
2Past research shows that retail and institutional investors chase performance when selecting fund managers
(e.g., Sirri and Tufano (1998), Karceski (2002), Knittel et al. (2004), and Goyal and Wahal (2008)).
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past performance. On the one hand, such decisions send a positive signal to the market about
the fund family’s selection ability. In such a case, more capital is directed towards the fund,
increasing the asset management company’s fees. On the other hand, if manager performance
is not persistent, underperforming funds may decide to change sub-advisors because fund
investors make decisions based on past performance. Therefore, regardless of the ability of
fund families to select sub-advisors and of the existence of performance persistence, we would
expect that sub-advisor turnover depends on the past performance of the fund and of the
sub-advisor. Similar to previous literature, our results show that fund families chase past
performance in selecting/terminating sub-advisors (Goyal and Wahal (2008) and Kostovetsky
and Warner (2015)). This behaviour is similar to the one found for retail and institutional
investors.
A natural question is if these sub-advisor changes can ultimately improve the performance or
risk profile of the fund. There are at least three different channels through which performance
could be enhanced. The first is that, by hiring past winners, the out-performance of the
chosen sub-advisor continues, improving the fund’s future returns. However, we find that the
performance of the fund following sub-advisor changes is in fact worse, mostly due to the
mean-reversion of sub-advisor returns after being hired/fired. Investors could still be better
off if the risk of the fund is reduced, but there is no significant reduction in fund volatility or
Sharpe ratio after sub-advisor changes. Finally, in spite of any improvements to clients, the
fund family might still benefit by changing sub-advisors if it leads to higher asset flows. Yet
again, our results do not show any significant effect due to sub-advisor changes on asset flows.
The effect of competition among sub-advisors on fund performance can be studied through
the lens of multi-advised funds. Fund performance depends not only on the returns of the sub-
advisor that is hired or fired. but also on any effects on incumbent sub-advisors that already
manage a portion of the fund’s assets. Therefore, a second channel that might improve the
performance of funds that already outsource asset management is through competition. The
arrival of a newly hired sub-advisor may increase competition and lead to better performance
of the incumbent sub-advisors. In turn, this could improve overall fund performance, even
as the abnormal performance of the newly-hired sub-advisor decreases after being hired (e.g.
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Goyal and Wahal (2008)), if the net effect is positive. Similarly, the termination of an under-
performing manager might discipline the remaining sub-advisors, improving fund performance.
Using unique data on the returns of individual sub-advisors of a fund, we find that performance
of the incumbent sub-advisors does not improve in the 36-month period after the change. A
third channel is that the performance of a newly-hired sub-advisor may still outpace that of
the incumbents, with a net positive impact on abnormal returns. Similarly, the performance of
a fired sub-advisor may be relatively worse than that of the remaining incumbents, resulting in
higher performance after the sub-advisor’s departure. Our results do not find any difference in
performance between newly-hired and existing sub-advisors. In short, our empirical analysis
provides no evidence that changing the level of competition through variation in the number
of sub-advisors of a fund improve its performance.
Finally, we study whether deviating from the investment mandate affects a sub-advisor’s
chances of being hired or fired. Sub-advisors possess some degree of freedom to drift away from
their mandates and deviations from a mandate might be used to exploit performance-enhancing
stock selection and market-timing opportunities, increasing fund performance (Chevalier and
Ellison (1999)). Alternatively, managers may deviate from their mandates to increase fund
flows and, ultimately, their own compensation and that of the fund family. ? show that
funds with higher levels of style volatility underperform, suggesting that style drift might be
motivated by agency issues. Relatedly, ? finds that funds that change the volatility of their
portfolios more often (i.e., higher “risk shifting”) also underperform. These results lead us to
hypothesize that sub-advisors with larger style-drift from their mandates are less likely to be
hired and more likely to be fired. Our estimates show that fund families are less likely to hire
outperforming sub-advisors if they exhibit larger style drift. When firing a manager, excessive
style drift of sub-advisors is associated with a higher likelihood of being fired, regardless of
its performance. These results show that fund advisors actively monitor sub-advisors and use
high-powered incentives to make sure that they stay in line with the stated investment style,
consistent with Chen et al. (2013) and Chevalier and Ellison (1999)
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3.2 Hypotheses Development
Asset managers aim to maximize profits extracted from fees based on total assets under
management. For any sub-advisor turnover decision to be rational, the asset manager should
benefit from a growing asset base post turnover through either improved performance or incre-
mental flows. Below, we describe four testable hypotheses that investigate the different ways in
which asset managers’ choice of sub-advisors is related to fund and sub-advisor characteristics.
Mutual fund investors tend to chase past performance and allocate capital to outperform-
ing funds (Sirri and Tufano (1998) and Karceski (2002)). As a consequence, we expect asset
managers aiming to expand their asset base to turnover sub-advisors if the fund suffers from
persistent underperformance or consistent outflows. On the other hand, management turnover
can be costly, and searching for new sub-advisors requires considerable skill and effort. There-
fore, if a fund is outperforming, there should be little incentive to replace sub-advisors and
the likelihood of turnover would be negatively related to the fund’s performance. Previous
literature documents similar patterns for both internal fund manager turnover and external
sub-advisor departure. Chevalier and Ellison (1999) find a negative relation between fund past
performance and the likelihood of management turnover. Kostovetsky and Warner (2015) find
an inverse relation between sub-advisor departure and past fund flows. Such return-chasing be-
haviour is documented not only among retail investors, but also among institutional investors
(Knittel et al. (2004) and Goyal and Wahal (2008)). Therefore, advisors are likely to engage
in return-chasing behaviour and their decision to hire and fire a sub-advisor should be affected
by past performance, regardless of whether mutual fund performance is persistent or not. This
leads to our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 The turnover of a sub-advisor is related to the past performance of the sub-
advisor and of the fund itself: hiring (firing) a sub-advisor is more (less) likely if the sub-advisor
is outperforming and less (more) likely if the fund is outperforming.
Mutual fund families have access to more expertise and resources than retail investors to
research the investment skill of other fund managers (Guercio and Tkac (2002)). As such, they
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are expected to make smarter decisions in delegating asset management. If asset managers are
skilled at identifying outstanding sub-advisors, we expect an improvement in the fund’s per-
formance, either via higher returns or lower risk, following sub-advisor turnover. Furthermore,
given the convex relationship between performance and fund flows (Sirri and Tufano (1998)),
we expect fund families to incorporate retail investor’s preference for mutual funds with higher
past performance, replacing sub-advisors in expectation of higher flows. This hypothesis is
summarized below:
Hypothesis 2 Following sub-advisor turnover, the risk and return characteristics of the fund
improves. The fund should also experience higher inflows of capital.
Our data allow us to decompose what drives the change in performance of multi-advised
fund following sub-advisor turnover. Consider the case where an outperforming sub-advisor is
hired by an existing outsourced mutual fund managed by an existing sub-advisor. There are
three channels through which fund performance could be affected by sub-advisor turnover in
this setting. First, the pre-hiring outperformance of the newly-hired sub-advisor persists after
hiring and improves the fund’s return. Second, the hiring of a new sub-advisor improves the
performance of the incumbent sub-advisors via increased sub-advisor competition. This may
be the case even if the new sub-advisor’s outperformance subsequently reverts to the mean
(Goyal and Wahal (2008)). Notwithstanding an expectation of mean reversion in post-hiring
sub-advisor performance, it is still rational for a fund to hire a new sub-advisor if the increased
competition among sub-advisors forces the incumbent ones to perform better, as long as the net
effect on fund performance is positive. Third, notwithstanding mean-reversion in post-hiring
sub-advisor performance, the post-hiring performance of the newly-hired sub-advisor might
still exceed that of the incumbents. Our third hypothesis focuses on the impacts of managerial
turnover on incumbent sub-advisors:
Hypothesis 3 When a fund family adds one or more sub-advisors to a sub-advised fund,
the incumbent sub-advisor(s) exhibit outperformance post-hiring as competition between sub-
advisors increases. Similarly, incumbent sub-advisors underperform after firing as competition
recedes.
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Advisors state the objective and style (“the mandate”) of the mutual fund that guides
investors on how they intend to invest their capital. Similarly, sub-advisors are in turn also
guided in their investment decisions by the same fund mandate chosen by the fund advisor.
Sub-advisors possess some degree of freedom to drift away from the fund mandate and devi-
ations from a mandate might be used to exploit performance-enhancing stock selection and
market-timing opportunities, increasing fund performance (Chevalier and Ellison (1999)). Al-
ternatively, managers may deviate from their mandates to increase fund flows and, ultimately,
their own compensation. ? show that funds with higher levels of style volatility underper-
form, suggesting that style drift might be motivated by agency issues. Relatedly, ? find that
funds that change the volatility of their portfolios more often (i.e., higher “risk shifting”) also
underperform. Since we believe that fund advisors are better monitors than ordinary mutual
fund investors, we expect that sub-advisors with larger deviations from their mandates are less
likely to be hired and more likely to be fired. Our last hypothesis is summarized below:
Hypothesis 4 Deviations from its investment mandate decrease the likelihood that a sub-
advisor is hired and increase the likelihood that a sub-advisor is fired.
3.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
3.3.1 Sample Selection
First, we download all sub-advised U.S. domestic equity funds from Morningstar. After
removing those with duplicate share classes, the initial sample comprises 1,061 unique funds
from January 1995 to December 2016. Our sample excludes owner funds that do not have
independent subadvisors or advisors that are affiliated with the main advisor (306 funds),
index funds (240), those without return and fee data (36), and funds that were reorganized or
merged with other companies (8 funds). For the final sample of funds, we download information
on assets under management, inception dates, fund manager names, investment style, returns,
and expense ratios.
From SEC fillings on EDGAR, we collect data on the identity of the sub-advisors and the
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date a sub-advisor is hired or fired. Our data also include information on sub-advisor firms,
such as inception dates and their total assets under management at the time of hiring. SEC
fillings also disclose when sub-advisors are direct subsidiaries of the main advisor or trust of
the fund.
For each fund sub-advisor, we obtain return data around hiring and firing events from
Morningstar and the Informa PSN Separately Managed Accounts database. In order to ob-
tain pre-hiring performance of a sub-advisor, we match the sub-advisor name and investment
style reported on EDGAR with the mutual fund in Morningstar which has the same portfolio
manager and investment style. We then select the class with the longest return history avail-
able, using the institutional share class whenever possible. Where we cannot find a match in
Morningstar, we search on the Informa PSN database. In the case of 25 sub-advisors without
an exact match using this procedure, we select the returns for the closest available strategy on
Morningstar (e.g., Large Cap Growth) as long as the fund managers’ names are the same.
3.3.2 Variable Definitions
Return Performance
We study the effects of hiring and firing of sub-advisors by fund advisors in event time
and define the event date as the month in which the hiring or firing takes place. We estimate
returns at both the fund level and the sub-advisor level for 12, 24, and 36 month windows
around each event. We evaluate performance up to three years to account for long-term mean
reversion following (Goyal and Wahal, 2008). In the remaining analysis, we denote the event
window by close intervals in months.
Abnormal returns are computed in two alternative ways. The first is based on Carhart’s
(1997) four-factor abnormal returns computed using a 36-month rolling window:
αi,t = Ri,t −RF,t − b̂i,t−1RMRFt − ŝi,t−1SMBt − ĥi,t−1HMLt − p̂i,t−1PR1Y Rt, (3.1)
where Ri,t is the excess return of portfolio i in month t over the one-month T-bill rate (RF,t)
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and RMRFt is the excess return on a value-weighted aggregate market proxy in month t.
SMBt, HMLt, and PR1Y Rt are returns on value-weighted, zero-investment, factor-mimicking
portfolios for, respectively, size, book-to-market equity, and one-year return momentum.3
The second abnormal return measure is based on a portfolio’s excess returns relative to its
benchmark (BMK ). At the fund level, we use the fund’s net monthly returns relative to its
benchmark. Where there is only a single sub-advisor, the returns of the fund and the sub-
advisor are identical. When there is more than one sub-advisor, we obtain the performance of
each sub-advisor by using the net monthly return of the matched portfolio for each sub-advisor.
Information on the primary prospectus benchmark and the monthly returns on the benchmark
indices are collected from Morningstar. If the benchmark information is missing, we replace
it with the most popular benchmark used by funds within the same 3x3 Morningstar style
category. A list of the categories along with the corresponding default benchmarks is provided
in Table A3.1.4 Alphas are estimated using the following equation:
Ri,t −RF,t = αi + βi,t(RBMKi,t −RF,t) + εi,t, (3.2)
where Ri,t denotes the net monthly return for portfolio i during month t and (RBMKi,t−RF,t)
denotes the excess return of the primary benchmark over the risk-free rate for fund i in month
t.
Other Performance Characteristics
We compute the Sharpe Ratio (SR) and Information Ratio (IR) for up to three years
before and after the hiring and firing decisions. We calculate the Sharpe Ratio at time t of an





3Monthly factor returns on market, size, value, and momentum factors come from Ken French’s website,
accessed through https://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.
4Soggiu et al. (2020) find that a mismatch may exist between the benchmark disclosed in the prospectus
and the fund’s mandate. In such cases, assigning a category benchmark that is better aligned to the fund’s
objective produces more reliable measures of benchmark-adjusted performance.
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where the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is defined as the arithmetic sum of the monthly





and σAR denotes the standard deviation of the abnormal returns over H periods. The Informa-
tion Ratio is calculated similarly, with cumulative abnormal returns replaced by the cumulative
benchmark-adjusted excess returns.5
Following Chevalier and Ellison (1999), we compute two measures of risk-taking deviations.
The first is a fund’s idiosyncratic risk, defined as the standard deviation of residuals from the
factor model regression on monthly returns. The second measure examines style drift (Beta
Dev), defined as the square root of the sum of squared deviations of a fund’s size and value
betas relative to the respective betas of its 3x3 Morningstar category:6
Beta Deviationi,t =
√
(βsizei,t − βsize,t)2 + (βvaluei,t − βvalue,t)2. (3.5)
Other Variables
In addition to the risk and return metrics, we also examine two measures of fund flow. The
dollar flow in a given month is defined as:
Dollar Flowi,t = TNAi,t − TNAi,t−1 × (1 + ri,t), (3.6)
where TNAi,t denotes the total net assets of fund i at the end of month t, and ri,t denotes the
gross return of fund i during month t. Percentage flow is equal to Dollar Flow scaled by the
5The Information Ratio measures the skill of a portfolio manager at generating returns in excess of a
given benchmark, while incorporating the consistency of the performance through the tracking error in the
denominator.
6The investment mandate of each fund falls into one of the 3x3 categories defined on the size and value
dimensions, as shown in Table A3.1. Therefore, style drift of a fund could be more accurately described by the







Fund flow is highly sensitive to past performance (Sirri and Tufano, 1998) and to other char-
acteristics such as fund age and total fund size (Kostovetsky and Warner, 2015). Following
Kostovetsky and Warner (2015), we estimate abnormal flow alpha as follows:
Flow Alphai,t = Dollar Flowi,t −
(
b̂i,t−1Ri,pr1yr + âi,t−1Agei,t + ŝi,t−1TNAi,t
)
, (3.8)
where Ri,pr1yr denotes the prior-12-month average of fund i’s net return, fund age and fund
TNA and the coefficients b̂i,t−1, âi,t−1, ŝi,t−1 are estimated using data from the previous 12
months.
3.3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of our final sample. In Panel A, we report
characteristics of the 426 mutual funds outsourced to 382 sub-advisors and distributed by 84
different fund families. A sub-advised fund on average has $491.8m AUM with monthly four-
factor alpha of -0.111% and benchmark alpha of -0.059%. The average monthly percentage
flow is 0.3%. The median and mean number of sub-advisors per fund is 1 and 2.62 respectively,
while the median and mean number of mutual funds managed by the same sub-advisor at the
same time is 1 and 3.25 respectively. The median tenure for a sub-advisor is 57 months, and
the mean is 71. In Panel B, we identify 1,239 cases of a sub-advisor being hired and 809 cases of
being fired. Among these hirings, there are 50 instances of hiring upon fund inception, whilst
among the firings there are 18 instances where sub-advisory contracts end with the delisting of
the fund. Less than 10% of the hiring events (105) arise when fund families move from in-house
management to outsourcing, while more than a quarter of the firing events (229) result from
outsourced funds shifting back to in-house management. Finally, in Panel C, we summarize
the 1,291 fund-month observations where there are sub-advisor turnovers, comprising 591 pure
hirings, 374 pure firings and 326 cases of simultaneous hiring and firing.
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Table 3.2 presents the percentage of sub-advised funds covered in the sample, together with
the distribution over the number of sub-advisors for each year from 1995 to 2016. The number
of sub-advised funds grow over time, reaching 350 at peak time in 2015, which represents
11.24% of all US domestic equity MFs. On average, 68.16% sub-advised funds have only one
single sub-advisor, 10.45% sub-advised funds have two, and another 6.47% sub-advised funds
have three. The other 14.92% sub-advised funds have four or more sub-advisors on average.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Impact of Past Performance on Sub-advisor Turnover
In this section, we investigate the determinants of sub-advisor turnover decisions by mutual
fund families to test the hypotheses laid out in Section 2. We start by examining the relation-
ship between sub-advisor hiring/firing decisions and past performance of both the fund and
the sub-advisor. We do so by estimating the following panel probit regression:
Pr(Hiredi,t/F iredi,t = 1) = Φ(µ+ β1Sub-advisor Performancei,t−1
+β2Fund Performancei,t−1 + λ
′Xt−1 + γt + εi,t),
(3.9)
where Hiredi,t/F iredi,t are indicator variables that take a value of one if sub-advisor i is
hired/fired by the fund in month t and zero otherwise. The notation Φ(·) stands for the cumu-
lative distribution function of a standard normal distribution. Our main explanatory variables
are performance measures computed for 12, 24, and 36 month-windows pre-hiring/firing, for
both the fund and the sub-advisor, based on the Carhart’s (1997) four-factor abnormal return
(Factor Alpha) and the benchmark-adjusted abnormal return (Benchmark Alpha). Control
variables are lagged one month and represented by the matrix Xt−1, including Log(Fund TNA,
Log(Sub-advisor Age), Log(Fund Age) and No. of Funds in Family. For firing decisions, we
include Log(Sub-advisor Tenure) and an indicator variable Co-branding, equal to 1 if the
sub-advisor’s name appears in the fund’s name, zero otherwise as in Moreno et al. (2018).
γt captures time fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in brackets and clustered at the
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fund-level.
We report results in Table 3.3. At the fund level, the past performance is associated
with changes in the likelihood of sub-advisor turnover. Coefficients on the prior 12-month
Factor Alpha and Benchmark Alpha performance measures are both negative and statisti-
cally significant at the 1% level in columns (1)-(4), for both hiring and firing. These results
imply that that underperformance at the fund-level drives sub-advisor turnover and consistent
with Chevalier and Ellison (1999), who show that closures of outsourced funds are more sen-
sitive to low past performance than in-house funds. At the sub-advisor level, outperforming
sub-advisors are more likely to be hired. Coefficients on both sub-advisor factor alpha and
benchmark alpha are positive and significant across columns (1)-(2). The statistical signifi-
cance can be dated as far back as three years pre-hiring. Similarly, results from column (3)-(4)
show that sub-advisors are more likely to be terminated for persistent under-performance. Co-
efficients on both the sub-advisor factor alpha and benchmark alpha measures are negative
and statistically significant for at least two years before firing. They show that outperforming
sub-advisors are more likely to be hired by a fund and less likely to be fired.
Table 3.3 About Here
When observing the results for control variables, most are not statistically significant,
but there are some exceptions. First, younger funds appear to be more aggressive in firing
underperforming sub-advisors. Second, fund families with fewer fund offerings are more likely
to hire new sub-advisors. This is partly due to the lack of relevant expertise within the family to
manage the portfolio in-house (Debaere and Evans, 2014). Third, sub-advisors with relatively
longer tenure are more likely to be fired.
Taken together, these findings support Hypothesis 1 and suggest that fund families use
past performance in their decision to hire/fire sub-advisors. Both the absolute performance
measured by Carhart’s alpha and the relative performance measured by benchmark alphas at
the sub-advisor level matter, and the effect can persist up to three years. The return-chasing
behaviour of sub-advised mutual funds is similar to that exhibited by both retail investors
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and plan sponsors in picking investment managers (Sirri and Tufano (1998), Bergstresser and
Poterba (2002), and Sapp and Tiwari (2004), and Goyal and Wahal (2008)).
3.4.2 Impact of Sub-advisor Turnover on the Returns, Risk, and
Flows of a Fund
In this section, we examine if fund advisors have superior skills when hiring/firing sub-
advisors. We construct a balanced sample by excluding fund observations without continuous
return data throughout the event window. In this way, the cases where sub-advisor hiring/firing
changes coincide with a fund’s launch or delisting are excluded from the sample. We also remove
events in which hiring a sub-advisor would make the fund go from being managed in-house to
being outsourced (and vice versa for firing). This ensures that our results are not due to the
effects from outsourcing and allows us to focus on the increase/decrease in competition among
sub-advisors.7
For an initial picture on how fund performance changes in the months around sub-advisor
turnover events, Figure 3.1 plots the annualized sample means of factor alphas for sub-advisors
(top panel), for all turnovers (middle panel), and for three different turnover types separately
(bottom panel). On the top panel, we can see that hired sub-advisors are outperforming in the
previous 36 months, while those fired have been underperforming. From the middle panel, we
can infer that there is no difference in performance before or after a change in sub-advisors.
The bottom panel decomposes these events and shows there is no difference in performance
regardless of the type of event (pure hiring, pure firing, or mixed).
Figure 3.1 About Here
For a more formal analysis, we employ an event study framework to compare fund perfor-
7Chen et al. (2013) show that outsourced funds underperform the in-house managed funds by about 52 basis
points per year. Chuprinin et al. (2015) find that in companies running both outsourced and in-house funds,
in-house funds outperform outsourced funds by 0.85% annually, which amounts to 57% of the expense ratio.
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mance before and after sub-advisor turnover:
Fund Characteristici,t = µ+ γ1Post Turnovert ∗ Pure Hiringi
+γ2Post Turnovert ∗ Pure F iringi + λPost Turnovert + εi,t.
(3.10)
Fund Characteristic denote the different dependent variables, including Carhart’s (1997) four-
factor alpha, benchmark alphas, Sharpe ratios, volatility, and asset flows for t=12, 24, and
36 -month windows around hiring/firing events. Post Turnover is an indicator variable that
equals one for post-event months and zero otherwise. Pure Hiring and Pure Firing are indicator
variables taking a value of one if a fund only, respectively, hires or fires a sub-advisor within a
given month and zero otherwise (i.e., when a fund does not simultaneously hire a sub-advisor
and fire another). The interaction terms of these variables with Post Turnover allow us to
perform a difference-in-difference analyses relative to the mixed hiring&firing before turnover as
the baseline case without any control variables. The parameter γ1 and γ2 capture the marginal
effect of, respectively, a pure hiring and a pure firing event on future fund performance relative
to the performance of a fund with a mixed hiring&firing before the event date.
It would make sense for advisors to outsource asset management based on past performance,
incurring the associated costs of the change, if the fund’s future performance or asset flows
improve. On Panel A in Table 3.4, the estimated coefficients for the constant in columns (1)-
(3) show that a fund’s Carhart’s (1997) before changing sub-advisors in mixed hiring&firing
events is negative and statistically significant regardless of the event window, varying from
-0.159% to -0.140% per month. After mixed hiring&firing events, there are no improvements
to fund alpha for the 12-month and 24-month windows (i.e., the Post Turnover coefficients
are not statistically significant). Pure Hiring and Pure Firing events are not associated with
any marginal improvements relative to the baseline mixed hiring&firing changes after changes
in sub-advisors. Results using the benchmark alpha in columns (4)-(6) are similar. Columns
(7)-(9) show a significant improvement in the Sharpe ratio two and three years post turnover.
Relative to a baseline mixed hiring&firing event, the average Sharpe ratio of a fund increases
from 0.114 to 0.114 + 0.067 = 0.181 in the two-year event window in column (8) and more
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than triples in the three-year event window (from 0.055 pre-turnover to 0.055 + 0.123 = 0.178
post-turnover).
Table 3.4 About Here
The increase in Sharpe ratios of a fund can be explained by a significant decrease in fund
volatility after sub-advisor changes. In columns (1)-(3) of Panel B, we observe a negative
and statistically significant decrease in volatility post turnover. In columns (2)-(3), we find
a reduction of almost 10% in a fund’s return volatility relative to the baseline. There is no
statistical difference after pure hiring and pure firing events.
An alternative to improving fund performance that can justify sub-advisor changes is that
it increases asset flows, leading to higher management fees to the fund family. We examine the
effect of sub-advisor changes on flow (columns (4)-(6)) and abnormal flow (columns (7)-(9)).
We do these findings indicate that although sub-advisor turnovers do not improve future fund
returns and asset inflow directly, they may lower the fund’s aggregate risk-taking in the long-
run, and hence provide investors with a better risk-return profile. However, these results may
be affected by mean reversion and other fund-specific and time-specific variation.
Controlling for Past Fund Characteristics
In Table 3.5 we estimate the following fixed-effect panel regression:
Fund Characteristici,t = µ+ β1PureHiring + β2PureF iring + β3Hiring&Firing
+λFund Performancei,t−1 + δ
′Controlsi,t−1 + γi + γt + εi,t,
(3.11)
where the dependent variable Fund Characteristic denotes Carhart’s (1997) alpha, benchmark
alphas, and Sharpe ratios measured for the fund i at time t over the next 12, 24, and 36-month
periods. Performance measures for the previous values for each of these windows are included
to capture mean reversion in performance. We also include fund and time fixed effects (γi and
γt). Standard errors are clustered at the fund-level to account for unobserved heterogeneity
across different fund advisors. The same set of control variables as in Table 3.3 is included,
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the time-invariant fund-specific characteristics are absorbed into fund fixed effects.
Table 3.5 About Here
We find a negative and significant relation between Log(Fund TNA) and fund future
performance reflects the decreasing return to scale among asset managers (Pástor et al. (2015)).
Fund age is also negatively related to fund performance, suggesting younger funds who have
better incentives tend to do better. Results also show substantial mean reversion in sub-advised
funds’ performance after managerial turnover. In columns (1)-(3), we can see that Carhart’s
(1997) alpha over the next three years are negatively correlated to past alphas (Fund Factor
Alpha), and the relationship remains significant at the 1% level for all three years. In columns
(4)-(6), we find that future benchmark alphas are also negatively related to past 12-month
benchmark alphas. The mean-reversion for the Sharpe ratios, shown in columns (7)-(9), is
weaker, with only the fund’s Sharpe ratio in the past 12-month being negative and statistically
significant.
More importantly, coefficients on the three sub-advisor turnover indicators — Pure Hiring,
Pure Firing, and Hiring&Firing — captures how the future performance of a fund is affected by
sub-advisor turnover. This represents the net effect related to sub-advisor turnover, controlling
for mean reversion. Across all performance measures and time windows, coefficients on sub-
advisor turnover indicators consistently point to the fact that changing sub-advisors does not
improve a fund’s future performance metrics. In the case of Pure Firing and Hiring&Firing
the effects are in fact negative, hurting the fund. The Sharpe Ratios improvements found in
Panel A of Table 3.4 disappear after we include controls and fixed effects, rejecting the first
part of Hypothesis 2. In columns (1)-(3) of Table 3.6 we can see that sub-advisor changes are
also unrelated to fund volatility, reinforcing the findings for the Sharpe ratio.
An alternative reason for fund families to change sub-advisors could be that if it increases
flows into the mutual fund, even if hurts fund performance. For the decision to replace sub-
advisors to be rational. the expected benefit to the fund advisor must exceed the associated
costs. In this section, we investigate if sub-advisor turnover could assist future flows.
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Table 3.6 reports the results of how sub-advisor changes (i.e., pure hirings, pure firings, and
mixed hirings/firings) affect a fund’s percentage monthly flows (columns (4)-(6)) and flow al-
pha (columns (7)-(9)) in the 12, 24, and 36 months after turnover. The positive and significant
coefficients on the prior 12 and 24-month percentage flows in Panel A show substantial persis-
tence of flows over time. After controlling for this effect, general sub-advisor turnovers appear
to be less harmful to future percentage flows. Pure hiring events improve future percentage
flows in the short-run, with a 0.41% increase in the first year and 0.22% in the following two
years, but the effect is not significant in the 36-month window. However, unlike Kostovetsky
and Warner (2015) there is no significant improvement in flows after pure firing and mixed
hiring/firing events.8 In columns (7)-(9), we repeat the analysis using the future flow alpha,
finding that the Pure Hiring coefficient is no longer statistically significant. Overall, changing
sub-advisors does not increase flows, rejecting the final part of Hypothesis 2.
Table 3.6 About Here
Finally, the effect of sub-advisor changes (Turnover) might show considerable cross-sectional
variations. On Table A3.3 of the Appendix, we test if the impact of sub-advisor turnover on
future performance and flow measures vary conditional on two specific fund-level character-
istics: the size of a fund and the fraction of its total net assets relative to the fund family’s
total net assets. First, columns (1)-(3) of Panel A show that size brings economies of scale and
expertise in picking sub-advisors. Consistent with this argument, we find that sub-advisors’
changes made by larger fund advisors are significantly less harmful to post-turnover fund ab-
normal performance than those made by smaller funds. Second, in columns (4)-(6) we test
if the higher share of a fund on its family’s total assets may increase performance, due to
more attention and resources being directed to the fund. The interaction term coefficients
are positive, but not statistically significant, using a 24 and 36 event-windows. In Panel B
of Table A3.3, we test if the past performance of a fund’s alpha affect changes the impact
8In unreported tests, we run the fixed effect panel regression on the subsample using the same period as
Kostovetsky and Warner (2015), the empirical pattern is consistent with the whole sample.
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of sub-advisor changes on future asset flows. Columns (1)-(3) show that a fund’s alpha does
not change how sub-advisor changes affect the flow alpha. In columns (4)-(6), the Turnover
coefficient is positive and significant at the 10% level for the 12 and the 24-month window.
The Turnover*Fund Flow Alpha[-12,-1] is negative and significant at the 10%level. These
results imply that changing sub-advisors may reduce future abnormal flows if the fund’s past
abnormal alpha are large enough.
3.4.3 Impact of Sub-advisor Turnover on Sub-advisors’ Performance
In the previous section, we examine fund characteristics before and after sub-advisor
turnover. Results suggest that advisors have no timing ability to select sub-advisors, and
that these changes in fact hurt future performance and do not improve asset flows. For in-
stance, in the top panel of Figure 3.1, we plot the annualized sub-advisor Carhart’s (1997)
alpha for 12, 24, and 36 months before and after hiring and firing. We can clearly observe that
sub-advisor abnormal performance is mean-reverting after being hired and fired. However, the
middle and bottom panel shows that the overall effect on the fund’s return is insignificant.
Figure 3.1 About Here
Since the return of a sub-advised fund is the value-weighted average of all of its sub-advisors’
individual returns, in this section we study how the performance of the individual sub-advisors
within a fund are affected after sub-advisor turnover. Hypothesis 3 discusses how competition
among sub-advisors can affect sub-advisors’ performance and the overall returns of the fund
through three channels. For example, suppose that a sub-advised fund hires an outperforming
sub-advisor. The first channel is that by picking a past winner, its outperformance persists,
positively affecting the returns of the fund. The second possibility is that the newly-hired
sub-advisor increases the performance of existing sub-advisors through increased competition.
Therefore, overall fund performance may improve by changing incentives for incumbent sub-
advisors. The third channel is that, even accounting for the underperformance after hiring a
sub-advisor (Goyal and Wahal (2008)), the overall performance of the new sub-advisor is still
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relatively better than that of incumbent ones.
In Panel A of Table 3.7 we examine the abnormal return persistence of sub-advisors, rather
than the fund’s, before and after sub-advisor turnover. We only include sub-advisors with
continuous return data around the symmetric event windows to create a balanced sample,
excluding any who are fired within 12, 24, and 36-month windows post-hiring. In columns
(1)-(3), we find that the sample mean for sub-advisor’s Carhart’s (1997) alpha prior to hiring
varies between 0.085% using the 12-month window and 0.166% using the 36-month window.
This shows that sub-advisors are outperforming immediately before being hired. Conversely,
for firing events in columns (4)-(6), we find that sub-advisors o average underperform before
being fired. For example, in column (4) we find that the average sub-advisor alpha in the 12
months prior to being fired is equal to -0.177%. However, our results also show substantial
mean reversion of sub-advisors’ returns across all event windows. For example, in column
(1) we find that the sub-advisor’s factor alpha drop significantly from 0.085% per month to
−0.011%(= 0.085%−0.096%) in the 12 months after being hired. The decrease in performance
remains indistinguishable from zero in the 36-month window. Similarly, after being fired, sub-
advisors’ factor alphas improve gradually from -0.177% to −0.11% = (−0.177% + 0.067%) in
the first year and −0.051% after three years.
Finally, sub-advisors hired by funds that already have multiple sub-advisors may face
steeper competition. Therefore, we add the variable Single/Multi, which denotes a fund that
changes from having a single sub-advisor to having multiple ones (or vice-versa) and interact it
with the Post Hiring/Firing indicator. In columns (1)-(3), we do not find consistent evidence
that funds that go from having no competition between sub-advisors to being multi-advised
in the long-run have any difference in performance, although in the first year we find that
performance is in fact worse. We find a similar lack of impact in columns (4)-(6), where we
investigate funds that go from having multiple sub-advisors to a single one, reducing the com-
petition. In columns (7)-(12) we use the benchmark alpha as the dependent variable, finding
similar conclusions.
Table 3.7 About Here
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In Panel B of Table 3.7, we examine the disciplinary effect of sub-advisor turnover on the
incumbent sub-advisors. We expect that the introduction of a new sub-advisor would boost
incumbent performance through increased competition. Similarly, firing a poorly performing
sub-advisor may discipline the remaining sub-advisors in the fund. We identify incumbent
sub-advisors of a fund 12, 24, and 36 months before the sub-advisor change that also remain as
sub-advisors for similar periods thereafter. Dependent variables are the value-weighted alphas
across all incumbents around the sub-advisor turnover. Coefficients on the Post Turnover
indicator are consistently negative across both performance measures across all event windows,
with the interaction with Pure Hiring and Pure Firing are mostly insignificant. Overall,
the empirical findings reject Hypothesis 3, as the performance of incumbent sub-advisors is
unaffected by hiring a new one or firing one.
In Panel C of Table 3.7, we compare the post-hiring performance of the newly-hired sub-
advisor relative to the average for all other sub-advisors in multi-managed funds. NewSub−
advisor is an indicator variable equal to one if the sub-advisors has been newly hired; and
zero otherwise. The coefficients are insignificant across both measures over all event windows,
suggesting that post-hiring performance of the new sub-advisor is indifferent from the exist-
ing peers. Overall, these results show that changing sub-advisors do not improve a fund’s
performance.
3.4.4 Impact of Style Drift on Sub-advisor Turnover
Hypothesis 4 states that sub-advisors that deviate from their mandates are penalized by
advisors, who care about the style drift of sub-advisors conditional on the returns generated.
We test this hypothesis using the same probit framework as in equation (9), except for the
inclusion of a measure of sub-advisors’ style drift. We examine the impact of sub-advisors’
risk-taking deviations relative to its peers on the likelihood of being hired/fired. We estimate
the beta loadings from Carhart (1997) four-factor model for all open-ended mutual funds using
a rolling 12-month window and compute the monthly average of factor loadings on the size
and value factors within each of the Morningstar 3 by 3 categories. The style-drift of a sub-
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advisor on a given month is captured by Beta Deviation, calculated as the square root of
the sum of squared deviations of the size and value betas from the sub-advisor’s corresponding
Morningstar category averages. Sub-advisor and fund Carhart’s (1997) alpha up to three years
pre-hiring/firing are included to control for the effect of past performance.
Table 3.8 About Here
Our results are reported in Table 3.8. The coefficient on the prior 12-month sub-advisor
beta deviation is indistinguishable from zero for hiring decisions in column (1), but positive
and significant at the 1% level for firing decisions in column (3). In columns (2) and (4),
we add an interaction term between the prior 12-months sub-advisor beta deviation and the
fund’s factor alpha. The coefficient on this interaction term is negative and significant at
the 5% level for hiring cases (column (2)) but not significant for firing cases (column (4)).
The hiring results imply that fund families are more likely to appoint a sub-advisor that has
been outperforming recently, but the higher is their beta deviation, the less likely they are
to be hired.9 In unreported tests, we decompose the prior 12-month sub-advisor factor alpha
into two censored variables denoting above and below-average alpha observations separately.
Statistical significance emerges from interaction with only the above-average factor alphas,
indicating that the negative and significant coefficient on the interaction term in column (2)
mainly comes from the marginal effect on outperforming sub-advisors.
Overall, results suggest that for hiring decisions, fund families tend to select sub-advisors
based on past performance and then select those with less risk-taking deviations from their
peers. In the case of firing decisions, both persistent underperformance and excessive style
drift of sub-advisors are associated with a higher likelihood of being fired. Fund advisors
actively monitor sub-advisors and use high-powered incentives to make sure that they stay in
line with the stated investment style, consistent with Chen et al. (2013) and Chevalier and
Ellison (1999).
9Notice that all continuous explanatory variables in Table 3.8 are standardized to have a mean of zero and
standard deviation of one, including sub-advisor factor alphas. A positive standardized factor alpha means the
performance is above average.
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Style Drift Around Sub-advisor Turnover
Contractual externalities make it difficult for principal fund advisors to monitor perfor-
mance from an outsourced relationship (Chen et al. (2013)). From columns (3)-(4) in Table
3.8, sub-advisors are more likely to be fired for both underperformance and excessive risk-
taking. We expect that sub-advisors facing steeper incentives are more concerned with job
preservation, so they may alter the risk structure and reduce beta deviation from its peers
(Chevalier and Ellison (1999)). In Table 3.9, we examine if sub-advisor turnover affects style
drift, using the same multivariate framework employed in Table 3.5, but with Beta Deviation
as the dependent variable.
Results do not find strong evidence of long-term style drift after sub-advisor changes. Co-
efficients for Pure Firing and Mixed Hiring&Firing are not statistically significant across all
windows. For Pure Hiring events, we find lower beta deviations for 12 and 24 months after
turnover, but the effect disappears afterwards. Furthermore, funds with more sub-advisors
tend to exhibit less style drift. While competition among sub-advisors does not lead to better
performance, it does seem to reduce deviation from the fund’s mandates. This is consistent
with our earlier findings that fund advisors act as monitors to mitigate style drift.
Table 3.9 About Here
3.5 Conclusion
This paper makes three main contributions. First, we analyse what drives the large number
of hiring and firing events and their resulting impact on mutual fund and sub-advisors’ returns.
Second, we study competition among sub-advisors by exploiting the fact that the existence of
sub-advised (or outsourced) funds with two or more sub-advisors effectively introduces compe-
tition into the management of these funds. The presence of more than one sub-advisor leads to
a split of management fees among sub-advisors, which in turn encourages greater monitoring
between them and appears to benefit performance (Moreno et al. (2018)). Exploiting the fact
69
that 32% of the outsourced funds in our sample are managed by two or more sub-advisors,
we examine if the performance of the incumbent sub-advisors varies when either one of them
is fired or a new sub-advisor is hired and if this performance is different from that of the
recently hired/fired sub-advisors. Finally, we study how actively the fund family monitors its
sub-advisors and whether deviating from the fund’s investment mandate affects a subadvisor’s
chances of being hired or fired.
We study the effects of managerial turnover and competition on U.S. sub-advised mutual
funds. Funds react to poor past performance by trying to change sub-advisors, but they lack
the ability to identify outperforming ones. We find that attempts by asset managers to improve
the performance of a fund by hiring and firing a sub-advisor are not successful. In fact, similar
to retail investors, sub-advisor turnover decisions exhibit return-chasing behaviour, but these
changes neither improve subsequent fund returns and risk measures, nor increase future flows
into the fund. Outperforming sub-advisors with larger style drift are less likely to be hired,
and the more a sub-advisor deviates from its investment mandate, the more likely it is to
be fired. Using variation in the number of sub-advisors to study the degree of competition
among sub-advisor, we do not find any changes in performance. Sub-advisor turnover does not
affect the risk-adjusted returns of incumbent sub-advisors, and their subsequent performance
is not different from those of recently hired/fired sub-advisors. Finally, the likelihood that
a sub-advisor is fired increases with its degree of style drift and that the likelihood of being
hired following outperformance is reduced by the style drift. Rather than outsourcing asset
management to improve returns, advisors just ensure that the mandates given to sub-advisors
are followed. These results are relevant for investors trying to understand the impact of
delegating asset management to sub-advisors and for those studying the effects of changing
the number of sub-advisors on a fund.
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Pure Hirings Pure Firings Mixed Turnovers
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This table presents descriptive statistics of U.S. open-ended equity funds and sub-advisors from
1995 to 2016. Panel A contains fund and sub-advisor characteristics. Panel B describes three
types of sub-advisor turnover events: “Single/Multi sub-advisors” represents the cases where the
fund goes from single-sub-advisor to multi-sub-advisor after hirings, and vice versa for firings;
“In-house/Outsource” stands for the case where the fund goes from being managed in-house to being
outsourced to a sub-advisor, and vice versa for firing; and “Fund Inception/Delisting” denotes cases
where a sub-advisor is hired at inception or fired when the fund is delisted. Panel C decomposes
fund turnovers into three mutually exclusive cases, “Pure Hirings/Firings” count the cases where a
fund makes only hirings/firings in a given month, “Mixed Hiring&Firing” counts the events where a
fund hires and fires at the same time.
Panel A: Fund Advisor and Sub-advisor Characteristics
Observations Median Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Number of Funds 426
Number of Sub-advisors 382
Number of Fund Families 84
Sub-advisor Carhart’s Alpha (%) 249,667 -0.002 0.013 1.833 -5.690 5.943
Sub-advisor Benchmark Alpha (%) 248,407 0.056 0.075 1.895 -5.857 6.197
Fund Carhart’s Alpha (%) 251,928 -0.108 -0.111 1.329 -4.371 4.277
Fund Benchmark Alpha (%) 253,140 -0.061 -0.059 1.277 -4.176 4.300
Fund Percentage Flow (%) 198,485 -0.353 0.300 5.145 -13.759 32.004
Fund Flow Alpha ($ billions) 165,573 0.229 1.998 7.149 -13.071 44.788
Fund TNA ($ millions) 246,679 491.8 997.5 1,739.3 0.0 27,786
Number of sub-advisors 334,055 1 2.216 2.624 0 14
Number of Funds Sub-advised by a Sub-advisor 363,563 1 3.253 6.564 0 44
Sub-advisor Beta Deviation 229,907 0.319 0.403 0.316 0.033 1.738
Sub-advisor Tenure (months) 209,602 57 71.199 54.327 3 336
Panel B: Decomposing Sub-advisor Hirings/Firings
Total Single/Multi In-house/ Fund
Observations Sub-advisors Outsource Inception/Delisting
Number of Hirings 1,239 104 105 50
Number of Firings 809 30 229 18
Panel C: Decomposing Fund Turnover
Total Observations Pure Hirings Pure Firings Mixed Hiring&Firing




This table shows the structure of how U.S. open-ended equity funds are managed from 1995 to
2016. For each year, we report the total number of funds, the number of subadvised funds, and the
number of those with one, two, three, and four or more sub-advisors. Numbers in brackets show the
percentage of sub-advised funds in each category.
Year
All Sub-advised Single Two Three Four or More
Funds Funds (%) Sub-advisor (%) Sub-advisors (%) Sub-advisors (%) Sub-advisors (%)
1995 1,395 24 (1.72%) 19 (79.17%) 2 (8.33%) 0 (0.00%) 3 (12.50%)
1996 1,568 34 (2.17%) 26 (76.47%) 2 (5.88%) 1 (2.94%) 5 (14.71%)
1997 1,791 39 (2.18%) 30 (76.92%) 2 (5.13%) 0 (0.00%) 7 (17.95%)
1998 2,067 50 (2.42%) 40 (80.00%) 2 (4.00%) 1 (2.00%) 7 (14.00%)
1999 2,285 68 (2.98%) 53 (77.94%) 3 (4.41%) 2 (2.94%) 10 (14.71%)
2000 2,510 93 (3.71%) 69 (74.19%) 9 (9.68%) 3 (3.23%) 12 (12.90%)
2001 2,563 123 (4.80%) 87 (70.73%) 13 (10.57%) 8 (6.50%) 15 (12.20%)
2002 2,503 155 (6.19%) 117 (75.48%) 11 (7.10%) 11 (7.10%) 16 (10.32%)
2003 2,538 173 (6.82%) 126 (72.83%) 15 (8.67%) 13 (7.51%) 19 (10.98%)
2004 2,542 194 (7.63%) 136 (70.10%) 21 (10.82%) 13 (6.70%) 24 (12.37%)
2005 2,659 215 (8.09%) 149 (69.30%) 26 (12.09%) 12 (5.58%) 28 (13.02%)
2006 2,715 230 (8.47%) 157 (68.26%) 27 (11.74%) 19 (8.26%) 27 (11.74%)
2007 2,796 250 (8.94%) 171 (68.40%) 27 (10.80%) 23 (9.20%) 29 (11.60%)
2008 3,021 259 (8.57%) 174 (67.18%) 29 (11.20%) 21 (8.11%) 35 (13.51%)
2009 3,026 268 (8.86%) 179 (66.79%) 30 (11.19%) 19 (7.09%) 40 (14.93%)
2010 2,910 280 (9.62%) 184 (65.71%) 32 (11.43%) 20 (7.14%) 44 (15.71%)
2011 2,948 290 (9.84%) 191 (65.86%) 34 (11.72%) 19 (6.55%) 46 (15.86%)
2012 2,952 307 (10.40%) 202 (65.80%) 39 (12.70%) 18 (5.86%) 48 (15.64%)
2013 2,989 316 (10.57%) 211 (66.77%) 36 (11.39%) 22 (6.96%) 47 (14.87%)
2014 3,000 346 (11.53%) 236 (68.21%) 36 (10.40%) 21 (6.07%) 53 (15.32%)
2015 3,113 350 (11.24%) 233 (66.57%) 37 (10.57%) 22 (6.29%) 58 (16.57%)
2016 3,118 349 (11.19%) 232 (66.48%) 39 (11.17%) 22 (6.30%) 56 (16.05%)
Average 2,591 201 (7.76%) 137 (68.16%) 21 (10.45%) 13 (6.47%) 29 (14.92%)
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Table 3.3
The Probability of Sub-advisor Turnover and Past Performance
This table investigates how past performance of a sub-advisor and the performance of the fund affect
sub-advisor turnover decisions using panel probit regressions. The dependent variables Hiredi,t and
Firedi,t are indicator variables that take a value of one if sub-advisor i is, respectively, hired and
fired in month t; and zero otherwise. As explanatory variables, we use Carhart’s (1997) alphas and
the benchmark-adjusted abnormal returns measured in yearly windows in the past 12, 24, and 36
months before each hiring and event. Further control variables include lagged values of Log(Fund
TNA, Log(Sub-advisor Age), Log(Fund Age) and No. of Funds in Family. For firing decisions,
we also include Log(Sub-advisor Tenure) and an indicator variable Co-branding, equal to 1 if the
sub-advisor’s name appears in the fund’s name, zero otherwise. All continuous explanatory variables
are standardized to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. Year fixed effects are
included and the standard errors are clustered at the fund-level. ***, ** and * denote statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Hiredi,t Firedi,t
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Sub-advisor Factor Alpha[-12,-1] 0.062*** -0.109***
(0.023) (0.017)
Sub-advisor Factor Alpha[-24,-13] 0.073*** -0.131***
(0.022) (0.022)
Sub-advisor Factor Alpha[-36,-25] 0.080*** 0.010
(0.018) (0.022)
Fund Factor Alpha[-12,-1] -0.082*** -0.073***
(0.027) (0.020)
Fund Factor Alpha[-24,-13] -0.038 0.015
(0.025) (0.026)
Fund Factor Alpha[-36,-25] -0.039** -0.028*
(0.020) (0.016)
Sub-advisor Benchmark Alpha[-12,-1] 0.087*** -0.111***
(0.017) (0.017)
Sub-advisor Benchmark Alpha[-24,-13] 0.075*** -0.124***
(0.021) (0.020)
Sub-advisor Benchmark Alpha[-36,-25] 0.046** -0.005
(0.020) (0.020)
Fund Benchmark Alpha[-12,-1] -0.081*** -0.070***
(0.025) (0.023)
Fund Benchmark Alpha[-24,-13] -0.041** 0.044**
(0.019) (0.022)
Fund Benchmark Alpha[-36,-25] -0.027 -0.025*
(0.016) (0.015)
Log(Fund TNA)i,t−1 0.020 0.019 0.016 0.016
(0.017) (0.017) (0.010) (0.011)
Log(Sub-advisor Age)i,t−1 0.009 0.003 -0.004 -0.012*
(0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006)
Log(Fund Age)i,t−1 -0.034 -0.030 -0.067*** -0.057***
(0.029) (0.026) (0.019) (0.020)
No. of Funds in Familyi,t−1 -0.026* -0.028** -0.002 -0.002
(0.014) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006)




Constant -2.598*** -2.597*** -1.741*** -1.764***
(0.091) (0.092) (0.039) (0.040)
Observations 127,286 128,974 86,721 87,930
Number of sub-advisors 1,099 1,116 715 723

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Probability of Sub-advisor Turnover and Style drift
This table investigates the effect of sub-advisor style drift on hiring/firing decisions. Hiredi,t and
Firedi,t are indicator variables that take a value of one if sub-advisor i is, respectively, hired and
fired in month t; and zero otherwise. As explanatory variables, we measure the level of style drift
for a sub-advisor, Sub-advisor Beta Deviation, by the squared root of beta deviations on the size
and value dimensions, where the beta loadings are estimated using a 12-month rolling window. We
included fund and sub-advisor Carhart’s (1997) alphas for each for the past three years. Further
control variables include lagged values of Log(Fund TNA, Log(Sub-advisor Age), Log(Fund Age)
and No. of Funds in Family. For firing decisions, we also include Log(Sub-advisor Tenure) and an
indicator variable Co-branding, equal to 1 if the sub-advisor’s name appears in the fund’s name,
zero otherwise. All continuous explanatory variables are standardized to have a mean of zero and
standard deviation of one. Year fixed effects are included and the standard errors are clustered at
the fund-level. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Hiredi,t Firedi,t
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Sub-advisor Beta Deviation[-12,-1]* -0.028** 0.004
Sub-advisor Factor Alpha[-12,-1] (0.012) (0.011)
Sub-advisor Beta Deviation [-12,-1] 0.022 0.024 0.044*** 0.045***
(0.018) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015)
Sub-advisor Factor Alpha[-12,-1] 0.050** 0.065*** -0.113*** -0.115***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.016) (0.018)
Sub-advisor Factor Alpha[-24,-13] 0.054** 0.055*** -0.113*** -0.112***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020)
Sub-advisor Factor Alpha[-36,-25] 0.081*** 0.080*** -0.003 -0.003
(0.017) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021)
Fund Factor Alpha[-12,-1] -0.075*** -0.079*** -0.065*** -0.064***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.019) (0.020)
Fund Factor Alpha[-24,-13] -0.033 -0.033 0.015 0.015
(0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024)
Fund Factor Alpha[-36,-25] -0.041** -0.042** -0.027 -0.027
(0.021) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018)
Log(Fund TNA)i,t−1 0.011 0.012 0.021* 0.021*
(0.018) (0.018) (0.011) (0.011)
Log(Sub-advisor Age)i,t−1 0.011 0.011 -0.005 -0.004
(0.011) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007)
Log(Fund Age)i,t−1 -0.034 -0.034 -0.075*** -0.075***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.019) (0.019)
Number of Funds in the Familyi,t−1 -0.026* -0.026* -0.001 -0.001
(0.014) (0.014) (0.006) (0.006)




Constant -2.587*** -2.586*** -1.732*** -1.732***
(0.096) (0.096) (0.040) (0.040)
Observations 117,698 117,698 80,710 80,710
Number of sub-advisors 1,017 1,017 664 664
Wald χ2 177.2 185.7 772 773.8
Year FE YES YES
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Table 3.9
Effect of Sub-advisor Turnover on Style Drift
This table compares the style drift of a fund around sub-advisor turnover events using 12, 24, and 36
months event-windows. Beta Deviation is calculated as the the squared root of beta deviations on
the size and value dimensions, where the beta loadings on thensize and value factors are estimated
using a 12-month rolling window. Pure Hiring is an indicator variable equal to one if a fund hires
a sub-advisor in a given month without firing any sub-advisor; and zero otherwise. Pure Firing
is an indicator variable equal to one if a fund hires a sub-advisor in a given month without firing
any sub-advisor; and zero otherwise. Hiring events that signal a fund going from in-house managed
to outsourced are excluded from the sample, so do the firing events marking an outsourced funds
getting back to in-house management. Only funds with continuous return data available for all the
months in an event window are included. Fund and year fixed effects are included and the standard
errors are clustered at the fund-level. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% levels, respectively.
Fund Beta Deviation
Variables [1,12] [1,24] [1,36]
Pure Hiring -0.023** -0.011* -0.007
(0.011) (0.007) (0.006)
Pure Firing -0.003 0.001 0.003
(0.011) (0.007) (0.006)
Mixed Hiring&Firing 0.002 -0.003 0.003
(0.010) (0.006) (0.005)
Fund Beta Deviation [-12,-1] 0.041**
(0.016)
Fund Beta Deviation [-24,-13] 0.003
(0.031)
Fund Beta Deviation [-36,-25] -0.037
(0.034)
Fund Factor Alpha[-12,-1] 0.005 0.009 0.001
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Fund Factor Alpha[-24,-13] -0.004 -0.006 -0.009*
(0.008) (0.006) (0.005)
Fund Factor Alpha[-36,-25] -0.004 -0.003 -0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Log(Fund TNA)i,t−1 -0.003 -0.000 -0.000
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
% of Fund’s TNA relative to Fund Family’s TNA i,t−1 -0.017 0.033 0.031
(0.039) (0.037) (0.038)
Log(Fund Age)i,t−1 0.006 -0.009 -0.013
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
No.(Sub-advisors in Fund)i,t−1 -0.011*** -0.007* -0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant 0.377*** 0.322*** 0.313***
(0.103) (0.100) (0.107)
Observations 34,883 34,883 34,883
Number of Funds 293 293 293
R2 0.128 0.172 0.214
Fund FE YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES
83
Table A3.1
3x3 Morningstar Categories and Benchmarks
Value Blend Growth
Large Russell 1000 Value TR USD Russell 1000 TR USD Russell 1000 Growth TR USD
MidCap Russell Mid Cap Value TR USD Russell Mid Cap TR USD Russell Mid Cap Growth TR USD
Small S&P SmallCap 600 Value TR USD Russell 2000 TR USD S&P SmallCap 600 Growth TR USD
Table A3.2
Largest sub-advisors
This table lists names of the top 20 sub-advisors sorted in descending order by the number of funds
that they sub-advise for. The third column shows the total number of family complexes these top
funds sub-advise for whilst the last column shows assets under management of the sub-advisory firms
at the time when they were sub-contracted. These top 20 sub-advisers cover approximately 30% of
all the sub-advisory activity in our sample.
Funds it Families it Sub-advisor’s family
Rank Sub-advisor Name sub-advises for sub-advises for AUM
1. Wellington Management Company, LP 59 21 444,673.4
2. Blackrock Investment Management, LLC 39 12 1,793,967.8
3. Alliance Bernstein, LP 30 12 428,378.4
4. T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc. 29 14 256,298.3
5. Goldman Sachs Asset Management, LP 21 13 559,907.3
6. J.P. Morgan Investment Management, Inc. 21 12 977,715.8
7. SSgA Funds Management, Inc. 21 12 263,414.3
8. Barrow Hanley Mewhinney & Strauss, LLC 19 12 54,948.3
9. Loomis Sayles & Company, LP 18 13 135,946.6
10. Mellon Capital Management Corporation 18 7 185,782.1
11. LSV Asset Management 17 8 37,362.1
12. TCW Investment Management, Co. 17 13 80,817.5
13. AJO, LP 15 6 12,626.8
14. Wells Capital Management, Inc. 15 7 251,030.4
15. Marsico Capital Management, LLC 14 11 37,684.1
16. Invesco Advisers, Inc. 13 10 334,794.8
17. Morgan Stanley Investment, Inc. 13 9 304977.9
18. Brandywine Global Investment Management, LLC 12 6 41,430.1
19. Columbus Circle Investors 12 8 11660.6
20. Systematic Financial Management, LP 12 9 8097.2
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Table A3.3
Cross-sectional Variation in Sub-advisor Turnover Effects
This table examines the cross-sectional variation in turnover effects on future fund performance
and flows under a panel regression framework. In Panel A, the dependent variables are Carhart’s
(1997) four-factor abnormal returns (Fund Factor Alpha) measured over the next 12, 24, and 36
months. In Panel B, the dependent variables are fund flow alphas measured over the next 12, 24,
and 36 months. The corresponding measures for the past 12, 24, and 36 months are included in
the explanatory variables to account for any effect of mean reversion or momentum. Interaction
terms with various fund characteristics are included to investigate the cross-sectional difference in
turnover effects. Fund and year fixed effects are included and the standard errors are clustered at
the fund-level. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Size and Importance of Fund for the Fund Family
Fund Factor Alpha
Variables [1,12] [1,24] [1,36] [1,12] [1,24] [1,36]
Turnover -0.477** -0.340** -0.228* -0.033** -0.015 -0.013
(0.203) (0.156) (0.121) (0.016) (0.013) (0.011)
Turnover*Log(Fund TNA)i,t−1 0.023** 0.016** 0.011*
(0.010) (0.008) (0.006)
Turnover*Fund’s % of Family TNAi,t−1 0.103* 0.024 0.031
(0.060) (0.039) (0.038)
Fund Factor Alpha[-12,-1] -0.079*** -0.073*** -0.086*** -0.079*** -0.073*** -0.086***
(0.018) (0.013) (0.011) (0.018) (0.013) (0.011)
Fund Factor Alpha[-24,-13] -0.060*** -0.078*** -0.067*** -0.060*** -0.078*** -0.067***
(0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012)
Fund Factor Alpha[-36,-25] -0.051*** -0.038*** -0.034*** -0.051*** -0.038*** -0.034***
(0.014) (0.012) (0.010) (0.014) (0.012) (0.010)
Log(Fund TNA)i,t−1 -0.071*** -0.064*** -0.059*** -0.071*** -0.064*** -0.059***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011)
Fund’s % of Family TNAi,t−1 -0.157 -0.081 -0.024 -0.157 -0.081 -0.024
(0.139) (0.124) (0.113) (0.139) (0.124) (0.113)
Log(Fund Age) i, t− 1 -0.098*** -0.083*** -0.078*** -0.098*** -0.083*** -0.078***
(0.033) (0.030) (0.029) (0.033) (0.030) (0.029)
No.(Sub-advisors in Fund)i,t−1 0.008 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.005
(0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011)
Constant 1.215*** 1.244*** 1.311*** 1.211*** 1.241*** 1.309***
(0.269) (0.257) (0.253) (0.269) (0.257) (0.253)
Observations 36,143 36,143 36,143 36,143 36,143 36,143
Number of Funds 295 295 295 295 295 295
R2 0.104 0.150 0.175 0.103 0.150 0.175
Fund FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
(Continued)
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Table A3.3 - Continued
Panel B: Fund Performance and Flow
Fund Flow Alpha
Variables [1,12] [1,24] [1,36] [1,12] [1,24] [1,36]
Turnover -0.006 0.038 0.067 0.396* 0.236 0.257*
(0.188) (0.149) (0.153) (0.214) (0.163) (0.139)
Turnover*Fund Factor Alpha[-12,-1] -0.404 -0.056 0.013
(0.449) (0.371) (0.330)
Turnover*Fund Flow Alpha[-12,-1] -0.169** -0.094 -0.095*
(0.078) (0.077) (0.056)
Fund Flow Alpha[-12,-1] 0.052 0.066 0.038 0.055 0.068 0.040
(0.058) (0.043) (0.041) (0.058) (0.043) (0.041)
Fund Flow Alpha[-24,-13] 0.124** 0.074 0.045 0.123** 0.073 0.045
(0.055) (0.045) (0.049) (0.055) (0.045) (0.049)
Fund Flow Alpha[-36,-25] 0.046 0.020 -0.001 0.046 0.020 -0.002
(0.070) (0.071) (0.061) (0.070) (0.071) (0.061)
Fund Factor Alpha[-12,-1] -0.004 -0.005 -0.008 -0.005 -0.004 -0.007
(0.166) (0.164) (0.168) (0.166) (0.163) (0.167)
Fund Factor Alpha[-24,-13] -0.183 -0.138 -0.046 -0.182 -0.137 -0.046
(0.189) (0.192) (0.175) (0.189) (0.192) (0.175)
Fund Factor Alpha[-36,-25] -0.171 -0.055 -0.027 -0.173 -0.056 -0.028
(0.190) (0.164) (0.165) (0.190) (0.164) (0.164)
Log(Fund TNA)i,t−1 0.968*** 1.055*** 1.059*** 0.967*** 1.055*** 1.058***
(0.212) (0.235) (0.240) (0.212) (0.235) (0.240)
% of Fund’s TNA relative to Fund Family’s TNA i,t−1 3.267** 3.078* 2.814* 3.274** 3.083* 2.820*
(1.636) (1.688) (1.684) (1.636) (1.688) (1.685)
Log(Fund Age)i,t−1 -2.560*** -2.701** -2.990** -2.565*** -2.703** -2.992**
(0.981) (1.096) (1.189) (0.980) (1.096) (1.188)
No.(Sub-advisors in Fund)i,t−1 0.344 0.238 0.142 0.346 0.239 0.143
(0.383) (0.294) (0.254) (0.382) (0.294) (0.254)
Constant -17.794*** -19.342*** -18.504*** -17.782*** -19.335*** -18.497***
(4.489) (5.047) (5.095) (4.487) (5.046) (5.094)
Observations 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000
Number of Funds 0.097 0.129 0.135 0.098 0.129 0.135
R2 284 284 284 284 284 284
Fund FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
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Chapter 4





Using 2,290 European equity and fixed income ETFs from 2001 to 2020, this paper studies how
the replication method affects the tracking efficiencies of ETFs, especially during market crises.
There is no persistent evidence suggesting superior tracking performance of synthetic ETFs
relative to physically-replicated ones. I identify 119 indices simultaneously tracked by both
physical and synthetic ETFs, and conduct a difference-in-difference analysis around Lehman
Brothers bankruptcy, sovereign debt crisis, and COVID-19 outbreak. Synthetic ETFs face
steeper declines in tracking efficiencies after a sudden increase in counterparty risk, but they
are shielded from liquidity shocks. There is a remarkable drop in the sensitivity of tracking
performance to market distress measures after the global financial crisis.
Keywords: Exchange-traded Fund (ETF), Synthetic Replication, Tracking Efficiency, Counterparty
Risk, Liquidity, VIX, Distress, Principle Component Analysis.
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4.1 Introduction
There are two fundamentally different ways that exchange-traded funds (ETFs) can repli-
cate their underlying benchmark indices, namely physical replication and synthetic replication.1
Physical replication involves holding all constituent securities or a representative sample of the
benchmark index. Synthetic replication achieves the benchmark return by entering into a total
return swap or other derivative contract with a counterparty, typically a large investment bank.
The first synthetic ETF was introduced on the French market in 2001. Since then, synthetic
structures have become more popular in Europe than in the US due to different regulations on
fund’s legal structures.2 In this paper, I examine all equity and fixed income ETFs in Europe
from 01 January 2001 to 31 December 2020 to see if the replication method affects the tracking
error.
Figure 4.1 shows the percentage of ETFs with synthetic replication over time. The market
share of synthetic ETFs reaches its peak in 2010, representing 50% of the total number of
ETF offerings in Europe and 30% of aggregate assets under management. However, despite
the exponential growth in ETF assets, the market share of synthetic ETFs has been shrinking
in the past decade. By the end of 2020, synthetic ETFs represent only 23% in number and
17% in total net asset (TNA) of European ETFs. After the global financial crisis, synthetic
ETFs has been widely criticized by regulators and financial advisors for their complexity, lack
of transparency and counterparty risk. However, there is a resurgence in interest for synthetic
ETFs, particularly those providing exposure to the US equity market due to their tax advantage
over their physical peers (Zarate et al., 2021).3 It is therefore important to known whether fund
1Physical replication can be divided into full replication and sampling, synthetic replication can be based
on either total return swaps or other derivatives, such as futures contracts. A more detailed classification
can be found at: http://www.argos-tsp.com/en/research/argos-finneo/terminological-research/
summary-of-index-replication-methods-used-by-etf-providers.html.
2Most US-registered ETFs are governed by the Investment Company Act 1940 (ICA), which prohibits
transactions between fund and its affiliate as well as other forms of self-dealing. As a result, organizing an ETF
using synthetic structure becomes complicated. On the other hand, the majority of European-listed ETFs are
regulated by UCITS, which allows the use of exchange-traded as well as OTC derivatives to achieve investment
objectives, and therefore synthetic replication becomes more popular in Europe.
3BlackRock, once being a major critic of the synthetic structure, has launched a swap-based S&P 500
UCITS ETF in September 2020. Here is the Financial Times article: https://www.ft.com/content/
6600bd7f-5433-47d3-a2df-04411e6de75b.
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families offering synthetic ETFs learn from market failures and improve the risk management
of synthetic structures since then.
This paper addresses the concern by answering the following three questions. First, do syn-
thetic ETFs posses superior tracking ability compared to physically-replicated ones? Second,
which replication method can better withstand market distress? Third, is there any improve-
ment on risk management after the global financial crisis, especially in terms of the swap
counterparty risk of synthetic ETFs? In this paper, I find no evidence of persistent superior
tracking ability of synthetic ETFs across the sample period, especially after controlling for
heterogeneity across the investment objectives. There are significant cross-sectional variations
in tracking errors. Furthermore, after the global financial crisis, I observe a large reduction
in tracking errors. Synthetic ETFs face steeper declines in tracking efficiencies after a sudden
increase in counterparty risk. But during liquidity shocks, their tracking ability is less affected
relative to the physical ones. I explain the relative tracking performance between physical and
synthetic replication around market crisis by describing the trade-off between counterparty
and liquidity risk that dominates the market. Finally, I find that the tracking performance of
both physical and synthetic ETFs becomes significantly less sensitive to market distress after
the global financial crisis. Specifically, synthetic equity ETFs demonstrate superior tracking
ability in terms of both lower tracking errors and lower sensitivity to market turbulence in the
post-crisis period.
There are a handful of studies comparing the tracking efficiencies between physical and
synthetic ETFs (Elia, 2011; Johnson et al., 2013; Meinhardt et al., 2014; Naumenko and Chys-
tiakova, 2015; Mateus and Rahmani, 2017). They look at different exchanges across different
sample periods and find contradicting results. In this paper, I use a sample of all European
equity and fixed income ETFs from 2001 to 2020 with daily observations. Unlike the previous
work, I account for the significant time-series and cross-sectional variations in tracking errors,
which largely reconcile the inconsistencies in the literature. There is a structural break in the
level of tracking errors after the 2008 global financial crisis, especially among equity ETFs.
Cross-sectionally, funds with high return volatility and poor past performance are associated
with higher tracking errors. Although a synthetic structure is applied more commonly in less
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liquid or less developed markets, I find no persistent relation between the liquidity or efficiency
of an objective market and the relative tracking efficiencies.
To address the second research question, I identify 119 physical and synthetic ETF pairs
that have the same underlying benchmark, and conduct a difference-in-difference (DiD) anal-
ysis. Previous literature documents higher tracking errors for all ETFs during crisis periods
characterized by large bid-ask spreads, small trading volumes, and high volatility of currency
and exchange rates (Buetow and Henderson, 2012; Johnson et al., 2013). In this paper, I disen-
tangle the impact of extreme market movements on ETFs with different replication methods.
Results from the DiD analysis suggest that equity (fixed income) ETFs with synthetic struc-
tures experience larger declines in tracking efficiencies around Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy
(sovereign debt crisis). However, synthetic ETFs fared better during the COVID-19 market
shock in 2020, compared to their physical equivalents. Therefore, I relate the different track-
ing ability between physical and synthetic ETF pairs during extreme market turbulence to the
trade-off between liquidity risk and counterparty risk.
Finally, I answer the third question by collecting several state variables that capture market
distress from different perspectives, ranging from stock market volatility to credit risk and
liquidity. V IX is the CBOE volatility index, which measures the expectation of stock market
volatility over the coming 30 days. V STOXX is the Euro Stoxx 50 volatility index, commonly
known as the “Euro VIX”, which measures the implied volatility of near term EuroStoxx 50
options. NOISE is a market-wide liquidity measure proposed by Hu et al. (2013). TED is
calculated as the spread between 3-month LIBOR based on US dollars and 3-month treasury
bill. I also extract a common factor using principal component analysis (PCA) to proxy for the
overall state of the market. I introduce a three-way interaction using an indicator for synthetic
replication, an indicator for the post-crisis period, and the daily change in state variables to
explore how tracking performance responds differently to market movements across time. I
find that the tracking performance of both physical and synthetic ETFs becomes less sensitive
to market distress after the global financial crisis. In particular, the post-crisis tracking ability
of synthetic ETFs is markedly less affected by market turbulence, compared to physically-
replicated ones. This finding suggests significant improvements in risk management over the
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past decade, especially regarding swap counterparty risk among synthetic ETFs.
This paper contributes to the literature from three perspectives. First, this paper dis-
entangles the effect of market distress on ETF tracking efficiencies. Difference in tracking
performance deterioration around market crisis between ETFs with physical and synthetic
replication is attributed to their different reactions to counterparty risk and liquidity risk. Sec-
ond, the extensive 20-year sample period allows identification of several physical and synthetic
ETF pairs tracking the same underlying benchmarks, and therefore a like-for-like comparison
across different types of major market crisis. To my best knowledge, this is the first paper to
make a direct comparison of ETFs with different replication methods on the same underlying
index.4 Third, I identify a structural break in both the level and sensitivity of market-wide
tracking efficiencies after the global financial crisis, and provide empirical evidence on how
market failure evokes tighter risk management.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the major hypotheses.
Section 3 describes the data and shows some summary statistics. Section 4 explains the research
design and elaborates the empirical results from the analysis. And Section 5 concludes.
4.2 Hypothesis Development
A major objective of this paper is to compare the tracking efficiencies between physi-
cal replication and synthetic replication. Tracking error arises from many sources, including
transaction and rebalancing costs, cash drag, dividend distribution and reinvestment, taxation,
security lending, etc (Johnson et al., 2013). Some factors are more relevant to a particular type
of replication method among others. For instance, a physical ETF can be forced to trade the
underlying securities during reconstitution of the benchmark index, and is therefore exposed to
trading frictions and liquidity risk. Also, there are periods when a proportion of the portfolio
needs to be held in cash, mostly due to index rebalancing or dividend distribution. Physical
ETFs are more prone to tracking inefficiencies arising from these periods of cash drag. Whereas
a synthetic ETF in theory provides a more precise replication of the underlying index through
4Meinhardt et al. (2014) explains the scarcity in physical and synthetic ETFs mimicking the same index.
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total return swap or other derivative contract. This leads to the first major hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 Without the need to physically hold the underlying securities and rebalance the
portfolio, synthetic ETFs posses better tracking ability and therefore lower tracking errors.
In real-world practice, synthetic structures are often applied to grant access to less liquid
assets or less efficient markets, which are associated with higher replication costs (Ramaswamy,
2011). Besides, many physical ETFs engage in security lending activities, which are less preva-
lent among synthetic ETFs (Hurlin et al., 2019). Since the securities post as collateral by
the swap counterparties are normally less liquid compared to the securities held for physical
replication (Ramaswamy, 2011). Security lending generates additional income to offset the
expenses associated with running the fund, while at the same time brings in additional coun-
terparty risk. The complexity and variety in the sources of tracking errors suggest significant
cross-sectional variations in tracking errors.
Next, I investigate the reasons behind different tracking performance between physical
ETFs and synthetic ETFs in the face of market crisis. On the one hand, liquidity dries up
during market distress, buying and selling of the underlying securities becomes increasingly
costly. Synthetic ETFs do not need to trade the underlying assets, and are therefore better
shielded from liquidity shocks. However, the default probability of the swap counterparties
for synthetic ETFs also increases sharply during extreme market downturns. The additional
counterparty risk faced by synthetic ETFs could drive up the tracking errors. Though physical
ETFs engaging in security lendings are also exposed to counterparty risk, the security lending
programs usually cap the amount that could be loaned out and the transactions are often over-
collateralised by 10-20% (Ramaswamy, 2011).5 I posit that the relative tracking performance
during market dislocations is determined by a trade-off between liquidity risk and counterparty
risk.
In the equity universe, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 is associated
with substantial counterparty risk (Fender and Gyntelberg, 2008; Korajczyk and Sadka, 2008).
5Although there is no bespoke regulations stating the maximum percentage of portfolio hold-
ings that can be lent out, UCITS ETFs must disclose both the maximum and expected per-
centages of securities lending usage in its offering documentation. https://kraneshares.eu/
breaking-down-securities-lending-benefits-to-etf-investors/.
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In the fixed income universe, the market experienced the greatest level of counterparty risk
during the 2011 sovereign debt crisis (BIS, 2011). While the 2020 market crash caused by the
outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic is mostly dominated by liquidity risk across both equity and
fixed income markets, without raising major concerns over counterparty defaults (ECB, 2020).
This leads to the next hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 Equity (fixed income) ETFs with synthetic structures would experience steeper
decline in tracking efficiencies around Lehman Brothers bankruptcy (sovereign debt crisis).
Meanwhile, the tracking efficiencies of physical ETFs would be more strongly affected by the
liquidity shocks around the COVID-19 outbreak in both equity and fixed income markets.
Losses experienced during the global crisis lead to better awareness and tighter management
of counterparty risk thereafter (Grill et al., 2018). Zarate et al. (2021) point out that the use
of multiple swap counterparties has become more common among synthetic ETFs to mitigate
swap counterparty risk in the recent decade. Also, almost all swap-based ETFs nowadays
apply the unfunded structure.6 Under unfunded swap structure, the ETF sponsor is the direct
beneficial owner of the collateral assets, which avoids the potential delay in realising the net
asset value (NAV) of the collateral in the case of counterparty default (Ramaswamy, 2011).
Transparency over the disclosure of collateral baskets has improved evidently compared to a
decade ago.7 There are also regulatory efforts spent on imposing additional requirements over
the quality and liquidity of collaterals from third parties (ESMA, 2012). With more stringent
standards on risk management, the tracking efficiencies are expected to be less dependent on
market movements and ETFs could better withstand market crisis. This leads to the third
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 Tracking errors become less sensitive to market distress post the global financial
crisis, especially for synthetic equity ETFs.
6According to Zarate et al. (2021), UBS is the only one that applies funded swap structures among all major
ETF providers.
7Full details regarding the constituents of the collateral baskets are publicized online and typically updated
on a daily basis by the ETF providers (Zarate et al., 2021).
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4.3 Data and Sample
4.3.1 Sample Selection
In this study, I started with a sample of 3,550 equity and fixed income ETFs provided by 79
different fund families, whose primary share class is listed on an European stock exchange from
1st January 2001 to 31th December 2020.8 Fund characteristics including TNAs, daily returns,
prices, spreads and volumes, as well as the annual report expense ratios are obtained from
Morningstar Direct Database. Both surviving and delisted funds are included in the sample to
avoid survivorship bias. Replication method is obtained from Morningstar, complemented by
information disclosed about the fund holdings. Funds without disclosure about the replication
strategy or where the replication method is not applicable, such as active funds and fund-of-
funds, are excluded from the sample.9 Information on the primary prospectus benchmark is
manually matched with Bloomberg and the official websites of ETF providers. Only the fund
observations with matched benchmark indices and non-missing time series of daily returns are
kept. The tracking efficiencies of leveraged and inverse ETFs are complicated by compounding
effect on top of the replication strategy (Shum and Kang, 2012). I therefore exclude them
from the sample. The final sample consists of 2,290 funds in total with 1,508 equity funds and
782 fixed income funds. On average, 48% of equity ETFs and 7% of fixed income ETFs use
synthetic replication.
All funds in the final sample are classified into 13 equity categories and 7 fixed income
categories, as listed in Table 4.1. Based on the investment objective indicated by the primary
prospectus benchmark, all equity funds are divided into two streams, namely specialized and
broad-based (Ben-David et al., 2021). A specialized fund has a specific focus on a particular
sector or theme, for instance industrial, infrastructure, energy, Technology, etc. A broad-based
8Exchange-traded notes (ETNs) and exchange-traded commodities (ETCs) are excluded from the original
sample. Morningstar uses “ETF” as an umbrella term to refer to a range of different ETPs, including ETFs,
ETNs and ETCs. Unlike ETFs, ETNs and ETCs are more accurately described as debt securities that are less
relevant to our study.
9Full replication and sampling strategy are both classified as physical replication. Full replication requires
physically holding all underlying securities included in the index, while in physical sampling, an optimized
portfolio of securities are selected to represent the index based on correlations, exposure and risk.
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fund tracks a broad-market index. I further categorize them according to the geographic focus
and investment style. Fixed income funds are categorized straightforwardly according to the
investment area.
In order to explore the relation between tracking efficiencies and market distress, I collect
four state variables to capture different aspects of the overall market condition. The first
state variable is the CBOE volatility index (VIX) obtained from FRED, which measures the
expectation of stock market volatility over the coming 30 days.10 Since the investment mandate
of 25% equity funds and 46% fixed income funds in our sample has a European (incl. UK)
focus, I include the Euro Stoxx 50 volatility index (VSTOXX) obtained from Qontigo as a
second state variable.11 VSTOXX is commonly known as the “Euro VIX”, which measures
the implied volatility of near term EuroStoxx 50 options. I also include a market-wide liquidity
measure NOISE proposed by Hu et al. (2013).12 The final state variable is a measure of credit
risk, namely TED spread, obtained from FRED.13 TED spread is calculated as the spread
between 3-month LIBOR based on US dollars and 3-month Treasury Bill. On top of the above
four continuous state variables, I also include an indicator variable Recession for US market
recession periods derived from business cycle turning points determined by the National Bureau
of Economic Research (NBER).14 Recession takes a value of one during three sample periods,
namely March 2001 to November 2001, December 2007 to June 2009 and Febuary 2020 to
April 2020.
10Chicago Board Options Exchange, CBOE Volatility Index: VIX [VIXCLS], retrieved from FRED, Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/VIXCLS,September23,2021.
11Historical daily index level of VSTOXX is available at www.stoxx.com/document/Indices/Current/
HistoricalData/h_vstoxx.txt.
12Historical daily measure of NOISE can be downloaded from http://en.saif.sjtu.edu.cn/junpan/.
13Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, TED Spread [TEDRATE], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TEDRATE,September22,2021.
14The NBER recession data are available at http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html.
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4.3.2 Variable Definitions
Tracking errors are measured in four different ways throughout the sample period. At daily
frequency, I follow Frino and Gallagher (2001) and compute the absolute tracking difference:
TE absi,t = |Ri,t −RBMKi,t|. (4.1)
At monthly frequency, three additional measures of tracking errors are calculated from daily
returns. The most commonly applied measure among practitioners is the standard deviation
of fund excess returns over the benchmark (Rompotis, 2005):
TE sdi,k =
√√√√∑Nt=1 ((Ri,t −RBMKi,t)− (Ri,t −RBMKi,t))2
N − 1
. (4.2)
Shin and Soydemir (2010) substitute the excess returns by the absolute return differences:
TE sd absi,k =
√√√√∑Nt=1 (|Ri,t −RBMKi,t| − |Ri,t −RBMKi,t|)2
N − 1
. (4.3)
The last measure is to compute the standard error of residuals within month k (Frino and
Gallagher, 2001; Shin and Soydemir, 2010):







where the residuals εt are derived from the following regression:
Ri,t = αi + βi,tRBMKi,t + εi,t. (4.5)
Pope and Yadav (1994) show that serial correlation in returns could bias the estimates of
tracking errors. Durbin-Watson test suggests significant first-order auto-correlation in the
above regression residuals. Serial correlation leaves the coefficient estimates unbiased but dis-
96
torts the standard errors and thus the efficiency of statistical inferences. Newy-West standard
errors are applied to relieve the distortion from serial correlation in daily returns.
To measure the aggregate risk level of a fund, return volatility is calculated as the standard
deviation of daily excess returns over the past 21 trading days. Benchmark Alpha is calculated
as the difference between the daily realized return and the predicted return with beta estimated
from the single index model using a rolling window of prior 252 trading days:
Ri,t − rf = αi + βi,t(RBMKi,t − rf ) + εi,t, (4.6)
where (RBMKi,t − rf ) denotes the excess return of the primary benchmark over the risk-free
rate for fund i on day t. Daily dollar volume is computed by multiplying the daily volume and
the daily trading price.
4.3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 4.2 reports the descriptive statistics for all four tracking error measures and major
fund characteristics, including return volatility, benchmark alpha, TNA, age, expense ratio,
bid-ask spread and dollar volume. Summary statistics on the daily change in levels of VIX,
VSTOXX, NOISE and TED spread are also reported. In panel A, summary statistics are
reported for all funds in the sample across the 20-year sample period 01 January 2001 to 31
December 2020. Panel B compares between equity and fixed income ETFs. Panel C compares
between ETFs with physical replication and synthetic replication. The “MeanDiff” column
in Panel B and C reports the difference in the sample means, together with the statistical
significance from a two-sided t-test. The mean tracking error derived from daily returns in the
full sample ranges from 0.12% to 0.20% across four different measures, the median ranges from
0.01% to 0.23%. The magnitude is consistent with the range from 4 to 7bps for annualised
tracking error found by Johnson et al. (2013). On average, an ETF underperforms its bench-
mark index by 1.64bps per month. A median fund in the sample has $141 million asset under
management, charging a total fee of 0.33% per annum. The median daily bid-ask spread is
0.1% and the median daily dollar volume is $0.03 million.
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Panel B indicates that equity ETFs on average have smaller size compared to fixed income
ETFs, and experience significantly higher return volatility and daily dollar volume. The av-
erage expense ratio charged by equity ETFs are 0.20% higher than fixed income ETFs, which
is economically substantial. Daily absolute tracking differences of equity ETFs are on average
5bps lower than fixed income ETFs. While tracking errors measured at monthly frequency
suggest marginally higher tracking efficiencies of fixed income ETFs over equity. Panel C in-
dicates that synthetic ETFs on average have smaller size and age compared to physical ETFs.
Synthetic ETFs also experience significantly larger return volatility, bid-ask spread and dollar
volume. On average, they charge 6bps higher annual expense ratios and underperform physi-
cal ETFs by 13bps daily. Tracking errors across all four measures at both daily and monthly
frequency consistently point to lower tracking efficiencies of synthetic ETFs. However, a rough
comparison over the entire sample could mask significant variations in tracking errors across
investment objectives and through time, which is unveiled in the next section.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Comparing Tracking Efficiencies between Physical and Syn-
thetic Replications
In this section, I examine Hypothesis 1 and compare the tracking efficiencies between
physical ETFs and synthetic ETFs within different category groups and across different sample
periods. Figure 4.2 plots the aggregate tracking errors for physical ETFs versus synthetic ETFs
separately within the equity universe and fixed income universe. The times series expands the
whole sample period from 01 January 2001 to 31 December 2020, with shaded areas indicate
the periods of major market crises.15 In the equity world, the global financial crisis brings the
highest level of market turbulence, reaching a climax at the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on
15The first synthetic ETF was an equity ETF introduced into the French market in 2001. While the first
synthetic fixed income ETF in our sample only appears in 2007.
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16 September 2008.16 The NBER declared June 2009 as the end date of the U.S. recession.17
The shaded period expands from September 2008 to June 2019 in accordance with the NBER
market turning points. In the fixed income universe, the sovereign debt crisis originated from
eurozone government deficits from April 2010 to October 2012 has the most severe impact on
market stability. I therefore identify the post-crisis period to be the sample period after June
2009 for equity funds and after October 2012 for fixed income funds. The time series suggests
that the average tracking error is noticeably smaller in the post-crisis period for both physical
and synthetic ETFs, especially in the equity universe. This confirms the premise that there
exist significant time-series variations in ETF tracking efficiencies.
Recognizing the structural break in the level of tracking errors post crisis, I conduct a re-
peated measure ANOVA analysis to compare the sample means between physical and synthetic
ETFs, sorted into four mutually exclusive groups by asset classes and sample periods. Figure
4.3 shows the ANOVA plots of group means with the 95% confidence intervals from Tukey’s
Post Hoc statistics. In the pre-crisis period, the mean tracking error of fixed income ETFs is
indifferent between physical and synthetic replications across all four measures. While the pre-
crisis tracking error of synthetic equity ETFs are on average 0.6% - 1.0% higher than physical
equity ETFs across different measures, which is significant both statistically and economically.
Post crisis, the relation is reversed. The average tracking error of both equity and fixed income
ETFs with synthetic replication is marginally smaller than ETFs with physical replication.
Together, the above patterns suggest that the significant tracking difference shown in Panel
C of Table 4.2 is dominated by equity funds pre-crisis. This also reconciles the discrepancies
from different findings. For instance, Mateus and Rahmani (2017) find no evidence on superior
tracking performance of synthetic equity ETFs traded on the London Stock Exchange (LSE),
as the sample period 2008-2013 is distorted by the extreme deterioration in tracking efficiencies
of synthetic ETFs before June 2009. While Johnson et al. (2013) finds lower tracking error on
ETFs using synthetic replications in the case of seven out of eight benchmarks studied during
the period 2010-2012, which is consistent with the pattern for post-crisis equity group in the
16https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Financial_crisis_of_2007_2008.




Next, I investigate the cross-sectional variations in tracking efficiencies. Table 4.1 reports
the category distribution of synthetic ETFs and compares the tracking efficiencies between
two replication methods within each individual investment objective. This table allows us to
explore if synthetic structure is more commonly applied to less liquid assets or to grant access
to remote markets, and therefore associated with higher costs and higher tracking errors. In the
equity universe, synthetic structure is more frequently applied in sector equity (60%), Africa &
Latin America equity (59%), emerging markets equity (50%), followed by US equity mid/small
cap (48%) and UK equity mid/small cap (45%). These categories indeed corresponds to less
liquid assets and remote markets as opposed to US/Europe equity large cap among others.
However, there is no persistent relation between the liquidity and efficiency of an objective
market and the relative tracking efficiencies. In 3 out of 5 categories listed above, synthetic
ETFs show inferior tracking performance compared to physical ETFs. While in 6 out of 11
equity categories, synthetic ETFs demonstrate superior tracking abilities. In the fixed income
universe, synthetic structure is most commonly applied in European (incl.UK) products, with
a frequency at around 20%.18 Across the whole sample period, synthetic funds within these
categories exhibit slightly inferior tracking abilities.
Overall, there is no persistent evidence on either superior or inferior tracking ability of
synthetic ETFs over physical ETFs across the whole sample, i.e. Hypothesis 1 is rejected.
There exists a structural break in the aggregate level of tracking errors post crisis. Though
synthetic structure is more common in less liquid or less efficient markets, this does not translate
into higher tracking errors directly.
4.4.2 Factors Affecting ETF Tracking Efficiencies
In the previous section, I compare the tracking efficiencies between physical and synthetic
ETFs in different sample periods and across different investment objectives. In this section, I
study the time-series and cross-sectional variations in tracking errors simultaneously under a
18There are 2 out of 5 synthetic funds in the fixed income miscellaneous group, which we do not discuss in
here.
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pooled panel regression framework. The regression model is specified as:
TE absi,t = β0 + β1Synthetic ∗ I + β2Synthetic+ β3I
+β4Return V olatilityi,t−1 + β5Benchmark Alphai,t−1 + β6Log(TNA)i,t−1
+β7Agei,t−1 + β8Expense Ratioi,t−1 + β9Bid-Ask Spreadi,t−1
+β10Dollar V olumei,t−1 + γt + εi,t,
(4.7)
where the dependent variable TE absi,t is the daily absolute tracking difference. Synthetic is
an indicator variable taking a value of one if fund i is under synthetic replication, and zero
otherwise. I represents an indicator for equity funds in the full sample, and an indicator for the
post-crisis period in the equity and fixed income subsamples. The Post Crisis indicator marks
the period June 2009 to December 2020 in the equity subsample and October 2012 to December
2020 in the fixed income subsample, as explained in the previous section. Return volatility
is measured from a 21-trading day rolling window, all other explanatory variables are lagged
one trading day. In the full sample, time fixed effect is included as γt. In the equity and fixed
income subsamples, category fixed effect is applied instead to account for heteroskedasticity
across different investment objectives.19 Pope and Yadav (1994) as well as Meinhardt et al.
(2014) show that the existence of serial correlation in daily returns has significant impact on
measures of tracking errors. A portmanteau test for fixed effects models proposed by Inoue and
Solon (2006) is applied to test for serial correlation in residuals, and the null of independent
error terms is rejected at 1% level. Therefore, Prais-Winsten transformation is applied to
the residuals (Prais and Winsten, 1954). All variables are standardized to have a mean of
zero and standard deviation of one, to allow for more direct interpretation and comparison of
coefficients.
The regression results are reported in Table 4.3. In the full sample, neither being an equity
fund or synthetic fund is associated with any significant difference in tracking errors. In the







19Fund and category fixed effect is not included in the full sample as the two indicator variables of our
interest, namely Synthetic and Equity are invariant within funds or categories. Similarly, time fixed effect is
not included in the equity and fixed income subsamples due to the inclusion of the Post Crisis indicator.
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daily absolute tracking differences relative to the mean before June 2009, but the tracking






(0.289 + 2.488) ∗ 0.552
0.126
)
lower daily absolute tracking
differences relative to the mean for physical (synthetic) ETFs. These results confirm significant
variations in tracking efficiencies across different time periods.
The panel regression results also confirm significant cross-sectional variations in tracking
efficiencies. Across all three models, the riskiness of fund returns exhibits a strong and positive
relation with the tracking error. In the full sample, a one standard deviation increase in fund
return volatility over the past month is associated with a 0.034 standard deviation increase






increase relative to the mean tracking difference. While past performance is negatively related
related to the tracking error across all three models. A one standard deviation increase in the
lagged Benchmark Alpha is associated with a 0.021 standard deviation decrease in daily ab-







the mean tracking difference. This is consistent with the risk-shifting behaviour of fund man-
agers following poor past performance (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997). There is also a positive
relation between fund size and the tracking difference, which is more prominent in the fixed
income subsample. This could be partly due to the difficulty for a large fund to effectively track
the underlying without significantly move the securities prices (Pástor et al., 2015; Magkotsios,
2018). In the equity subsample, younger funds are associated with higher tracking errors, the
relation is not found in the fixed income subsample. In the fixed income model, a one standard
deviation increase in the expense ratio is associated with a 0.05 standard deviation increase






increase relative to the mean tracking difference.21 This confirms the negative impact of total
cost on tracking efficiencies found by Frino and Gallagher (2001), Chu (2011) and Johnson
et al. (2013). However, the relation does not hold in the equity subsample. Moreover, the liq-
20The percentage decrease is calculated using statistics for the equity subsample, where the daily TE abs
has a mean of 0.126% and a standard deviation of 0.552%.
21The percentage increase is calculated using statistics for the fixed income subsample, where the daily
TE abs has a mean of 0.072% and a standard deviation of 0.262%.
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uidity measures Bid-Ask Spread and Dollar V olume show no significant impact on tracking
errors after controlling for category fixed effects. This contradicts the intuition that synthetic
structure being more widely applied in less liquid markets is associated with higher tracking
errors.
4.4.3 Relative Tracking Efficiencies of ETF Pairs around Crisis
In this section, I examine Hypothesis 2 and investigate the differential impact of major
market crises on tracking efficiencies between physical and synthetic ETFs. Recognizing the
existence of significant cross-sectional variations in tracking errors, I construct a subsample of
physical and synthetic ETF pairs tracking the same underlying benchmark to enable a like-for-
like comparison. The whole sample consists of 2,290 funds tracking 957 distinct benchmarks.
There are 528 benchmark indices tracked by a unique fund throughout the sample period, the
other 429 benchmark indices have more than one funds tracking.22 I identified 119 benchmarks
which are followed by both physical and synthetic ETFs simultaneously. In the cases where
there are more than one physical/synthetic ETFs tracking the benchmark at the same time,
the daily absolute tracking difference of each fund with the same replication structure is equally
weighted.
Figure 4.4 plots the average daily absolute tracking differences for physical and synthetic
ETF pairs following the same underlying benchmark in the [-21,+126] trading days event win-
dow around major market crises. Among equity ETF pairs, the tracking error of synthetic funds
rocketed significantly more compared to physical funds following Lehman Brothers bankruptcy,
while they reacted less dramatically following the outbreak of COVID-19. Similar pattern is
also present among fixed income ETF pairs. The tracking error of synthetic ETFs went up sig-
nificantly more than their physical equivalents during the sovereign debt crisis, especially within
the first two months, which is in stark contrast to their milder reaction following COVID-19
outbreak.
22S&P 500 and Euro Stoxx 50 are the two most popular benchmarks followed by 41 and 33 funds in the
sample, respectively. MSCI USA and MSCI World are both followed by 29 funds during the sample period
2001-2020, ranking the third.
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I conduct a difference-in-difference (DiD) analysis on the tracking performance between
ETF pairs in a event window of [-21,+126] trading days around major market crisis. The
baseline regression model follows Equation (4.7), with the indicator variable I being replaced
by a vector of indicators representing different post-event time windows. As before, category
fixed effect is included. Prais-Winsten transformation is applied to the residuals (Prais and
Winsten, 1954). All variables are standardized to have a mean of zero and standard deviation
of one. The DiD analysis is applied to the equity and fixed income subsample separately.
To study the trade-off between liquidity risk and counterparty risk in determining relative
tracking efficiencies, I identify the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008 as
a representative of sudden increase in counterparty risk affecting the equity market. In a
similar vein, the Sovereign Debt Crisis on 27 April 2010 is considered an unexpected surge in
counterparty risk hitting the fixed income market. While the outbreak of COVID-19 on 20
Febuary 2020 mainly leads to rise in liquidity risk in both equity and fixed income markets,
without raising major concerns about counterparty risk.
Table 4.4 reports the results from the above DiD analysis. In Panel A, the marginal decline
in tracking efficiencies of equity ETF pairs is contrasted in the post-event windows between
Lehman Brothers bankruptcy (Model (1)& (2)) and COVID-19 outbreak (Model (3)& (4)).
The most interesting result is that the tracking performance of synthetic ETFs post Lehman
Brothers bankruptcy drops significantly more than the physical equivalents within the same
benchmark pair. While the decline in tracking efficiencies of synthetic ETFs post COVID-19
outbreak is significantly smaller than physical ETFs. According to Model (1), daily absolute
tracking difference of synthetic ETFs in the first week, i.e. [+1,+5] trading days, post Lehman






(relative to the mean) more than their







(relative to the mean) higher than physical ETFs. The







the mean) in the first month, i.e.[+6,+21] trading days, post event. And the pattern persists
at least up until 6 months post event. In Model (2), all continuous explanatory variables
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in Table 4.3 are included as controls. The incremental difference remains positive and is
significant within the first month post event. In both models, there is also an increase in daily
absolute tracking difference of physical equity ETFs in the 6-month window post crisis, though
sometimes insignificant. The statistical pattern is reversed around the COVID-19 outbreak.
According to Model (3), coefficients on the three event-window indicators are all positive and
significant at 1% level, suggesting the tracking error of physical ETFs grows substantially larger
post event. However, coefficients on the interaction terms are negative and significant in the
[+6,+126] event window, indicating that the decline in tracking efficiencies due to COVID-19
outbreak is less severe for synthetic ETFs.
DiD analysis on fixed income ETF pairs exhibits similar patterns and the results are re-
ported in Panel B of Table 4.4. Control variables are not included due to the lack of complete
observations. There is no significant difference in tracking efficiencies between the ETF pairs







times (relative to the mean) more than their physical
equivalents during the [+6,+21] event window. While following the COVID-19 outbreak, the






(relative to the mean)
lower than the physical equivalents during the same [+6,+21] event window.
Together, results from the DiD analysis on ETF pairs in both equity and fixed income
subsample confirm Hypothesis 2. The relative tracking performance between physical ETFs
and synthetic ETFs during extreme market turbulence is determined by a trade-off between
liquidity risk and counterparty risk. When the perception of counterparty risk hits the market
unexpectedly, ETFs with synthetic replication would face steeper decline in their tracking
efficiencies. While during liquidity shocks, the tracking performance of synthetic ETFs is
better protected compared to the physical ETFs.
4.4.4 Sensitivity of Tracking Efficiencies to Market Distress
In this section, I examine Hypothesis 3 and explore how tracking performance sensitivity
to market movements varies through time. In order to do so, I introduce a three-way inter-
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action of the Synthetic indicator, the Post Crisis indicator and the lagged daily change in
State V ariable to investigate how synthetic ETFs in the post-crisis period respond to changes
in the state variable differently. The three corresponding pair-wise interactions are also in-
cluded and the regression model is specified as:
TE absi,t = β0 + β1Synthetic ∗ Post Crisis ∗∆State V ariablei,t−1
+β2Synthetic ∗∆State V ariablei,t−1 + β3Post Crisis ∗∆State V ariablei,t−1
+β4Synthetic ∗ Post Crisis+ β5Synthetic+ β6Post Crisis
+β7∆State V ariablei,t−1 + β8Return V olatilityi,t−1
+β9Benchmark Alphai,t−1 + β10Log(TNA)i,t−1
+β11Agei,t−1 + β12Expense Ratioi,t−1 + β13Bid-Ask Spreadi,t−1
+β14Dollar V olumei,t−1 + θi + εi,t,
(4.8)
where the lagged daily change in VIX index, VSTOXX index, NOISE measure and TED spread
are used in turn as ∆State V ariablei,t−1, as well as a common factor PC1 derived from all four
state variables using Principal Component Analysis (PCA). In the equity subsample, I also
replace ∆State V ariablei,t−1 with an indicator variable Recession marking the NBER defined
US recession periods. As before, category fixed effect is included. Prais-Winsten transforma-
tion is applied to the residuals (Prais and Winsten, 1954). All variables are standardized to
have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one.
Each of the four state variables measures the degree of market distress from a different per-
spective, ranging from stock market volatility to credit risk and liquidity. I follow the practice
of Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001), Johnson (2008) and Richardson et al. (2017) and use PCA to
extract a common factor to proxy for the state of the market.23 Table 4.5 reports the results
from the analysis. Panel A lists the eigenvalues and proportion of variance explained by the
four principle components using 4,860 days when all state variables are jointly available. The
first principle component (PC1) explains almost 70% of the total variance with an eigenvalue
23Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) and Johnson (2008) apply PCA to extract common factors in stock returns,
order flows and liquidity proxies. Richardson et al. (2017) use PCA to construct a common factor for funding
liquidity measures.
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of 2.78, being the only factor with eigenvalue above one. According to the Kaiser rule, only
PC1 is selected. Panel B displays the eigenvectors, i.e. factor loadings, on the principle com-
ponents. Column 1 shows that the four state variables contribute evenly to PC1, with loadings
ranging from 0.409 to 0.558. In Panel C, I examine the correlation between PC1 and the four
state variables. PC1 appears to be positively correlated (with correlation coefficients being
above 0.60) with all four variables. The pairwise correlation coefficient between PC1 and VIX
is 0.931.
In Table 4.6, the above regression (4.8) is run in the equity subsample. Control variables
are included in all models, though not reported for brevity. In Model (1), synthetic ETFs
during market recession after June 2009 face 13.3 =
(1.718 + 0.352 + 0.840 + 0.130) ∗ 0.552
0.126
times (relative to the mean) less drop in tracking efficiencies compared to themselves dur-
ing market recession before June 2009. For physical ETFs, the drop in tracking efficiencies
is 2.1 =
(0.352 + 0.130) ∗ 0.552
0.126
times (relative to the mean) less during market recession af-
ter June 2009. Especially in the post-crisis period, synthetic ETFs on average experience
94.2% =
(1.718− 1.634 + 0.840− 0.709) ∗ 0.552
0.126
(relative to the mean) less drop in tracking
efficiencies than physical ETFs during market recession. The statistical pattern persists when
the Recession indicator is substituted with changes in continuous state variables. Model (4)
displays the results using the daily change in PC1 constructed above. The increase in daily ab-
solute tracking differences for synthetic ETFs associated with a one standard deviation increase
in ∆PC1 in the post-crisis period is 12.3 =
(0.029 + 0.013 + 2.469 + 0.290) ∗ 0.552
0.126
times (rela-
tive to the mean) less than the pre-crisis period. For physical ETFs, the increase in tracking dif-
ferences is 1.3 =
(0.013 + 0.290) ∗ 0.552
0.126
times (relative to the mean) less post crisis. Synthetic
ETFs in the post crisis period experience 53.4% =
(0.029− 0.039 + 2.469− 2.337) ∗ 0.552
0.126
(rel-
ative to the mean) less increase in tracking differences than physical ETFs, when ∆PC1 in-
creased by one standard deviation. In Table 4.7, the same regression (4.8) is applied to the
fixed income subsample. The statistical inference remains in the same direction across all
model specifications, though the significance of results is diminished.
Overall, the results confirm Hypothesis 3. The sensitivity of tracking performance to mar-
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ket distress for both physical and synthetic ETFs drops significantly post the global financial
crisis. In particular, the post-crisis tracking ability of synthetic ETFs is markedly less affected
by market turbulence, compared to physical ETFs. This remarkable change in tracking per-
formance sensitivity could partly due to closer scrutiny and better awareness of counterparty
risk that market participants learnt from the disastrous global financial crisis.
4.5 Conclusion
This paper studies how the replication method affects the tracking efficiencies of ETFs,
especially during market crises. There is no persistent evidence on either superior or inferior
tracking ability of synthetic ETFs over physical ETFs across the whole sample. I first ex-
amine the relative tracking efficiencies across different objective markets and different sample
periods. Synthetic structure is more common in less liquid or less efficient markets, however
this does not translate into higher tracking errors directly. There exists a structural break
in the aggregate level of tracking errors after the global financial crisis. Besides, there are
significant cross-sectional variations in tracking differences. Higher return volatility, lower past
performance, larger fund size, younger age, higher expense ratios are all associated with higher
average tracking errors. Liquidity and volume do not show any significant impact on tracking
efficiencies.
Next, I investigate how tracking efficiencies of physical and synthetic ETFs react differ-
ently around major market crisis. To enable a like-for-like comparison, I identify physical
and synthetic ETF pairs tracking the same underlying benchmark and perform DiD analysis
under an event-study framework. The relative tracking performance between physical ETFs
and synthetic ETFs around crisis is determined by a trade-off between liquidity risk and coun-
terparty risk. When the perception of counterparty risk hits the market unexpectedly, ETFs
with synthetic replication face steeper decline in their tracking efficiencies. While during pure
liquidity shocks, the tracking performance of synthetic ETFs is better protected compared to
physical ETFs.
Finally, I explore how tracking performance responds differently to market movements
108
across time. I find that sensitivity of tracking performance to market distress for both phys-
ical and synthetic ETFs drops significantly post the global financial crisis. In particular,
the post-crisis tracking ability of synthetic ETFs is markedly less affected by market turbu-
lence, compared to physical ETFs. This finding demonstrates significant improvements in risk
management over the past decade post crisis. Synthetic ETFs has done particularly well in
controlling counterparty risk.
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Figure 4.1. Percentage of Synthetic ETFs through Years
This figure shows the percentage of ETFs with synthetic replication in each year from 2001 to 2020.
The upper panel plots the relative number of fund offerings, and the lower panel plots the aggregate
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Figure 4.2. Time Series of Aggregate Tracking Errors
This figure plots the time series of aggregate tracking errors for physical and synthetic ETFs from
January 2001 to December 2020. The tracking error is measured monthly as the standard deviation
of daily excess returns over the benchmark. The upper panel displays the time series for equity funds,
with the shaded area denoting the NBER defined market recession periods around Lehman Brothers
bankruptcy and COVID-19 outbreak. The lower panel shows the time series for fixed income funds,
with the shaded area denoting the NBER defined market recession periods around sovereign debt
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Figure 4.3. ANOVA Mean Plots
This figure plots the sample means with 95% confidence intervals from repeated measure ANOVA
analysis. The whole sample is divided into four mutually exclusive groups. Equity Pre(Post) de-
notes the equity fund observations before (after) the end of the global financial crisis on June 2009,
FI Pre(Post) denotes the fixed income fund observations before (after) the end of the sovereign
debt crisis on October 2012. A different measure for tracking error is applied in each panel. TE abs
denotes the daily absolute tracking difference. TE sd denotes the monthly standard deviation of
daily excess returns over the benchmark. TE sd abs denotes the monthly standard deviation of daily
absolute tracking differences. TE seres denotes the standard error of residuals from the regression
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Figure 4.4. Event-time Daily Tracking Errors Between ETF Pairs
This figure displays the average daily absolute tracking differences for physical and synthetic ETF
pairs following the same underlying benchmark in the [-21,+126] trading days event window around
major market crises. The first two panels plot the equity ETF pairs around Lehman Brothers
bankruptcy and COVID-19 outbreak. The last two panels plot the fixed income ETF pairs around
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Table 4.1
Objective Distribution of Synthetic ETFs
This table reports the category distribution of synthetic ETFs. Panel A shows the 13 equity categories
classified by geographic orientation and investment style. Panel B shows the 7 fixed income categories
classified by geographic orientation. The last three columns compare the tracking efficiencies between
two replication methods within each individual investment objective. The“MeanDiff” column reports
the difference in the sample means, together with the statistical significance from a two-sided t-test.
The asterisks denote statistical significance as follows: *** significant at 0.1%, ** significant at 1%,
and * significant at 5%.
Category
Number of Number of TE sd (%)
Funds Synthetic Funds Physical Synthetic Diff.
Panel A: Global Equity Categories
Sector Equity 402 (22%) 240 (60%) 0.249 (0.005) 0.207 (0.004) 0.042***
Europe Equity Large Cap 371 (20%) 78 (21%) 0.175 (0.003) 0.143 (0.006) 0.032***
APAC Equity 301 (17%) 128 (43%) 0.251 (0.003) 0.261 (0.006) -0.010
US Equity Large Cap 248 (14%) 94 (38%) 0.236 (0.004) 0.166 (0.005) 0.070***
Global Equity 145 (8%) 41 (28%) 0.170 (0.006) 0.128 (0.006) 0.042***
Emerging Markets Equity 116 (6%) 58 (50%) 0.259 (0.012) 0.362 (0.012) -0.103***
Europe Equity Mid/Small Cap 64 (4%) 18 (28%) 0.110 (0.004) 0.264 (0.019) -0.154***
UK Equity Large Cap 51 (3%) 19 (37%) 0.104 (0.005) 0.161 (0.012) -0.057***
Africa & Latin America Equity 39 (2%) 23 (59%) 0.275 (0.010) 0.459 (0.027) -0.184***
Canada Equity 23 (1%) 4 (17%) 0.237 (0.008) 0.114 (0.011) 0.123***
US Equity Mid/Small Cap 23 (1%) 11 (48%) 0.194 (0.012) 0.178 (0.010) 0.016
Equity Miscellaneous 21 (1%) 6 (29%) 0.158 (0.013) 0.272 (0.018) -0.114***
UK Equity Mid/Small Cap 11 (1%) 5 (45%) 0.039 (0.005) 0.182 (0.030) -0.143***
All Equity 1508 (66%) 725 (48%) 0.204 (0.002) 0.219 (0.003) -0.015***
Panel B: Global Fixed Income Categories
Europe Fixed Income 195 (41%) 40 (21%) 0.062 (0.001) 0.068 (0.007) -0.006
US Fixed Income 153 (32%) 3 (2%) 0.164 (0.003) 0.013 (0.002) 0.151***
Global Fixed Income 57 (12%) 5 (9%) 0.215 (0.004) 0.257 (0.013) -0.042***
Emerging Markets Fixed Income 30 (6%) 0 (0%)
UK Fixed Income 25 (5%) 5 (20%) 0.028 (0.002) 0.079 (0.024) -0.051***
APAC Fixed Income 10 (2%) 1 (10%) 0.168 (0.007) 0.238 (0.016) -0.070***
Fixed Income Miscellaneous 5 (1%) 2 (40%) 0.060 (0.014) 0.055 (0.010) 0.005
All Fixed Income 782 (34%) 56 (7%) 0.106 (0.001) 0.081 (0.006) 0.025***




This table reports the descriptive statistics for all four tracking error measures and major fund
characteristics, including return volatility, benchmark alpha, TNA, age, expense ratio, bid-ask spread
and dollar volume. Summary statistics on the daily change in levels of VIX, VSTOXX, NOISE and
TED spread are also reported. In panel A, summary statistics are reported for the whole sample across
the 20-year sample period 01 January 2001 to 31 December 2020. Panel B compares between equity
and fixed income ETFs. Panel C compares between ETFs with physical replication and synthetic
replication. The “MeanDiff” column in Panel B and C reports the difference in the sample means,
together with the statistical significance from a two-sided t-test. The asterisks denote statistical
significance as follows: *** significant at 0.1%, ** significant at 1%, and * significant at 5%.
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for the Whole Sample
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max Skew Kurt
TE abs (%) 0.117 0.514 0.010 0.000 98.690 21.335 1,420.981
TE sd (%) 0.199 0.521 0.023 0.000 23.597 9.616 182.806
TE sd abs (%) 0.147 0.374 0.017 0.000 22.146 11.823 338.509
TE se res (%) 0.177 0.413 0.022 0.000 24.135 9.721 244.199
Return Volatility (%) 1.069 0.765 0.885 0.000 32.979 3.371 32.309
Benchmark Alpha (bps) -0.078 36.489 -0.007 -390.718 371.096 -0.406 49.326
TNA ($million) 680 1,701 141 0.001 44,210 8.278 120.231
Age (years) 4.988 3.926 4.083 0.083 21.167 0.980 3.555
Expense Ratio (%) 0.367 0.191 0.330 0.000 1.810 0.884 4.626
Spread (%) 2.214 16.495 0.100 0.000 375.490 16.745 336.802
Dollar Volume ($million) 0.908 4.304 0.025 0.000 76.713 11.384 165.057
∆VIX -0.002 1.828 -0.090 -17.640 24.860 1.565 30.838
∆VSTOXX -0.001 1.853 -0.096 -13.987 22.642 1.458 22.270
∆NOISE (bps) 0.000 0.322 0.000 -7.858 9.400 2.074 223.152
∆TED (%) 0.000 0.050 0.000 -0.800 0.990 0.819 86.655




Obs. Mean1 Obs. Mean2
TE abs (%) 664,795 0.072 3,174,318 0.126 -0.053***
TE sd (%) 780,699 0.203 2,954,322 0.198 0.005***
TE sd abs (%) 780,699 0.150 2,954,322 0.146 0.004***
TE se res (%) 780,051 0.178 2,949,232 0.177 0.001**
Return Volatility (%) 673,973 0.500 3,205,160 1.189 -0.689***
Benchmark Alpha (bps) 663,335 -0.073 3,168,835 -0.079 0.005
TNA ($million) 891,708 807 3,633,254 649 158***
Age (years) 643,511 4.333 3,219,436 5.119 -0.786***
Expense Ratio (%) 444,822 0.202 1,878,791 0.406 -0.204***
Spread (%) 866,348 2.197 2,907,915 2.219 -0.022
Dollar Volume ($million) 1,142,737 0.813 3,865,287 0.936 -0.123***




Obs. Mean1 Obs. Mean2
TE abs (%) 2,389,408 0.109 1,449,705 0.128 -0.019***
TE sd (%) 2,314,358 0.195 1,420,663 0.206 -0.011***
TE sd abs (%) 2,314,358 0.145 1,420,663 0.149 -0.004***
TE se res (%) 2,309,729 0.175 1,419,554 0.181 -0.006***
Return Volatility (%) 2,409,877 1.017 1,469,256 1.155 -0.138***
Benchmark Alpha (bps) 2,384,832 -0.028 1,447,338 -0.160 0.132***
TNA ($million) 3,046,837 837 1,478,125 355 482***
Age (years) 2,443,566 5.112 1,419,381 4.776 0.336***
Expense Ratio (%) 1,738,485 0.353 585,128 0.409 -0.056***
Spread (%) 2,634,179 2.101 1,140,084 2.474 -0.374***
Dollar Volume ($million) 3,572,032 0.901 1,435,992 0.924 -0.023***
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Table 4.3
Factors Affecting Tracking Errors
This table explores the factors affecting ETF tracking efficiencies through a pooled panel regression
with AR (1) disturbance. The dependent variable is the daily absolute tracking difference for fund i on
day t. Synthetic (Equity) is an indicator variable taking a value of one if fund i is a synthetic (equity)
ETF. Post Crisis indicates the period after June 2009 in the equity subsample and after October 2012
in the fixed income subsample. Return V olatility is the standard deviation of daily excess returns
calculated from a rolling window of 21 trading days. BenchmarkAlpha is the difference between the
daily realized return and the predicted return with beta estimated from the single index model using
a rolling window of 252 trading days. Time fixed effect is included in the full sample, category fixed
effect is included in the equity and fixed income subsamples. All variables are standardized to have a
mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Rho AR is the autocorrelation coefficient estimated in
error terms from Prais and Winsten (1954). ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Variables
TE absi,t





Synthetic*Post Crisis -2.488*** 0.020
(0.034) (0.033)
Post Crisis -0.289*** 0.034**
(0.014) (0.017)
Synthetic -0.054 2.352*** -0.034
(0.067) (0.039) (0.083)
Return Volatilityi,t−1 0.034*** 0.069*** 0.133***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Benchmark Alphai,t−1 -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.026***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Log (TNA)i,t−1 0.021*** 0.007 0.025***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009)
Agei,t−1 -0.045*** -0.022*** 0.008
(0.008) (0.005) (0.008)
Expense Ratioi,t−1 0.014* -0.004 0.050***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.017)
Bid-Ask Spreadi,t−1 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Dollar Volumei,t−1 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Constant 0.224 0.328*** 0.172
(0.255) (0.031) (0.148)
Observations 445,930 363,780 82,150
Number of fundid 1,295 1,026 269
Time FE Yes No No
Category FE No Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.135 0.136 0.135
Rho AR 0.652 0.659 0.501
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Table 4.4
Difference-in-Difference Analysis around Market Crisis
This table reports the results from Difference-in-Difference (DiD) analysis on relative tracking effi-
ciencies between ETF pairs following the same underlying benchmarks. The dependent variable is
the daily absolute tracking difference for fund i on event day t. Event Day represents 15 Septem-
ber 2008 for Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, 27 April 2010 for sovereign debt crisis and 20 Febuary
2020 for COVID-19 outbreak. Event window [+1,+5] denotes the first week post event, [+6,+21]
denotes the rest of the first month and [+22,+126] denotes up until half a year post event. Panel A
compares how tracking performance of equity ETF pairs reacts differently towards Lehman Brothers
bankruptcy and COVID-19 outbreak. Panel B compares fixed income ETF pairs around sovereign
debt crisis and COVID-19. Category fixed effect is included in all model specifications. All variables
are standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Rho AR is the autocor-
relation coefficient estimated in error terms from Prais and Winsten (1954). ***, ** and * denote
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.




(1) (2) (3) (4)
Synthetic*Event Day -0.043 0.009 0.173** 0.009
(0.124) (0.404) (0.083) (0.241)
Synthetic*[+1,+5] 0.581*** 0.484* -0.012 -0.008
(0.077) (0.279) (0.058) (0.185)
Synthetic*[+6,+21] 0.785*** 0.811*** -0.186*** -0.305**
(0.055) (0.214) (0.042) (0.148)
Synthetic*[+22,+126] 0.250*** 0.171 -0.079*** -0.049
(0.041) (0.168) (0.030) (0.112)
Synthetic 0.304*** 0.578*** -0.060 -0.178
(0.088) (0.196) (0.044) (0.114)
Event Day 0.049 0.202 0.066 0.157
(0.093) (0.350) (0.055) (0.157)
[+1,+5] 0.081 0.400* 0.168*** 0.122
(0.058) (0.230) (0.039) (0.113)
[+6,+21] 0.106** 0.167 0.381*** 0.288***
(0.041) (0.184) (0.028) (0.092)
[+22,+126] 0.034 0.031 0.231*** 0.118*
(0.031) (0.145) (0.020) (0.070)
Return Volatilityi,t−1 0.072** 0.102***
(0.033) (0.020)
Benchmark Alphai,t−1 -0.028** -0.150***
(0.013) (0.007)




Expense Ratioi,t−1 0.390*** -0.041
(0.108) (0.038)
Bid-Ask Spreadi,t−1 0.018 0.013
(0.015) (0.009)
Dollar Volumei,t−1 0.028* -0.013
(0.015) (0.010)
Constant -0.278* -0.492* -0.067 0.015
(0.168) (0.298) (0.047) (0.106)
Observations 23,088 2,249 63,660 10,458
Number of fundid 179 65 441 165
Category FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.158 0.329 0.026 0.097
Rho AR 0.259 0.518 0.358 0.604
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Panel B: Fixed Income ETF Pairs
Variables
TE absi,t
Sovereign Debt Crisis COVID-19





















Number of fundid 13 27
Category FE Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.027 0.203




This table presents the results from principle component analysis used to extract the common factor
from state variables. V IX is the CBOE volatility index, which measures the expectation of stock
market volatility over the coming 30 days. V STOXX is the Euro Stoxx 50 volatility index, commonly
known as the “Euro VIX”, which measures the implied volatility of near term EuroStoxx 50 options.
NOISE is a market-wide liquidity measure proposed by Hu et al. (2013). TED is calculated as the
spread between 3-month LIBOR based on US dollars and 3-month Treasury Bill. Panel A lists the
eigenvalues and proportion of variance explained by the four principle components using 4,860 days
when all state variables are jointly available. Panel B displays the eigenvectors, i.e. factor loadings, on
the principle components. Panel C shows the correlation matrix between the estimated first principle
component (PC1) and the four state variables.
Panel A: Eigenvalues and Proportion of Variance Explained by
Principal Components (N = 4,860 days)
Principal
Eigenvalue Difference
% Variance Cumulative %
Component (PC) Explained Variance
1 2.784 1.958 69.6% 69.6%
2 0.827 0.509 20.7% 90.3%
3 0.317 0.246 7.9% 98.2%
4 0.0716 . 1.8% 100.0%
Panel B: Eigenvectors (Factor Loadings) on Principal Components
Variable PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4
VIX 0.558 -0.324 0.139 -0.751
VSTOXX 0.512 -0.524 0.216 0.646
NOISE 0.510 0.294 -0.802 0.103
TED 0.409 0.731 0.539 0.088
Panel C: Correlation Between PC1 and State Variables
PC1 VIX VSTOXX NOISE TED
PC1 1
VIX 0.931 1
VSTOXX 0.854 0.910 1
NOISE 0.851 0.671 0.548 1
TED 0.682 0.458 0.307 0.622 1
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Table 4.6
Tracking Performance Sensitivity to Market Distress - Equity Subsample
This table explores how tracking performance sensitivity to market distress for equity ETFs varies
across time, using a pooled panel regression with AR (1) disturbance. The dependent variable is the
daily absolute tracking difference for fund i on day t. Synthetic is an indicator variable taking a value
of one if fund i is a synthetic ETF. Post Crisis indicates the period after June 2009. Recession
marks the NBER defined US market recession periods. ∆V IX (∆V STOXX) is the daily change in
CBOE (Euro Stoxx 50) volatility index. ∆PC1 is the daily change in the common factor extracted
from all four state variables using PCA. All continuous explanatory variables in Table 4.3 are included
as controls. Category fixed effect is included. All variables are standardized to have a mean of zero
and a standard deviation of one. Rho AR is the autocorrelation coefficient estimated in error terms
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Synthetic*Post Crisis -0.840*** -2.500*** -2.482*** -2.469*** -0.832***
(0.117) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.121)
Synthetic 0.709*** 2.365*** 2.346*** 2.337*** 0.706***
(0.119) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.123)
Post Crisis -0.130*** -0.288*** -0.289*** -0.290*** -0.123***
(0.019) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.020)
Constant 0.168*** 0.327*** 0.328*** 0.329*** 0.161***
(0.033) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.034)
Observations 363,780 355,530 363,780 333,255 333,255
Number of fundid 1,026 1,026 1,026 1,026 1,026
Controls & Category FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.141 0.137 0.138 0.136 0.141
Rho AR 0.658 0.663 0.661 0.675 0.674
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Table 4.7
Tracking Performance Sensitivity to Market Distress - Fixed Income Subsample
This table explores how tracking performance sensitivity to market distress for fixed income ETFs
varies across time, using a pooled panel regression with AR (1) disturbance. The dependent variable
is the daily absolute tracking difference for fund i on day t. Synthetic is an indicator variable taking
a value of one if fund i is a synthetic ETF. Post Crisis indicates the period after October 2012.
∆V IX (∆V STOXX) is the daily change in CBOE (Euro Stoxx 50) volatility index. ∆NOISE is
the daily change in the liquidity measure proposed by (Hu et al., 2013). ∆TED is the daily change in
TED Spread. ∆PC1 is the daily change in the common factor extracted from all four state variables
using PCA. All continuous explanatory variables in Table 4.3 are included as controls. Category fixed
effect is included. All variables are standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation
of one. Rho AR is the autocorrelation coefficient estimated in error terms from Prais and Winsten
(1954). ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Variables
TE absi,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)








































Synthetic*Post Crisis 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.016 0.019
(0.034) (0.033) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036)
Synthetic -0.030 -0.034 -0.031 -0.023 -0.025
(0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083)
Post Crisis 0.035** 0.034** 0.035** 0.038** 0.042**
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Constant 0.162 0.172 0.163 0.157 0.163
(0.148) (0.148) (0.148) (0.148) (0.149)
Observations 80,281 82,150 79,729 78,861 75,377
Number of fundid 269 269 269 269 269
Controls & Category FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.134 0.135 0.133 0.133 0.135
Rho AR 0.518 0.502 0.522 0.525 0.532
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Table A4.1
Top 20 European ETF Providers
This table list the top 20 European ETF providers ranked by the aggregate family TNA by the end
of 2020. Family TNA is reported in billion USD. The total number of ETF offerings as well as the
number and percentage of fund offerings with synthetic replication are reported. The percentage of
family assets under synthetic structure is reported in the last column.
Rank
Branding Name
Family TNA Number of Number of % Number of % TNA of
(by TNA) ($billion) ETFs Synthetic ETFs Synthetic ETFs Synthetic ETFs
1 iShares 1390.573 587 3 0.51% 0.02%
2 UBS 447.717 424 37 8.73% 22.69%
3 Xtrackers 322.632 342 136 39.77% 23.57%
4 Lyxor 280.834 651 427 65.59% 51.26%
5 Amundi 210.466 350 223 63.71% 47.80%
6 Vanguard 144.023 52 0 0.00% 0.00%
7 Invesco 99.223 179 93 51.96% 59.18%
8 State Street 80.753 138 0 0.00% 0.00%
9 BNP Paribas 49.888 130 57 43.85% 45.68%
10 HSBC 11.790 37 0 0.00% 0.00%
11 Deka 11.589 54 1 1.85% 0.52%
12 JPMorgan 10.180 29 5 17.24% 0.00%
13 PIMCO 9.815 10 0 0.00% 0.00%
14 Natixis 7.741 23 11 47.83% 87.12%
15 Legal & General 7.673 33 4 12.12% 3.49%
16 Credit Suisse 7.540 10 0 0.00% 0.00%
17 Handelsbanken 4.426 18 12 66.67% 4.99%
18 Fidelity 4.071 13 0 0.00% 0.00%
19 VanEck 3.631 23 0 0.00% 0.00%





Panel A: Tracking Error Measures
TE abs Daily absolute difference between the fund return and the benchmark return.
TE sd Standard deviation of fund daily excess returns over the benchmark.
TE sd abs Standard deviation of daily absolute tracking difference.
TE se res Standard Error of residuals from the following regression:
Ri,t = αi + βi,tRBMKi,t + εi,t.
Panel B: Fund Characteristics
Return Volatility Standard deviation of excess returns over the risk-free rate for the prior 21 trading days.
Benchmark Alpha Difference between the daily realized return and the predicted return with beta estimated from
the single index model using a rolling window of 252 trading days.
TNA Total Net Asset managed by the fund obtained from Morningstar.
Age Number of years since the inception of fund.
Expense Ratio Annual report total expense ratio obtained from Morningstar. Including all asset-based cost
incurred by the fund, expressed in percentage of assets.
Bid-Ask Spread Daily Bid-Ask spread obtained from Morningstar.
Dollar Volume Daily trading volume multiplied by daily closing price, both obtained from Morningstar.
Panel C: State Variables
VIX CBOE volatility index (VIX) obtained from FRED, which measures the expectation of stock
market volatility over the coming 30 days.
VSTOXX Euro Stoxx 50 volatility index obtained from Qontigo, which measures the implied volatility
of near term EuroStoxx 50 options.
NOISE A market-wide liquidity measure proposed by Hu et al. (2013).
TED TED spread is calculated as the spread between 3-month LIBOR based on US dollars and
3-month Treasury Bill.
PC1 The first principle component extracted from the above four state variables from principal
component analysis.
Recession An indicator variable taking a a value of one during three NBER defined market recession
periods, namely March 2001 to November 2001, December 2007 to June 2009 and Febuary 2020 to April 2020.
Post Crisis An indicator variable that marks the period June 2009 to December 2020 in the equity subsample,




This thesis studies three related topics in asset management, namely the determinants of
ETF launching decisions, the impact of MF subadvisor turnovers, and the effect of replication
method on ETF tracking efficiencies.
The first essay contributes to the industrial organization literature on the ETF industry.
First, I build upon the literature concerning the industrial organization of the open-ended funds
to show how the decision to launch an ETF is affected by fund characteristics in distinct ways
relative to open-ended MFs. Second, I provide evidence on how market conditions, including
liquidity and market concentration, affect the competition and growth of the ETF industry.
Prior literature has documented the effect of market quality on ETF flows (Clifford et al.,
2014). In this essay, I discuss a more direct channel of the industry expansion, namely the
emergence of new market entrants.
The second essay makes three main contributions. First, we analyse what drives the large
number of hiring and firing events and their resulting impact on mutual funds and sub-advisors’
returns. Second, we study competition among sub-advisors by exploiting the fact that the exis-
tence of sub-advised (or outsourced) funds with two or more sub-advisors effectively introduces
competition into the management of these funds. The presence of more than one sub-advisor
leads to a split of management fees among sub-advisors, which in turn encourages greater mon-
itoring between them and appears to benefit performance (Moreno et al. (2018)). Exploiting
the fact that 32% of the outsourced funds in our sample are managed by two or more sub-
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advisors, we examine if the performance of the incumbent sub-advisors varies when either one
of them is fired or a new sub-advisor is hired and if this performance is different from that of
the recently hired/fired sub-advisors. Finally, we study how actively the fund family monitors
its sub-advisors beyond looking at performance and whether deviating from the investment
mandate affects a subadvisor’s chances of being hired or fired. Rather than outsourcing asset
management to improve returns, advisors just ensure that the mandates given to sub-advisors
are followed.
The third essay contributes to the literature from three perspectives. First, I disentangle
the effect of market distress on ETF tracking efficiencies. Difference in tracking performance
deterioration around market crisis between ETFs with physical and synthetic replication is
attributed to their different reactions to counterparty risk and liquidity risk. Second, the
extensive 20-year sample period allows identification of several physical and synthetic ETF
pairs tracking the same underlying benchmarks, and therefore a like-for-like comparison across
different types of major market crisis. To my best knowledge, this is the first study to make a
direct comparison of ETFs with different replication methods on the same underlying index.1
Third, I identify a structural break in both the level and sensitivity of market-wide tracking
efficiencies after the global financial crisis, and provide empirical evidence on how market
failure evokes tighter risk management.
Finally, I list here several directions for future research. Regarding the first essay, it is
interesting to examine the family decision to launch an ETF versus an index fund. There are
many similarities shared between ETFs and index funds, including their passive and low-cost
nature, as well as their tax efficiencies. While I show that ETF launching decisions are affected
by different factors compared to the active funds, the difference between launching an ETF and
an index fund could be more subtle. Regarding the second essay, we plan to further collect
data on the distribution channel and in-house managing capacity of fund families, to see if
they explain cross-sectional variations in the turnover effects. Regarding the third essay, there
are three directions to extend the research. First, subject to the accessibility of information
regarding the swap counterparties for synthetic ETFs, one could study the relation between
1Meinhardt et al. (2014) explains the scarcity in physical and synthetic ETFs mimicking the same index.
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tracking efficiency and the level of credit risk in the swap contract. Second, an event study on
the different reactions of tracking efficiencies could be carried out around dividend payments
by top constituents of the underlying index. Third, it worth checking if there are cases where
ETFs with synthetic structure before the global financial crisis are transformed into physical
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